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INTRODUCTION 
In this working paper we are going to present a collection of documents that deal with 
the relationship between Hungary and countries of the Middle East. Using the term 
Middle East we refer to the states of the so-called greater Middle East, or what the 
World Bank refers to as the MENA region, meaning Middle East and North Africa
1
. 
We chose to include Sudan in this group since there were tangible relations between 
the two countries during the Cold War era. This chosen unit mainly covers Islamic 
countries with the obvious exception of Israel. However, in accordance with the 
World Bank grouping, we will not deal with those Muslim states that lie east from 
Iran. 
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The history of the Hungarian connections with countries of the Islamic world and the 
Middle East can be traced back to several centuries. Even though there was no 
constant Islamic presence in Hungary the country got into touch from time to time 
with Muslim communities and states where Islam was the dominant religion even 
before the 20
th
 century. After the breakup of the Austro-Hungarian empire in 1918, 
only a marginal Muslim presence remained in the country.  
As Hungary became part of the Soviet Bloc after World War II, the country needed to 
give heed to the line that was directed from Moscow. Since the countries of the 
Middle East were not significant for Moscow under Stalin, this early period cannot be 
characterised by intensive relations between the Soviet Bloc-countries and those of 
the Middle East. It is worth mentioning the Zhdanov doctrine, dividing  the World 
into two camps, under which it was difficult to deal with countries that were not part 
of either blocks, and those Middle Eastern countries that gained their independence by 
this time did not play a significant role in the new bipolar world. Besides, before 1953 
a number of territories of the Middle East were still under direct or indirect control of 
the colonialist European powers. Moreover, at that time the focus of the Kremlin’s 
attention in world politics was in Europe and Asia (Korea) which is another cause 
why the Middle East was not of high importance to the Soviet Union and her satellite 
states. Hungary was no exception to this trend, the country’s relationship with Middle 
Eastern countries were marginal during this period. The only exception in the region 
was Czechoslovakia that took a significant role in supplying weapons to Israel during 
the 1948-1949 conflict. Significant connections between Hungary and the Middle 
East restarted only after the death of Stalin in 1953, but a few years were needed for 
closer and more tangible connections to be rebuilt after years of neglect. 
The following parts of the introduction will present the documents in 5 thematic 
groups. Firstly, we deal with the subject of political relations between the Middle 
East, Hungary and the Soviet Bloc. Secondly, we will cover those documents that 
deal with economic relations. As we will demonstrate below, the region was a 
significant export-market for Hungary. Afterwards, we will focus on military 
cooperation. Export from Hungary to Middle Eastern countries played a major role in 
this spectrum as well. Fourthly, we discuss the relationship between Hungary and the 
communist parties of the region. Finally, we will present documents that deal with the 
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Iraq-Iran war that lasted for almost eight years between September 1980 and August 
1988. 
 
1. Political relations 
Before turning our attention to the archive documents that deal with political relations 
between the Middle Eastern countries and Hungary, let us see, in which countries of 
the region Hungary established diplomatic missions
2
. As one of the main partners in 
the region, Egypt was the first country Hungary came into contact with after World 
War II in 1947. However, diplomatic relations with Iraq were established as early as 
1937. Nevertheless, establishing diplomatic relations is only the first step that is 
followed by their build up until the point of having a permanent representative or 
envoy in the given country. Egypt is also an exception, since the first and last minister 
of the Hungarian Republic, Viktor Csornoky arrived there in 1947 only to be called 
back and later executed by the Rákosi regime in 1948. Then, it was only in 1957 
when a new Hungarian envoy was delegated to Cairo by the Hungarian Peoples’s 
Republic, proclaimed in 1949. Israel was the second country, with which Hungary 
established diplomatic relations in 1948, however after the six-day war in 1967 these 
official links were cut-off, only to be restored just before the regime change in 
September, 1989.  In 1951, the connections were taken up with Iran, but it was only in 
1964 when the Foreign Ministry could open an Embassy in Tehran. Syria and Sudan 
are similar cases, with diplomatic relations established in 1954 and 1956, and 
Embassy openings in 1961 and 1966, respectively. With Tunisia and Morocco, the 
case was simpler. Embassies there opened in the year of the establishment of 
diplomatic relations, namely in 1956 for Tunisia and 1959 for Morocco. Yemen is 
another example for a country, where Hungary managed to set up links in 1959, but 
Embassies were only opened in 1963 in Sana’a and in 1968 in Aden respectively. 
Hungarian Embassies were open in Somalia in 1960, in Algeria in 1962, in Kuwait in 
1963 and in Jordan in 1964. The last country of the region was Libya, where relations 
and an Embassy were set up only in 1967. 
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And now let us take a look at how some of the relationships between countries of the 
region and Hungary developed after 1953. 
The death of the Soviet dictator did not bring a prompt and tangible policy change 
vis-vis the Middle East in Moscow, it was only in 1955 that the first deals regarding 
the selling of weapons to Egypt were agreed. Nevertheless, we can see an 
abandonment of the Zhdanov doctrine for a more global approach. With the 
stabilisation of the situation in the Europe from the early 1960s, the Soviet Union and 
the countries of the Eastern Bloc could turn their attention to other regions as well.  
The policy of the Soviet Bloc in the post-Stalin era cannot be characterised by a 
monochrome red. One can rather see many shades of this colour when examining the 
foreign policy of the countries allied with Moscow. Conducting an effective 
diplomacy in this region proved to be a difficult task sometimes for the socialist 
countries, as they called themselves. The main problem was that although many 
countries were deemed as “friendly” with a “progressive” government, this did not 
mean that these states were socialist in a classical Soviet sense. It is true, one could 
see numerous leftist elements in the policies of these “friendly” Middle Eastern 
countries, such as land reform or nationalisation of key industries. However, often 
these very same governments spared little effort to marginalise their national 
communist parties in order to further their grip on power. This meant a considerable 
burden in bilateral relations, because Hungary as well as other socialist countries 
maintained strong connections with the communist parties of these Middle Eastern 
countries. In many cases the close links between the Hungarian Socialist Workers 
Party (HSWP) with the national communist parties, resulted in strained relations in 
regards to the governments of these states, such as Syria and Egypt
3
. For instance, the 
Hungarian diplomatic body refused to accept the idea that the Syrian government was 
building socialism. The Syrian government was pushing to have this recognised in 
joint statements issued after an ambassadorial bilateral meeting in 1973. However, the 
Hungarian delegation refused to recognise this, thus eventually the joint statement 
was not published.  The case was different with the Czechoslovakian delegation that 
agreed to a similar Syrian initiative and thus a joint statement was produced. What we 
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can see here is an interesting example of significant difference in the foreign policy 
approach by two loyal allies of the USSR. In this case the Hungarian delegation kept 
a closer line to the communist ideology, whereas the Czechoslovakian decision 
betrays more pragmatism.  
Hungary’s relationship with Egypt was one of the closest in the region. Nasser 
planned to visit Hungary as early as 1956. However, because of the unfolding Suez 
crises and because of his meeting with Tito and Nehru a couple of weeks earlier, he  
cancelled his Eastern-European trip during which he would have visited Hungary 
too
4
.  This clearly indicates the tightrope act Nasser played in order to avoid 
confronting either of the super powers. He wanted to strengthen his image as a non-
aligned leader, not leaning towards the Eastern Bloc amid the stifling atmosphere that 
preceded the Suez crises. That might be the reason why he needed to cancel his 
planned trip to the region. 
Egypt was very understanding towards the Hungarian government as far as the so-
called ‘Hungarian question’ was concerned in the UN after the 1956 Hungarian 
revolution.
5
 The Egyptian president and his government supported the Hungarian 
government in the UN according to Document 1. This report suggests Nasser’s 
opinion was that the Hungarian question was used only for propaganda purposes. 
Nasser drew a parallel between Hungary and Jordan in regards to the US role. He 
pointed out that the US and her allies did not raise the ‘Jordanian question’ of 1957, 
when the government, supporting Arab unity was ousted in a short conflict by the 
king and his troops. 
The Bloc countries’ diplomatic missions received regular foreign policy updates from 
the Soviet ambassadors in the capitals of the Middle East. A good example is 
Document 5 which gives insight on the main concerns of Soviet foreign policy in the 
1960s. During the negotiations between Nasser and Prime Minister Kosigin in May, 
1966, all the topical issues of World policy were discussed and the question of China 
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came up as well. Kosigin rejected Nasser’s comment on the crisis of the “progressive 
forces” allegedly caused by the Sino-Soviet split.  Besides, he labelled  China’s policy 
as one of an adventurer’s. As for the Middle East situation, Kosigin remarkably 
warned Nasser against a preventive war on Israel, hardly a year before the six day war 
in 1967, arguing that” real danger in the case of a possible war is not Israel”. The 
Soviet Prime Minister also told Nasser that “Israel is not in a position to be able to 
make a nuclear bomb and launch a nuclear attack against the Arab countries. 
Therefore, it is not necessary for the UAR to begin nuclear tests….” 
 Another significant point is that the Soviet delegation could not give a positive 
answer for the Egyptian request for wheat imports. This clearly showed the limits of 
possible Soviet support for these countries. Moscow was able to give financial and 
military support for “friendly” governments in the Middle East, but as far as food aid 
was concerned, Moscow’s hands were tied due to the inefficiency of the Soviet 
agricultural sector. As we will demonstrate below, the Eastern Bloc could offer 
industrial and military support for these countries. Moreover, during the 1960s, 70s 
and 80s, Hungary and other Bloc countries hosted a number of students in the tertiary 
education. These former students are still considered the backbone of the informal 
relations with the countries in the region until the present days as well. Besides, 
Hungary sent several industrial experts to these countries to help kick-start industrial 
projects. (Egypt dominated the scene in this case as well.) 
The question of Palestine came to the fore again after the successful coup in Iraq in 
1957. According to Hungarian diplomacy, both general Qasim and Nasser wanted to 
use the issue for political purposes
6
. Document 9 falls in line with the Soviet Bloc 
policy of the time. It points out that the ever-stronger Palestine Liberation 
Organisation (PLO) and Fatah
7
 mean a challenge for the Arab governments who had 
used the Palestinian question for their own political purposes so far. The report is 
favourable to the PLO regarding it as an anti-imperialist force fighting Israel that is 
vilified in the report. The watershed regarding the Soviet-Palestinian relationship was 
the 1970 visit of Yasser Arafat in Moscow. Before this event, Hungary treated some 
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injured Palestinians and accepted a small number of Palestinian students, but after 
Arafat’s trip, Moscow indicated that Hungary should deepen relations with the PLO. 
Not long after the international recognition of the PLO in 1974, the Office of the 
Palestine Liberation Organisation opened its doors in Budapest. As a result of 
Hungarian policy favouring the PLO and its dominant member organisation, Fatah, 
Yasser Arafat visited Hungary several times in the 1970s and 1980s. Hungary needed 
good relations with the PLO to maintain close contacts with other Arab states, in 
order to keep up the flow of goods and people between Hungary and the region. In 
this aspect, good relations with the PLO were the token of strong connections with the 
wider Middle East. 
As Hungary cut diplomatic ties with Israel after the 6-day war in 1967, Hungarian 
diplomacy was forced to perform another balancing act. As the country had a tangible 
Jewish population, there were many connections between the two countries outside 
the political sphere. Besides, trade relations with Israel meant much needed western 
foreign currency for Hungary. Consequently, despite the fact that Hungary did not 
have official diplomatic relations with Israel after 1967, this did not mean zero 
relations between the two countries at all. Document 11 deals with the financial 
support given to the Israeli Communist Party (ICP) that was having financial 
difficulties. The report from 1971 states that 13,000 USD support had already been 
given to the ICP, and an additional 5,000 USD should be transferred to them. The 
furthering of relations between the ICP and Hungary is demonstrated in Document 16 
according to which in 1981 the ICP requested the Hungarian government to ease the 
restriction of the travel of Israeli tourist to Hungary. As the ICP held a monopoly of 
organising such travels, it meant a reasonable income for the Party. The report points 
out that such enhanced travel arrangements had been already organised between the 
ICP and Bulgaria. This is another example of the relative autonomy of the foreign 
policy of the states allied with the Soviet Union. As we pointed out earlier this was a 
delicate balancing-act since the majority of Hungary’s trade in the region was 
conducted with Arab states antagonistic to Israel. 
Thanks to the briefings by Soviet ambassadors to top Hungarian politicians, the 
Hungarian political leadership was aware of the challenges the Soviet Union was 
facing during the Cold War. As Document 7 describes, Moscow was interested in 
détente as much as the USA. In relations to the 6-day war in 1967, the report states 
 8 
that the Soviet leadership was interested in the warming of relations between the two 
superpowers since, besides the problems caused by China, the Soviet Union itself had 
major domestic challenges such as raising the living-standard and introducing 
reforms. The report suggests that down to the Vietnam conflict, the US was also 
interested in the amelioration of relations between the two blocks. The possible 
predictions in case of a radical change in the bipolar situation is also worth noting. 
The Soviet Union had considerable leverage on the Egyptian government too at the 
end of the 1960s, and in the early 1970s. Having a look at the negotiations upon 
which Document 10 reports, we can see that the Soviet diplomats were able to 
convince their Egyptian counterparts about accepting the Rogers Plan, a US attempt 
in late 1969 and early 1970 to end the stand-off between Israel and Egypt. The Soviet 
Union also managed to moderate relations between Iran and Egypt, another good 
example of the Soviet influence on Egypt and in the region. Besides, in this case we 
can see a notable instance of realpolitik and détente in the converging interest of the 
Soviet Union and the USA in regard to the management of the Arab-Israeli relations.  
Despite the fact that we emphasised the multi-shaded foreign policy of the countries 
of the Eastern Bloc, Document 12 is a case in point for the Kremlin’s defining the 
future strategy of the states allied with the Soviet Union in relation to the Middle East. 
With the losing of Egypt in the 1970s, the strategy focused on other Arab states, such 
as Syria and Iraq. 
The intensive connections between the countries of the Warsaw Pact and countries of 
the Middle East resulted in the former countries’ thinking about initiating the 
establishment of official connections between the Warsaw Pact and the Arab League 
in 1987. As Document 31 shows, there were many obstacles in front of this 
endeavour. First of all, the institutional structure of the Warsaw Pact was not designed 
to maintain relations with other multilateral international organisations. For this to 
happen, deep institutional reform would have been needed. The question as why the 
Warsaw Pact and why not the COMECON should have been the organisation that 
would get into touch with the Arab League was brought up by the Czechoslovak 
delegation. As the initiative for closer connection between the two organisations came 
too late, nothing materialised from it. However, it shows how the leaders of the 
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socialist countries wanted to further open their export markets to the Middle-Eastern 
region during a time of ever increasing economic hardship. 
 
2. Economic relations 
The region was a major market for Hungarian exports
8
 from the 1960s. In fact, the 
Arab countries meant the biggest market for Hungary where it could trade in US 
Dollars, resulting in a positive trading balance in regards to the region
9
. Hungary 
exported machinery and other industrial goods, as well as weapons. In return, the 
country imported raw materials and agricultural goods such as cotton. Since Hungary 
faced a constant shortage of western currency down to a continuous trade deficit, 
trade with the countries of the Middle East did not only mean political influence but 
was also an economic necessity for the country.  Commerce with the region was also 
a chance for Hungarian industry to balance the predominance of agriculture, which 
showed massive excess in the country’s export mix.  
However, commercial connections were marred by a number of problems. One of 
them was that before the 1973 oil crisis, trade was conducted through a clearing 
system. This, paired up with several barter agreements, meant that the country could 
not always get the much-needed hard currency out of these deals. Indeed, the pre-
1973 commercial relationship with the “friendly” countries of the region was founded 
more on political then commercial grounds. During the 1960s as the socialist 
countries’ economies were still growing relatively fast, governments of the Soviet 
Bloc usually gave loans to developing nations. 
A Foreign Ministry memorandum in 1965 exposed this problem in the following way:  
“The demand of better loan-conditions can be experienced in our relationship with Arab 
countries and with developing nations generally. The foreign currency conditions of these 
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countries are further deteriorating, we will have to count with their increasing demand for 
loans.”10 
Because of this problem and because the Hungarian industry’s inability to absorb 
large amounts of these imported raw materials such as cotton, some of these imports 
had to be re-exported. As a result, prices in the world market experienced a downward 
pressure that put the very countries, which wanted to benefit from these trade 
relations, in a difficult position. Besides, the reliability of these partnerships was not 
as good as those of Hungary had with westerns countries. The following excerpt is a 
good example of the numerous challenges of Hungary’s trade relations with the 
region.  
“Our trade-relations are developing, but the biggest problem is that the majority of these 
countries cannot offer goods that are useful for our domestic economy and could offset 
the value of our exports, thus on the one hand we conduct re-export, a major cause of 
complain of the partner countries (in regards to the UAR, Morocco), or they regularly 
intervene since we do not buy from them (in case of Iraq, Lebanon and Jordan).”
11
 
Thus the states of the region could be put into two groups: there were intensive trade-
relations with the so-called “friendly” countries (Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Lybia and later 
Syria), but there was hardly any flow of goods in regards to those states that were 
closer to the western sphere of influence (Saudi-Arabia, Kuwait, etc.). There were 
some states that fell between these two groups, such as Lebanon, Tunisia, Morocco 
and Syria. In case of these countries close political relations as well as commercial 
connections could not be very intense either. 
 
3. Military cooperation 
In a number of cases, commercial relations between the Soviet Bloc countries and 
“friendly” or “progressive” regimes in the region had a “special” dimension. 
“Special” was the codename for military in the Soviet Bloc official jargon, so 
“special” relations usually meant exporting military equipment to these countries.  
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The first attempts to import military hardware from Hungary were made by Egypt as 
early as 1947. Egyptian politicians contacted the Hungarian envoy inquiring about the 
possibility of such shipments
12
. No reaction was given to this request. A few years 
later, in 1951 Amransy, the deputy of the Egyptian envoy to Hungary contacted the 
Hungarian government, with the same intentions. When Andor Berei, the first deputy 
of the Ministry of Foreign affairs pointed out that Hungary does not produce the 
heavy weaponry Egypt was interested in. Amransy replied that Egypt was interested 
in any kind of available weaponry
13
. It seems, after the 1948 Israeli victory, Egypt 
was desperate to obtain any kind of armament. However, we do not have information 
about any deals that actually materialised before 1953. The first arms shipments from 
the Eastern Bloc were sent to Egypt in 1955, but this time, Hungary did not play an 
active role, the main players were Czechoslovakia and Poland. Czechoslovakia was 
the main exporter besides the Soviet Union. As János Kádár pointed out in July, 1967 
in Document 6/B regarding a possible arms shipment to the region:  
“Here, we need to “conspire” with the Soviet Union. We need to say that this is the 
situation, we have not responded yet, and they should say what they think. Or, if you 
will, we can expand the range of participants in the consultation, because the actual 
suppliers were two socialist countries.” 
Thus, as Egypt and other countries gravitated towards the Soviet Union, from the 
mid-1950s, Hungary joined other Bloc countries and started to deliver weapons and 
other military hardware to Cairo and other “friendly” Arab governments (Documents 
6/A, 6/B and Document 8). 
Document 8 also gives an insight in the complexity of links between some “friendly” 
Arab states and the Eastern Bloc. In this Foreign Ministry report from 1969, the 
behaviour of the Egyptian politicians is very telling. It demonstrates that members of 
the Egyptian ruling elite had great leverage over the governments of the Bloc. If the 
Soviet Union and her allies wanted to keep these countries close, they needed to fulfil 
their demands. This report also shed light on signs of the upcoming rupture between 
the Soviet Bloc and Egypt. The pressure for shipping the demanded military 
equipment was so great that the Soviet and the Hungarian leadership decided to 
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develop certain manufacturing capacity for those systems that were not available in 
any of the Soviet Bloc countries. In this aspect, the arrogant behaviour of Egypt 
meant technology transfer and additional investment in the Hungarian defence 
industry. Besides, it is worth pointing out that although the Warsaw Pact conventional 
forces were superior in dimensions such as headcount and the number of tanks to 
NATO, even in the 1960s the Eastern Bloc countries had difficulty in supplying 
sophisticated military equipment such as locators (radars) to “friendly” countries in 
need. 
During the 1973 Yom Kippur war Hungary was playing an active role in supporting 
the Arab states. János Kádár, the leader of the HSWP received a confidential report 
from Moscow about the imminent attack in the afternoon of 5 October, just one day 
before the start of the offensive
14
. On 9 October 1973, when the Israeli counter-
offensive gathered momentum on the Golan-Heights, the Syrian leadership turned to 
the Soviet Bloc (except for Romania) for support, which they received. The 
Hungarian decision-makers decided the dispatching of 90 T-54 tanks, 12 Mig-21 
planes and F-13 fighters with rockets, anti-tank weapons and ammunition to the 
Syrian army via the air-lift provided by the Soviet Union
15
. Cuba sent personnel of an 
armoured regiment and 10 well-trained pilots. North-Korea also sent a number of 
pilots, since Soviet advisers regarded Arab pilots unprepared for the flying missions
16
. 
Hungarian army personnel did not take part in the actual fighting, but a number of 
Soviet soldiers did, mainly as part of the anti-aircraft defence. Two Soviet “advisers” 
were decorated after the conflict with the merit of the Hero of the Soviet Union, since 
they were very successful in shooting down Israeli planes
17
. It seems Soviet support 
for the Arab states was much more significant than US support for Israel in this 
conflict. 
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4. Relations with local Communist parties 
The close connection between the HSWP and the communist parties of the region 
provide us with valuable insight concerning several domestic issues of the Middle 
Eastern politics of that time. During the Cold War era the Communist parties of 
“friendly” states enjoyed various degrees of freedom. As Document 3 shows, the 
Communists played a significant role in the 1958 coup d’état in Iraq. The detailed 
information provided by the Iraqi communists sheds new light on the dynamics of the 
coup. It reveals that general Qasim, in accordance with the Iraqi Communists, turned 
down the first possibility of a coup in 1957, since he and his Communist allies 
deemed the situation immature for a take-over. It is also interesting to note how the 
military led by general Qasim could play an independent and initiative role in the 
process of the coup. This demonstrates the total lack of control of the political parties 
over the military, which is characteristic of young weak states even today. 
As mentioned earlier, the Eastern Bloc countries had very close links with the 
national Communist parties of any given foreign partner, sometimes closer than with 
the government of the country in question. These links did not break down even in a 
case when the activity of a given Communist party was considered incorrect or even 
damaging. Document 4, dealing with the domestic politics of Algeria after the coup of 
1965 is a good example of how the Soviet Bloc states had to manoeuvre between 
realpolitik and foreign policy based on ideological solidarity from time to time.  It is 
interesting to see that the Hungarian embassy in Algiers, receiving information 
mainly from the Algerian Communist Party (ACP) became very critical about the 
coup d’état.  Meanwhile the Ministry of Foreign Affairs led a more objective line, 
thanks to the numerous channels of information, thus it disapproved that the ACP 
decided not to participate in the new government
18
.  The memorandum is rather 
critical concerning the ACP’s handling of the political process after the coup.  It 
condemns the fact that the ACP is fractured and chose not to get involved in the new 
government, despite the fact that Boumedienne, the leader of the successful coup 
offered them ministerial posts. Even though the author of the report is worried about 
the possibility of the shift to the right in the Algerian government, this report 
demonstrates the dilemma of the Hungarian diplomatic body. By this time, the two 
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countries had several business contracts with each other. Thus, the condemnation of 
the coup could have meant the breaking of these links as well between the two 
countries, which would have had negative effects on Hungarian external trade. It is 
clear that the relationship between the Eastern Bloc countries and the “friendly” 
Middle Eastern states was not harmonious all the time. From time to time there was a 
crackdown on members of the Communist parties of the region, which strained the 
relationship between the countries. However, these periods of strained relations did 
not always reach the public sphere of the Socialist Bloc. As an example, we could 
mention Nasser’s turn on the Communist party in Egypt, which took off in 1958 with 
his speech in Port Said. Not long after, a report from 1959 produced by the Hungarian 
embassy in Cairo described the Egyptian regime as “resembling the Nazi regime in 
Germany as far as their methods are concerned”19. However, there was no public 
condemnation about the maltreatment of Egyptian Communists until Khrushchev’s 
speech in early 1959, but even this speech did not trigger any further action on the 
diplomatic front. It seems the interest of keeping Egypt close to the Eastern Bloc 
overrode ideological solidarity with the Egyptian Communists. This demonstrates that 
although the Communist connection was a very strong and deep one, its priority was 
not absolute, rather only an element of a complex foreign-policy equitation. 
 
5. The Soviet Bloc and the Iraq-Iran war 
The Hungarian documents on the Iraq-Iran war shed light on the challenges the 
country and the Eastern Bloc were facing in regards to that conflict. The revolution in 
Iran in 1979 meant that one of the major bastions of the American encirclement 
policy towards the Soviet Union turned against its former ally. At the same time, the 
fact that Iran did not start to reach out towards the Eastern Bloc was disillusioning and 
worrying for the Communist   states. It was worrying, since as Document 15 
indicates, at the early stages of the conflict, Iraq was slipping out from the Soviet field 
of influence. This report predicted that with the end of the war the American influence 
would become even more significant.  
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Document 14 seems to contradict the previous analysis of Hungarian diplomats. The 
report on the visit of the special envoy of Saddam Hussein to Hungary in October 
1980 notes that the intention of the Iraqi leadership is to free the Gulf-region from any 
US influence. However, the Iraqi National Charter proclaimed in 1980 states that the 
aim is to keep distance from both superpowers and to keep them away from the 
region. This was a clear demonstration of the regional ambitions of the Iraqi 
leadership that eventually urged both superpowers to find a country to balance Iraq. In 
the case of the Soviet Union this country was Syria and later Iran. 
Document 15 deals extensively with the causes behind the souring of relations 
between the Iraqi and the Soviet leadership. Among others, one can read about the 
deteriorating political environment of the Iraqi Communist Party and Iraq’s overtures 
towards the Western Bloc. 
Iraq’s negative attitude towards the Soviet Union and the Iraqi Communists resulted 
in the halting of arms shipments to the country. This posed a major challenge to 
Hungary, since by the early 1980s, Iraq became the biggest trading partner of 
Hungary in the developing world (Document 20), and the halting of “special” exports 
could have led to deteriorating commercial relations in other sectors as well. Iraq’s 
need for weapons and ammunition, however pushed the country to change her attitude 
towards the Eastern Bloc.  
Document 17 gives a good example of the efforts Iraqi diplomacy made on a number 
of fronts regarding the Soviet sphere of influence in the early 1980s. In this document 
the Iraqi deputy prime minister visiting Hungary in May, 1981 states that his country 
would like to strengthen the relationship with the Socialist countries.  Iraq badly 
needed the resumption of the weapons shipments at that time, therefore the delegation 
offered to open further economic sectors to the Communist countries, such as the 
petro-chemical sector. This new direction in Iraqi foreign policy eventually proved to 
be successful. According to Document 18, one year after the visit of the Iraqi 
delegation in Budapest, the Soviet leadership decided to lift the embargo regarding 
military hardware in 1981. 
Document 23 is notable firstly, since it is another good example of strained relations 
due to the harassment of Communist activists in Iran. Secondly, this document from 
1983 proves that Iran received Soviet military support as well. In this regard, Soviet 
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policy towards the two warring states is parallel to the foreign policy of the United 
States. It seems the Soviet Union had its very own policy of double-containment.  
The fact that the Soviet ambassador asked for the help of Hungarian diplomacy in 
warming up the relations with Iran in 1981, shows us the significance of smaller states 
in the Soviet Empire. It seems the Soviet leadership used the services of its allies 
when its own foreign policy staff could not achieve the desired results. This sheds 
further light on the proactive role the allied states played in regard to external 
relations of the Eastern Bloc. One example for such a diplomatic activity is Document 
32. This report covers the high-profile visit of a Hungarian government delegation led 
by prime minister Károly Grósz to Iran in 1988. This visit was made in return to a 
visit by Iranian politicians in Hungary two years earlier. Besides, since Hungary 
participated in the activity of the UN supervisory forces charged with overseeing the 
ceasefire between Iraq and Iran, the visit was even more important for Iran. The 
Iranian politicians understood that one road to Moscow leads via Budapest, so they 
went out of their way to emphasise the role of the Iranian revolution in breaking up 
the encirclement of the Soviet Union. During the negotiations the need for closer 
bilateral connections was raised, but because of the eventual fall of the Communist 
regime in Hungary, this never materialised. 
One also has to point out that the Iraqi efforts to keep the superpowers outside the 
region backfired completely, since it only resulted further involvement of these states  
both in Iraq and in Iran.  
Documents 24 and 25 give valuable insights in the internal issues of an Iraq that was 
tangled up in a conflict that would not finish. Indeed, the Iraqi regime wanted to end 
the war quickly, but that plan never materialised. These two documents describe the 
effects of the on-going military struggle and the deteriorating strategic situation. By 
1984, in five years time, Iraq, a country of previously promising regional 
perspectives, was then struggling to keep the conflict under control. Thus, Saddam 
Hussein eventually failed to realize his goal of obtaining a regional power status and 
keeping the US away from the conflict and from the region as a whole.  
Studying these documents one would suggest that the policy of double-containment 
during the 1980s was successful. The worsening military situation paired up with a 
war economy in a downward spiral questioned the future regional perspective of the 
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regime in the longer term. The dynamics of domestic politics reveal how the regime 
softened its line amid the growing difficulties of the population. The main goal was to 
kick-start the economy again by resuming the petroleum exports. However, an ever-
deepening division between the ruling elite and the rest of the society and expansion 
of the informal economy clearly demonstrated the growing difficulties of ordinary 
Iraqis people. 
Re-establishment of diplomatic relations between Iraq and the US in November 1984 
did not concern the Hungarian diplomats in Baghdad, as Document 27 shows. The 
relatively passive American attitude towards Iraq ensured that the country would 
remain a stable market for weapons shipments from the Eastern Bloc. This report 
regards Iran as a strategic partner of the United States, a persisting point of view of 
the Hungarian diplomats residing in Baghdad. Besides, as Document 28 further 
suggests, as the war dragged on and as the relations between the Soviet Union and the 
United States started the reach a new phase, the conflict between Iraq and Iran 
became of secondary or ever tertiary importance for the US. The need to somehow 
stabilise the conflict in order to enable the US to focus on other major global events 
can be read out from these documents. 
Document 29 from 1986 gives us a rare insight into the dynamics of a dictatorship in 
crisis. This Hungarian embassy report sheds light on a number of survival tactics of 
the regime, such as how Saddam Hussein decided to stay in the background during 
the difficult times of the conflict and how ancient religious and folk myths were 
“rediscovered” by the government in order to forge unity among the population. 
Document 19 covers the effects of the Israeli bombing of the Osirak nuclear site in 
Iraq in 1981. The report suggests that the Israeli operation would have devastating 
effects for Egyptian foreign policy. The author of the report emphasises the decreased 
international latitude of Egypt after the Camp David accords. According the report, 
the bombing of Osirak came at the worst possible time, as Egypt was on the verge of 
retaking its place among the Arab countries. This military strike threatened to 
complicate Egypt’s position in the region. This sheds some light on the wider effects 
of the Israeli operation. This report proves that the bombing of Osirak should be 
examined in a wider regional perspective. Thus, according to the authors a stable Iraq 
could play a tangible role in resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 
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Document 33 from 1987 describes the internal issues of Iraqi politics. As the situation 
deteriorated, the opposition in Iraq became ever more active. The report gives us 
some valuable information on the Kurdish and Shi’ite opposition and their role in the 
conflict. Even though the situation for the ruling party was very dim, there was no real 
alternative to the ruling regime, according to the report. 
Document 21 deals with unfavourable military situation for Iraq and its possible 
political and economic consequences in 1982. Since Iraq was a key economic partner 
for Hungary, the weakening strategic position of Iraq could have meant a fall in 
Hungarian exports. Nevertheless, the report emphasised that Hungary’s ordinary and 
“special”(military) trade relations, had grown in the previous years. 
The increasingly difficult Iraqi situation in regard to Iran lead the country to seek 
early exit from the war in 1983. Document 22 covers the attempts of the Iraqi 
ambassador in Budapest to this effect. The ambassador suggested Hungary should 
play a bigger role in moderating between the two warring countries. The ambassador 
also emphasised that the Soviet Union should also play a more active role in the 
region, since according to him, the politics of the region were dominated by the US 
and the division between Arab countries. 
Document 26 reports on the negotiations between the Hungarian deputy foreign 
minister and top Iraqi politicians in Baghdad in 1984. During these negotiations Tariq 
Aziz, first deputy Prime Minister and minister of foreign affairs betrayed the dire 
situation of Iraq. Besides trying to demonize the Iranian leadership, claiming that they 
were mentally insane, he voiced Iraq’s concern about the shipment of arms from the 
Soviet Bloc to Iran. He suggested the Soviet Bloc was able to influence the Iranian 
position by introducing sanctions against the country. 
Document 30 deals with the internal politics of Iraq in 1986. As the balance of 
military power shifted in favour of Iran, the Iraqi political system started to teeter. 
Riots by the Shi’ite community were more severe. Besides, cracks were visible within 
to the ruling regime itself. It is interesting to see how Saddam Hussein managed to 
eliminate all the potential threats coming from inside and outside the party. According 
to the report, he managed to marginalise all possible rivals within the Baath party. 
The mentioning of Egyptian guest workers returning to their homeland is also very 
telling about an increasingly deteriorating Iraqi economic situation. 
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While Document 30 covers the situation of the Iraqi society and economy, Document 
32 focuses more on military issues. Although, both Iraq and Iran showed signs of 
fatigue, the situation was evidently in Iran’s favour by 1987. As Iraq failed to 
convince the Arab states to regard the war against her neighbour as a defensive 
struggle, the country could not unite the Arab countries behind her. The report also 
mentions the deteriorating relationship between Iraq and the Gulf countries, the main 
financial supporters of the Iraqi military struggle. The difficult Iraqi situation forced 
the leadership to look for support wherever it was possible. This was the reason for an 
attempt for rapprochement with Syria. 
By the end of the conflict in 1988, both warring countries became increasingly 
isolated. Iraq could never ensure the unified support of the Arab states, and Iran 
turning more assertive due to its military successes started to worry her neighbours 
and the great powers as well. Both Documents 30 and 34 deal with the above 
problem, while giving some insight into domestic issues on both sides as well. Iran’s 
increasing confidence led to an extension of her influence in the Gulf and the straight 
of Hormuz. This was worrying not only for the countries in the region, but also for the 
Soviet Union, having a number of military and civilian ships in the region. The hostile 
attitude of the Soviet leadership can be felt from Document 32. This explains why the 
top Iranian politicians were at pains to ensure the goodwill of the country towards to 
the Eastern Bloc upon the high-profile visit of Hungarian politicians, mentioned 
above (Document 34). As for Iraq, the country that initiated the war, became 
increasingly isolated. Document 30 describes this isolation, both in a regional and in a 
wider global aspect. 
 
Conclusion 
To sum up, we can state that the relationship between Hungary and the countries of 
the Middle East could be characterised by certain dichotomies.  
As mentioned above, the states of the region in question could be put into two 
categories. “Friendly” states had closer connections with the Soviet Bloc, and 
naturally with Hungary as well. However, with those countries that were in the US 
sphere of influence connections were rather shallow. 
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Another dichotomy can be found in regards to relations with the “friendly” states of 
the region. On the surface, relations with these countries were cordial. However, the  
documents published here show another, more complex picture. Under the surface, 
both Hungary and the Middle Eastern countries tried to profit as much from these 
relations as possible. This intention of profit maximization on both sides lead to 
strains in relations on a regular basis. Good examples for this are the difficulties that 
occurred between Egypt and Hungary in regard to the military support in 1969 
(Document 8). 
One might ask why these strains in relations did not come to the fore. The reason may 
be a certain degree of interdependence that characterised these relations. On the one 
hand, Hungary was in constant shortage of hard currency during the Cold War years. 
The fact that the currencies of the Soviet Bloc were not convertible and the unofficial 
social contract between the post-1956 HSWP and Hungarian society was based on 
constant amelioration of living standards, the Hungarian government was in constant 
need of Western convertible currency in order to import those goods the economies of 
the Eastern Bloc were unable to produce. Consequently, the Hungarian government 
needed good relations with the countries of the Middle East, since these were markets 
where Hungarian goods could be sold for US Dollars. As these countries were happy 
to purchase those Hungarian goods that were otherwise uncompetitive on western 
markets, economies of the Middle Eastern countries meant an opportunity for the 
Hungarian government to compensate for the otherwise negative trade-balance. 
Indeed, exporting manufactured goods to the Middle East also meant an attempt to 
rebalance the export mix of Hungary that was heavily dominated by agricultural 
products.  
On the other hand, these “friendly” countries needed not only military hardware, but 
also industrial products and expertise to be able to decrease dependence from the 
western dominated global economy. In the post-colonialist, and highly nationalist 
atmosphere of the time, good relations with the countries of the Soviet Bloc were of 
high importance in order to have economic progress in these rather underdeveloped 
economies. The documents reveal that the pursuing of self-interest and the 
interdependence mentioned above, encouraged both sides to keep these sometimes 
fierce debates away from the spotlight, giving them greater room for manoeuvre 
behind closed doors. However, even these transfers of hard currency could not stop 
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Hungary’s indebtedness to increase in the long term after the 1970s, which reached a 
critical level by the early 1980s. Indeed, Hungary’s financial situation was so dire, it 
needed a loan of 100 million USD from China to be able to pay the financial 
contribution needed to join the IMF and the World Bank in 1982. The desperate 
financial situation may be a reason why the Hungarian government decided to deepen 
economic relations with Israel, even if this meant putting good connections with 
friendly Arab states at risk. 
With these economic necessities in mind, it is fair to say that realpolitik gained the 
upper hand many times. Not denying the fact that the connections between the 
communist parties of the region and the ones of the Soviet Bloc and Hungary were 
rather close, these parties were let down if the interest of the Eastern Bloc demanded 
good relations with the government of a given country.  However, in a number of 
cases, the amelioration of relations between Arab countries and the Soviet Bloc meant 
greater freedom for local Communists to operate as well. Thus the local Communist 
parties were sometimes used as bargaining chips in the complex bi- and multilateral 
relations between the Middle Eastern countries and the Eastern Bloc. 
Finally, we would like to emphasise again Hungary’s room for manoeuvre as far as 
foreign policy is concerned. Keeping in mind that the government needed to keep 
itself to the line defined by Moscow, within this framework following the policy of 
constructive loyalty, Hungarian diplomacy could pursue its own interests as well.
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This supports the idea of a multi-layered foreign policy as far as the countries of the 
Soviet Bloc were concerned. Moscow could not and in reality did not want to have  
total control on the foreign policy of the allied countries. One instance, when this 
proved useful was when the Hungarian diplomatic service was used to pave the way 
for the thawing of relations between Moscow and Tehran in 1983 (Document 23). 
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 On Hungarian foreign policy in the Cold War era see: Csaba Békés: Hungarian 
foreign policy in the bipolar World, 1945–1991, Foreign Policy Review [Budapest], 
2011. 65–97. (Available online: www.coldwar.hu/Publications/Bekes) 
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To conclude this short introduction we would like to emphasise again that relations 
between friendly Middle Eastern countries and Hungary were mainly built on mutual 
interests while common elements of ideology only played a secondary role.  
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Annex I. 
The Establishment of diplomatic relations between Hungary and the countries of 
the Middle East during the Cold War in chronological order 
Country & City 
Date of the Establishment of 
Diplomatic Relations 
Current* Status of Representation 
Iraq/Baghdad 1937 Embassy (since 08/03/1958) 
Egypt/Cairo 1947 Embassy (since 06/15/1957) 
Israel/Jerusalem 1948(-1967) 
  Legation (1948-1967) 
  Embassy since 09/1989 
Iran/Teheran 1951 Embassy (since 05/12/1964) 
Syria / Damascus 1954 Embassy (since 10/12/1961) 
Sudan / Khartoum 1956 Embassy (since 11/12/1966) 
Tunisia / Tunis 1956 Embassy (since 08/30/1956) 
Morocco / Rabat 1959 Embassy (since 10/23/1959) 
Yemen, People’s 
Republic of /Aden 
1959 Embassy (since 02/02/1968) 
Yemen, Arabic 
Republic/Sanaa 
1959 Embassy (since 02/28/1963) 
Somalia / Mogadishu 1960 Embassy (since 10/16/1960) 
Algeria/ Alger 1962 Embassy (since 04/07/1962) 
Kuwait / Kuwait 1963 
Accredited Embassy (since 
05/1964-1975) 
Jordan/Amman 1964 Embassy (since 07/01/1964) 
Libya/ Tripoli 1967 Embassy (since 07/01/1967) 
 
Source: A szocializmus útján: A népi demokratikus átalakulás és a szocializmus 
építésének kronológiája, 1944. szeptember-1980. április. (On the Road of Socialism: 
The Popular Democratic Transition and the Chronology of the Build-up of Socialism, 
September 1944 –April 1980). 2nd ed. Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1982. pp. 603-
630. Available online at the web site of the Cold War History Research Center, 
Budapest: www.coldwar.hu/Finding aids. 
*In 1980 
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Annex II. 
 
List of Middle Eastern countries with diplomatic representatives from Hungary 
  
Country 
& City 
Date of 
the 
Establis
hment of 
Diploma
tic 
Relation
s 
Current* Status of 
Representation 
Name & Position 
Appointment 
by the 
Presidential 
Council (PC) 
Presentation 
of credentials 
Withdrawal 
by PC 
Algeria/ 
Alger 
1962 
Embassy (since 
04/07/1962) 
László MÁTYÁS Amb. 11/15/1962 12/15/1962 06/28/1968 
      
Elek TÓTH 
06/28/1968 No handover 02/23/1970   
Amb. 
      
Lajos SZALAI Chargé 
d’affaires ad interim 
  (1968-1969)   
      
Zoltán ZSIGMOND 
Amb. 
02/23/1970 04/03/1970 08/04/1975 
      
Zoltán SZÉPHELYI 
Amb. 
08/04/1975 10/24/1975 11/18/1980 
Egypt/Cai
ro 
1947 
Embassy (since 
06/15/1957) 
Viktor CSORNOKY 
Min. 
11/22/1947 12/28/1947 07/30/1948 
      
Péter NAGY 
08/01/1948 08/01/1948 09/ /1948   
Chargé d’affaires ad 
interim 
      
György ZÁGOR Chargé 
d’affaires ad interim 
11/ /1949 12/08/1949 10/25/1955 
      György ZÁGOR Min. 10/22/1955 11/28/1955 08/30/1957 
      Lajos SZIJÁRTÓ Amb. 08/30/1957 10/28/1957 08/27/1963 
      
Pál RÁCZ 
09/27/1963 01/02/1964 08/22/1968   
Amb. 
      Károly SZARKA Amb. 08/22/1968 10/19/1968 05/28/1970 
      Dr. Jenő RANDÉ Amb. 05/28/1970 09/01/1970 08/09/1974 
      Lajos S. NAGY Amb. 08/09/1974 10/29/1974 10/25/1978 
Iraq/Bagh
dad 
1937 
Embassy (since 
08/03/1958) 
Vencel HÁZI Amb. 09/23/1958 10/29/1958 11/15/1961 
      Károly RÁTH Amb. 11/10/1961 12/20/1961 05/08/1964 
      Lajos S. NAGY Amb. 05/08/1964 07/09/1964 07/30/1969 
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      József FERRÓ Amb. 07/30/1969 11/15/1969 10/15/1970 
      
József HORVÁTH 
02/03/1971 04/06/1971 07/06/1976   
Amb. 
      Lajos GONDA Amb. 07/06/1976 10/16/1976 06/09/1981 
Iran/Tehe
ran 
1951 
Embassy (since 
05/12/1964) 
István MURAI Min. 11/06/1951 12/22/1951 02/21/1958 
      
Károly BONYHÁDI 
Chargé d’affaires ad 
interim 
03/19/1959 03/21/1959   
      
Károly BONYHÁDI 
09/09/1962 09/20/1962 04/16/1966   
Min. 
      
Károly BONYHÁDI 
Amb. 
07/16/1964 09/12/1964 12/29/1966 
      László GYÁROS Amb. 02/25/1967 03/16/1967 10/28/1967 
      
József VÁRKONYI 
Amb. 
02/29/1968 04/04/1968 06/02/1972 
      Bálint GÁL Amb. 06/02/1972 09/17/1972 05/31/1976 
      Dr. József MIKÓ Amb. 05/31/1976. 10/02/1976 04/18/1981 
Israel/Jer
usalem 
1948-
1967 
Legation 
István ROMHÁNYI 
Chargé d’affaires ad 
interim 
03/09/1950 No handover 09/18/1954 
After 
1967, 
Sweden 
represent
ed 
Hungary 
in Israel 
    István KÁLLÓ Min. 02/12/1957 03/19/1957 11/11/1959 
      
Gyula NYERKI Chargé 
d’affaires ad interim 
11/11/1959 No handover 07/ /1965 
      
Kálmán CSÉCSEI 
Chargé d’affaires ad 
interim 
08/ /1965 No handover 06/ /1967 
Jordan/A
mman 
1964 
Embassy (since 
07/01/1964) 
István MURAI Amb. 08/03/1964 10/01/1964 08/12/1968 
      Pál MÁNYIK Amb. 09/18/1968 12/02/1968 11/16/1970 
      János VERES Amb. 02/25/1971 05/10/1971 06/24/1975 
      László SZIKRA Amb. 06/24/1975 02/02/1976   
Kuwait / 
Kuwait 
1963 
Accredited 
Embassy (since 
05/1964-1975) 
Lajos NAGY S. Amb. 10/12/1964 11/30/1964 11/12/1969 
Until 
1975, the 
Ambassa
dor in 
Baghdad 
was 
accredite
d 
    
József HORVÁTH 
Amb. 
11/12/1969 01/14/1970 10/15/1970 
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      József FERRÓ Amb. 04/01/1971 05/17/1971 09/08/1975 
      Károly SZIGETI Amb. 09/08/1975 11/04/1975 09/1980 
Libya/ 
Tripoli 
1967 
Embassy (since 
07/01/1967) 
Pál RÁCZ 
10/06/1967 12/01/1967 08/22/1968   
Amb. 
Until 
1975, 
Ambassa
dor in 
Cairo was 
accredite
d 
    Károly SZARKA Amb. 10/23/1968 02/24/1969 0l/14/1971 
      Dr. Jenő RANDÉ Amb. 01/14/1971 03/23/1971 08/17/1974 
      
Dr. Gyula BOGNÁR 
  (1972-1974)     
Chargé d’affaires ad 
interim 
      Lajos NAGY S. Amb. 08/17/1974   09/12/1975 
      Pál SZŰTS Amb. 09/12/1975 11/06/1975 08/31/1978 
Mauritani
a / 
Nouakcho
tt 
1965 
Accredited 
Embassy - Rabat 
(since 12/07/1965) 
Győző KÁRÁSZ Amb. 02/03/1966 04/11/1966 11/30/1966 
Until 
1972, the 
Ambassa
dor in 
Conakry, 
since 1972 
the 
Ambassa
dor in 
Rabat is 
accredite
d 
    
Gusztáv GOGOLYÁK 
11/30/1966 04/12/1967 11/18/1970 
  
Amb. 
      
Imre SZTANKOVICS 
Amb. 
11/18/1970   01/12/1972 
      László MOLNÁR Amb. 01/12/1972 10/03/1972 01/25/1977 
      
Dr. Frigyes LÉDERER 
Amb. 
01/25/1977 07/30/1977 01/19/1980 
Morocco / 
Rabat 
1959 
Embassy (since 
10/23/1959) 
László GYÁROS Amb. 04/30/1963 11/19/1963 09/12/1966 
      
Kálmán ÚJLAKI 
Chargé d’affaires ad 
interim 
08/10/1966 
Nem történt 
átadás 
12/01/1968 
      
Raymond TÓTH Chargé 
d’affaires ad interim 
11/22/1968 
Nem történt 
átadás 
10/14/1970 
      László MOLNÁR Amb. 09/21/1970 01/15/1971 08/21/1975 
      
Dr. Frigyes LÉDERER 
08/21/1975 12/18/1975 12/19/1979   
Amb. 
Somalia / 
Mogadish
1960 
Embassy (since 
10/16/1960) 
Dr. Károly SZABÓ 
Amb. 
01/24/1968 06/10/1968 03/02/1970 
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u 
Ambassa
dor in 
Dar-es 
Salaam is 
accredite
d 
    Dr. Miklós BÁRD Amb. 03/02/1970 05/06/1970 10/08/1976 
      Gyula BARANYI Amb. 10/08/1976 10/16/1976 02/17/1989 
Syria / 
Damascus 
1954 
Embassy (since 
10/12/1961) 
Károly BONYHÁDI 
Chargé d’affaires ad 
interim 
03/01/1954 05/13/1954 03/22/1957 
At the 
time of 
the union 
with 
Egypt, a 
General 
Consulate
s worked 
here 
    
János RADVÁNYI 
Consul-general 
03/23/1957.   08/01/1958 
      
Pál MÁNYIK Consul-
general 
08/01/1958   06/ /1962 
      
István MURAI 
03/10/1962 06/07/1962 08/12/1968   
Amb. 
      
Pál MÁNYIK 
08/12/1968 08/24/1968 11/16/1970   
Amb. 
      
János VERES 
01/06/1971 01/30/1971 05/15/1975   
Amb. 
      László SZIKRA Amb. 05/15/1975 10/25/1975 09/27/1979 
Sudan / 
Khartou
m 
1956 
Embassy (since 
11/12/1966) 
György ZÁGOR Min. 02/18/1956 04/21/1956 11/28/957 
Until 
1970, the 
Ambassa
dor in 
Cairo was 
accredite
d, the 
Embassy 
in 
Khartou
m is led 
by the 
Chargé 
d’affaires 
ad 
interim 
    Lajos SZIJÁRTÓ Min. 11/28/1957 01/21/1958 09/27/1963 
      
Béla TÓTH 
06/ /1960 No handover 07/ /1962 
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Chargé d’affaires ad 
interim 
      
Pál RÁCZ 
12/07/1963 04/17/1964 11/22/1966   
Min. 
      
Pál RÁCZ 
11/22/1966 02/05/1968 08/22/1968   
Amb. 
      Károly SZARKA Amb. 08/22/1968 12/17/1968 07/02/1970 
      
Sándor PATAKI Chargé 
d’affaires ad interim 
  (1968-1974)   
      
Lajos 
BENCZEKOVITS 
Amb. 
07/02/1970 07/27/1970 08/12/1974 
      
István FODOR Chargé 
d’affaires ad interim 
  1974-   
Tunisia / 
Tunis 
1956 
Embassy (since 
08/30/1956) 
László MÁTYÁS Amb. 09/01/1965 09/30/1965 06/28/1968 
      
Elek TÓTH 
06/28/1968 No handover 02/02/1970   
Amb. 
      
Lajos SZALAI Chargé 
d’affaires ad interim 
  (1968-1969)   
      
Zoltán ZSIGMOND 
Amb. 
04/23/1970 05/ /1970 08/04/1975 
      
Zoltán SZÉPHELYI 
Amb. 
08/04/1975 11/13/1975 11/13/1975 
Turkey / 
Ankara 
1947 
Embassy (since 
08/08/1967) 
Béla ANDAHÁZY-
KASNYA 
12/13/1946   07/03/1947 
    
  Min. 
      
György GULÁCSY 
Min. 
08/27/1947 10/13/1947 04/30/1949 
      János GYETVAI Min. 03/17/1949 04/05/1949 06/30/1950 
      
József GÁBOR 
06/30/1950 08/23/1950 10/28/1954   
Min. 
      
István MURAI 
11/21/1954 01/31/1955 02/21/1958   
Min. 
      
Dénes FELKAI 
09/05/1958 10/16/1958 09/14/1962   
Min. 
      
Imre KUTAS 
09/14/1962 10/25/1962 10/24/1967   
Min. 
      
Imre KUTAS 
10/24/1967 12/20/1967 06/27/1969 
  
 29 
 
 
 
Source: A szocializmus útján: A népi demokratikus átalakulás és a szocializmus 
építésének kronológiája, 1944. szeptember-1980. április. (On the Road of Socialism: 
The Popular Democratic Transition and the Chronology of the Build-up of Socialism, 
September 1944 –April 1980). 2nd ed. Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1982. pp. 603-
630. Available online at the web site of the Cold War History Research Center, 
Budapest: www.coldwar.hu/Finding aids. 
*In 1980 
 
Amb. 
      György ZÁGOR Amb. 06/27/1969 10/27/1969 07/23/1973 
      
Károly KAPCSOS 
Amb. 
07/23/1973 10/10/1973 06/29/1977 
      
Dr. László ROSTA 
Amb. 
06/29/1977 10/20/1977 10/20/1977 
Yemen, 
People’s 
Republic 
of /Aden 
1959 
Embassy (since 
02/02/1968) 
Károly SZARKA Amb. 08/25/1968 05/20/1969 12/18/1970 
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Annex III. 
Trade between Hungary and her five main Arab partners 1960-64 
 
Export 
(Billion 
HUF) 
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 I-IX. 
UAR 79.3 103.9 185 144.8 53.4 
Algeria 0.17 0.05 0.1 0.9 5.5 
Iraq 52.1 25 40.8 31.5 25.4 
Syria 14.2 12.4 19.5 26.5 29.9 
Morocco 9.3 8 34.8 46.1 16.3 
Total 
Export: 
155.07 149.35 280.2 249.8 130.5 
 
Import 
(Billion 
HUF) 
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 I-IX. 
UAR 90 104.6 67 149.3 128.8 
Algeria 0 0 0 0 0.1 
Iraq 1.4 0 5.9 3.9 0.3 
Syria 7.6 10.4 9.5 30.9 27.1 
Morocco 2.2 3.1 29 39.7 14.8 
Total 
Import: 
101.2 118.1 111.4 223.8 171.1 
 
Source: MOL, Küm, XIX J-1-j, Arab országok Tük, 1965. 111. d. IV-14.   
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Documents 
 
Document 1 
 
Foreign Ministry report on the Hungarian government delegation’s trip in Egypt 
in 1957  
(Excerpts) 
 
(26 September 1957) 
 
Strictly confidential! 
[…] 
 Foreign Minister Fawzi said the following during the conversation: 
 The Egyptian government ordered its UN representative to object to putting 
the so-called Hungarian problem on the agenda. So, the position of the Egyptian 
government on this issue is clear. He wants to stress the same by saying that he 
himself is not going to attend the session of the extraordinary General Assembly, he 
will only take over the leadership of the Egyptian UN delegation at the opening of the 
12th General Assembly. 
 For extremely selfish reasons, the standpoint of Egypt on this problem is the 
same as the position of Hungary. Egypt is a small country which is unable to prevent 
the armed attack of the superpowers. Therefore, they should stick with at least one 
principle, the principle of non-intervention. And since Egypt would not like to see its 
internal affairs discussed at an international forum either, they naturally support the 
Hungarian position. 
[…] 
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 On 29 August President Nasser received the Hungarian government delegation 
at his apartment. After our arrival he suggested we should allow the press to take 
photos, and we agreed to it. After five minutes of talking about general matters 
Deputy Minister Szarka began to talk and explained the Hungarian government’s 
position on the so-called “Hungarian problem”, and then he handed over the 
memorandum and the confidential documents to the president. He was noticeably 
strongly impressed by the fact that he was given documents that had not been made 
public before. 
 President Nasser said the following: …He did not think it was possible to 
prevent “the Hungarian problem” from being put on the agenda in the UN. He hoped 
that now that the Hungarian delegation was also participating in the debate, they 
would explain and defend their position in detail and make their arguments widely 
public, since in a case like this the western propaganda often hushes the truth up.  
 He said they had already given the proper instructions to their UN delegation 
and they were on our side regarding this issue. He was convinced that the western 
powers would use the Hungarian problem for propaganda in the UN, especially 
against the Soviet Union. Why don’t they talk about Jordan, he asked, where the 
national government was ousted, the nationalists were being prosecuted and the 
people are being oppressed under martial law? And he immediate made a parallel 
between the American intervention in Hungary and in the Middle East. He stated that 
they rely on the support of the enemies of the system, the feudalists and the 
representatives of religious minorities in Syria as well. 
Then he asked which other countries the Hungarian delegation was going to visit. He 
said we could surely rely on the support of Egypt and Syria. We should try to 
convince the rest of the Arab countries but the situation with these countries is not 
that simple. He regards Yemen as a country with an independent Arab policy and 
maybe they would also support us. As for Libya, he was not sure, since a small 
country like that did not have any significant influence. Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq and 
Saudi Arabia are under American, Sudan under British influence. 
[…] 
Translated by András Bocz 
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Source:  Magyar Országos Levéltár [Hungarian National Archives], henceforward 
MOL Küm, XIX-J-1-j, Egyiptom Tük, 1957. 5.d. 5/b–004399/1. Visit of a Hungarian 
government delegation to Egypt. Cairo, 26 September 1957. Report by the 
ambassador (excerpts). The visit took place between 5 and 28 September, 1957. 
Published in Hungarian in: J Nagy László, Magyarország és az arab térség – 
Kapcsolatok, vélemények, álláspontos 1947-1975 [Hungary and the Arab World – 
Connections, opinions, standpoints 1947-1975], JATE Press, Szeged, Hungary, 2006. 
 
Document 2 
 
Report of the Hungarian Ambassador in Cairo on the establishment of the 
United Arab Republic and the Syrian public opinion in 1958 
(Excerpts) 
(31 January 1958) 
 
Strictly confidential! 
Reactions to and the aftermath of the events 
 The events took the Syrian public totally unprepared. In the first few days the 
crowd, heated by nationalism, was cheering the idea of the union enthusiastically. 
However, it lasted only for a few days. Many of the people began to look at the likely 
political events from the point of view of their own personal fate. I tried to meet as 
many people I could and listen to many different views during these days. Low- and 
middle-ranking foreign affairs officials were extremely embittered, saying that that 
they would be the first to be dismissed. For example, the deputy head of the protocol 
department said that he would resign if he were to be transferred to Cairo. 
 Wholesale traders and businessmen are worried about the strict Egyptian 
economy and transfer the mobilizable part of their assets to Lebanon first and then to 
Swiss banks. it is characteristic that the exchange rate of dollar increased by 15 
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percent in a week. At the same time, they don’t know, for example, how the currency 
problems and numerous other economic issues will be resolved. It must be noted that, 
in order to satisfy traders, the government said the economic issues would be settled 
only after several months and in a gradual way taking each of the particular problems 
one by one. 
 Manufacturer are worried about Egyptian competitor and the effects of cheap 
Egyptian labour. Landowners with huge areas of land a lot of villages are concerned 
by Nasser’s land reform. 
 People living on wages and salaries think their situation is totally unsecure 
because they don’t know how the difference between standard of living in the two 
countries will be dealt with, since at the moment it is much higher in Syrian than in 
Egypt. 
 In addition to the issues listed above, obviously several other political and 
sociological problems are being raised too. People are constantly concerned with the 
difference between the Syrian political system which is based on a wide range of 
democratic rights and the essentially dictatorial Egyptian system. 
 I have heard people saying that the Syrians kindly warned their Egyptian 
friends that Nasser should not introduce a political system that is based on a non-party 
united national front because the Syrian people would definitely regard anything like 
that as a dictatorial system and Nasser would lose the great reputation he currently has 
in Syria. 
 It can be seen now that many of Nasser’s pictures are being removed from 
shop windows  and while his pictures were received with a round of applause in 
movie theatre before, now people refrain from any expression of approval.  
 A few words must also be devoted to the position of the Syrian army 
regarding the union. However, I have to begin by saying that in this respect I have 
radically different, opposing information. According to one source, the entire staff 
supports the plan of the union. In view of the political situation in Syria – and the 
allegedly subversive activity of the socialist and populist party – they did not see any 
other way but to fully unite with Egypt. 
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 According to another source, General Bizri got into a conflict with General 
Nfuri and Colonel Sarage, the followers of the federation who don’t want the Syrian 
army to come under the command of Egyptian officers. 
 However, it is easy to see that the Syrian people do not support the plan of the 
union but would have endorsed a federation or confederation instead. 
 
Situation of the Syrian Communist Party 
 In this report I have already dealt with the statement that reflects the official 
position of the Party. In this statement the Party makes it clear that the union of the 
Arab countries is a positive step. In this case the Syrian-Egyptian Union is built on 
sound bases ensuring the already existing democratic rights and definitely 
strengthening the anti-imperialist front. 
 Then Comrade Bakdash, the secretary-general of the Party said in his 
statement issued on 28 January: “There has never been a Communist party in the 
world which has dissolved itself. The Syrian-Lebanese Communist Party will not take 
this course either. We hope that the emerging union of Syrian and Egypt will preserve 
these already existing democratic rights.” Comrade Bakdash’s statement generated 
huge reaction. The statement published in Al Nour, the Party’s official paper, was 
presented in every paper regardless of their party allegiance and the people were 
talking about it all over the city. Ambassador Riad officially warned the government 
that the statement jeopardized the plan of the Egyptian-Syrian Union. However, the 
government did not take any administrative action against the Party. 
 When Foreign Minister Bitar presented the results of his talks regarding the 
Union and the decision of the government at the meeting of the Foreign Affairs 
Committee of the Parliament on 30 January, Comrade Bakdash stressed in his speech 
that Syria should preserve its democratic achievements within the Union too and 
should not be ungrateful to the Soviet Union for the huge support that they had 
provided that far. 
 To my knowledge the members of the Party were centrally ordered to begin a 
comprehensive propaganda campaign in order to explain to the people the dangers 
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that the steps to dissolve political parties would mean. At the same time the Central 
Leadership took steps to ensure that the Party would not be taken unprepared if they 
were to be forced to go underground.  
Translated by András Bocz 
Source: MOL-M-KS 288 f.32/1958. 8.ő.e. Copy from the report of the Hungarian 
Embassy on 31 January 1958  
Published in Hungarian in: J Nagy László, Magyarország és az arab térség – 
Kapcsolatok, vélemények, álláspontos 1947-1975 [Hungary and the Arab World – 
Connections, opinions, standpoints 1947-1975], JATE Press, Szeged, Hungary, 2006. 
 
 
 
Document 3 
Report of the Hungarian Ambassador in Baghdad on the preparations for the 
Iraqi revolution in 1958 
(18 December 1958) 
 
Strictly confidential! 
We have received the following information from Comrade Amer, member of the 
central leadership of the Party here: 
 After the unity of the Iraqi Communist Party had been restored in the second 
half of 1956 and especially as a result of the crackdown on the street demonstrations 
and protests organized during the aggression against Egypt it became clear to the 
Party that there was only one way out of Nuri As-Said’s oppression and the Baghdad 
Pact; the kingdom and the ruling regime had to be overthrown by armed force. 
 37 
 In addition to propaganda work among the people aimed at informing and 
making people aware of the situation (of which I have given a detailed account in the 
report referenced), the Communist Party focused on the following aspects: 
1./ Arming the people. 
2./ Tightening cooperation with the officers of the army (with Qasim, in particular) 
who were ready to support the revolution. 
3./ Winning the support for and participation of the leaders of the other political 
parties in the revolution which rallied in the people’s front. 
1. The arming of the people began in October 1956 and continued until the day the 
revolution broke out. It was not an easy task. The clash with the police and the army 
at the end of 1956 had produced some results already. However, the amount of arms 
received from abroad was a lot more significant. And finally, they were definitely 
able to rely on the comrades that infiltrated the army on the one hand, and on Qasim 
and his troops that were actively taking part in the preparation of the revolution. 
 The arms were given out only to the most trustworthy communists, and most 
of the arms were carefully hidden away. The arms were fully distributed only on 13 
and 14 July 1958. By that time the squads set up in advance had been put on high 
alert. This is how on 14 July, while the division headed by Qasim occupied key points 
in the capital and eliminated the royal family along with its guards and Nuri As-Said, 
the Party and, to some extent, the armed squads of the people’s front along with the 
people from the streets methodically surrounded military garrisons and barracks and, 
partly by way of persuasion and partly by armed force, convinced most of the military 
units to join the revolution.  
 These armed squads form the basis of the present voluntary national guard 
whose effective force is gradually growing, recruiting its members from civilians, 
mostly workers and students. 
2. The leaders of the Communist Party got into personal contact with Brigadier 
General Qasim and some other high-ranking officers in the second half of 1955. 
Although they did not talk about taking prompt armed action together, they began 
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joined organization work at that time. The Party’s work in the army can be grouped in 
accordance with the following: 
a./ Theoretical debates and planning with Qasim and his officers 
b./ Establishing a revolutionary filed officer group in Baghdad 
c./ Winning the support of subordinate officers in Baghdad and in garrisons in the 
country 
d./ Setting up the Association of Soldiers and Officers to support the revolution 
 Only a few leading members of the Communist Party maintained contact with 
Qasim and some of his officers. When it became clear that Qasim himself, as one of 
the highest military leaders, liked the progressive movement and was ready to act any 
time for his own principles against Nuri As-Said’s rule, these Party leaders gradually 
began to raise the idea of ousting the ruling system to him more openly. Qasim 
seemed willing to act but only on condition that the people’s front was ready to 
overthrow the system in a united way and the Party was able to ensure that the people 
were properly prepared to support the revolution.  
 In the fall of 1956 – during the aggression against Egypt – the top leadership 
of the Iraqi army organized military maneuvers which were commanded, among 
others, by Qasim himself. It was suggested that this opportunity might be used for 
overthrowing the system. However, in view of the fact that at that time the National 
Democratic Party totally refused to join the revolution, the leaders of the Communist 
Party, in agreement with Qasim, did not find the opportunity suitable. Instead they 
made efforts to develop preparations further. The various military groups and 
organization described above were not yet connected to one another; they had direct 
contact only with the leaders of the Party. However, at that time, when the detailed 
plans for the revolution and the setup of the government that should follow were 
developed the leaders of the party informed Qasim of the available forces. It should 
be noted that at first hearing Qasim was distrustful of the various military groups and 
therefore he demanded that all the officers and soldiers in these groups should make 
an oath of allegiance. 
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 At the beginning of 1957 Nuri As-Said commanded Qasim to serve in Jordan 
with the 2nd brigade. At that time Qasim’s deputy was Colonel Arif. During his 
service in Jordan the Party continued the preparations for the revolution. In addition 
to military organizations they established a civil organization, “Freedom of 
Fatherland” which comprised thousands of patriots under the leadership of the 
communist. This organization was to ensure reserves for the armed squads during the 
revolution. The leaders of the Party informed Qasim of the preparation every week by 
a messenger. 
 During Qasim’s stay in Jordan the Iraqi king and Nuri AS-Said planned a joint 
visit to Jordan to inspect the Iraqi armed forces stationed there. Qasim sent a message 
by the messenger proposing that if the People’s Front was willing to take power in 
Baghdad he saw this visit as a good opportunity to eliminate the king and Nuri As-
Said. Eventually this proposal was dismissed in Baghdad, partly because Nuri As-
Said missed the inspection and partly because Qasim and his troops were away in 
Jordan and the party did not find the armed forces available in Baghdad sufficient. So 
the revolution once again had to be postponed. The people under the influence of the 
Party as well as the leaders of the political parties that rallied under the People’s Front 
were all on high alert. Time was passing by and the case of the revolution was 
dragging on up until 11 July 1958. 
 Qasim as the commander of the 19th Brigade and the 20th Brigade (at that 
time commanded by Colonel Arif) were ordered to move to Lebanon on 11 July 1958. 
Making up a division, the two brigades were given their task under Qasim’s 
command. 
 When informed by Qasim, the leaders of the Party decided that the time had 
come for the revolution and taking power by armed force. This time Qasim again 
stipulated that he was only willing to support the revolution with his armed force if 
the entire people’s Front participated in it; moreover, they should be in the 
government to be formed after the victory revolution. Arif negotiated with the leaders 
of the Baath Party and Qasim himself with those of the Independence Party and the 
National Democratic Party on this issue. The leaders of the Baath Party and the 
Independence Party (Shanshall)  seemed willing to agree but the leader of the 
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National Democratic Party (Chaderchi) did not agree to participate either in the 
revolution or in the government to be formed after its victory. 
 During further negotiations the participants managed to convince even 
Chaderchi to listen to reason at least to some extent, who was still unwilling to 
participate in person but finally agreed that his party would take part in the revolution 
and represent itself in the newly formed government. At the same time he also 
promised that he would not betray the revolution although he would stay passive 
during the events. So, Qasim also accepted 14 July as the day of the revolution. On 11 
July the units of his division were still being stationed in camps 50–80 km north and 
south of the capital. He officially and formally prepared his troops to execute the 
order given by the general headquarters to move to Lebanon. Before departure, 
however, he commissioned the officers as commanders who had already been 
involved in the preparations for the revolution. 
 In accordance with the plans carefully designed in advance, the Qasim 
division, the Communist Party and the people mobilized and armed by the People’s 
Front overthrew the kingdom in Iraq and proclaimed the republic. The proclamation 
of the republic was read personally by Aref in the Baghdad radio, which was a clear 
source of his subsequent popularity. Five hours after the first shots had gone off 
Qasim, as the commander-in-chief of the revolution, was already in the Ministry of 
Defence giving orders to his subordinates. 
Translated by András Bocz 
Source: MOL M-KS 288.f.32/1958 7.ő.e. Copy of the report of the embassy in 
Baghdad composed on 18 December 1958 
Published in Hungarian in: J Nagy László, Magyarország és az arab térség – 
Kapcsolatok, vélemények, álláspontos 1947-1975 [Hungary and the Arab World – 
Connections, opinions, standpoints 1947-1975], JATE Press, Szeged, Hungary, 2006. 
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Document 4 
 
Foreign Ministry memorandum on Algeria’s political background after the coup 
in 1965  
 (Excerpts) 
(22 November 1965) 
Strictly Confidential! 
 
 Following the independence the government of Algeria and the National 
Liberation Front (FLN) – with the leadership of Ben Bella- named future functional 
duties that lied ahead substantially well, considering the Algerian realities and 
according to the program above.  
 The realization of the program, however could not be realised without a hitch. 
Despite Ben Bella’s positive personality and good will he made several grave 
mistakes especially considering the realization of domestic affairs. The following 
elements made the successful coup of 29 June possible: poorly chosen tactics for a 
good strategy; not recognizing future challenges; the lack of execution of already 
existing resolutions that would have strengthened his position such as the agrarian 
reform; in many cases the replacement of these reforms with sheer command words; 
neglecting the leading party and lack of organizing economic life and most especially 
the defects in his manner of leading.  
 On 19 June 1965 intrinsically an unconstitutional military coup d’état took 
place in Algeria, during which Ben Bella was arrested who was elected president by 
the public and who was also elected as Secretary of Party by the congress of FLN.  
 The coup caused major confusion and shock amongst the working class, the 
peasantry, progressive intellectuals and their mass organizations, harmed the 
revolutionary upsurge experienced in Algeria and its international respect. Besides, 
the timing was especially unfavorable for the general anti-imperialist struggle.  
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 Boumedien in order to succeed with the coup leaned on those who were on the 
right from Ben Bella, from those a few who were members of the last Ben Bella 
government and a few who had left it in the past few years.  
 The consistence of the new government and the Revolutionary Council, which 
was formed after the coup remains heterogeneous, amongst its members are well-
known anti-communists and western-oriented negative individuals who do not behave 
in a friendly manner towards socialist countries (Bouteflika, Medeghri, Kait Ahmed, 
Cherif Belkacem). Those leftists who chose the legal struggle after the coup are also 
part of the government. According to our experience and knowledge so far and to his 
recent declarations we do not assume that Boumedien seeks to step up against the 
achievements of the revolution and we do not believe he seeks to establish an anti-
communist, bourgeois system in Algeria. In his declarations, speeches he stood up for 
continuing the revolution, developing Algeria by socialist measures, preserving 
accomplishments of the revolution and carrying out the agrarian reform with certain 
austerity measures along with the development of self-administration. The following 
fact is also noteworthy: he isolated the individuals who openly claimed civil 
development, those who reported immediately after the coup and claimed they want 
to exclude socialism from the program.  
 Thus it can be stated that in Algeria after the coup – compared to the previous 
situation – an orientation to the right took place and currently the danger of further 
orientation exists, though the democratic and progressive attitude of the public, 
previous strong influence of progressive powers and the strongly organized army that 
represents potential power due to its social stratification will not make a quick 
orientation to the right possible.  
[…] 
 According to the indications, it seems Boumedien is currently exposed to 
crossfire. As for the rightists, they consider him to be too much of a leftist, the left 
wing, however demonstrates an open or passive stand against him. It can be assumed 
that there will be a clash between the two parties sooner or later, when the well-
chosen activity of the leftist powers will be of utter importance.  
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 As it is known, there was no realistic chance for organizing leftist actions or 
resistance after the coup of 19 June, now there is even less chance for that. After the 
coup, the Algerian communist party immediately chose to go underground, the left 
wing of the FLN split into two parts: one started an illegal fight, the other chose legal 
means and takes part even in the work of the government. According to our credible 
sources, Boumedien asked to meet with leftist leaders of the ACP and the FLN after 
the coup and offered them a chance to co-operate and even expressed his wished to 
work together with them in the newly evolved situation. The leftists declined this 
offer. It is a fact that the leadership actually did not take any steps directly after these 
events that we could see as giving up the path declared under Ben Bella, actual 
breaking with previous foreign and domestic politics and though with certain 
corrections, he fundamentally made a promise to continue on the same political path. 
This brings up the issue whether the fact that the ACP and the divided FLN lead by 
Zahouane chose to go into illegality, the formation of an illegal opposition and taking 
similar steps was truly the only solution at the time. It can be assumed that there could 
have been other methods for expressing the views of the political left that 
concentrates more on the balance of power and possibilities – a form that would not 
have given a legal ground for a counter-attack. This illegal activity that left the actual 
balance of power out of consideration, and in some cases the mobilizing activities 
against socialist and anti-imperialist countries (eg.: encouraging the sabotage of the II: 
Afro-Asian Conference), granted possibility, a legal ground and reference point for 
stepping up against leftist individuals and contributed to the division of the leftist 
powers. The leaders of the new system emphasize that arresting communists does not 
mean they are anti-communists since these people were arrested for behaving as 
anarchic individuals.  
 Considering Algerian domestic affairs the viewpoint of the army and the 
officer corps is also a deciding factor. This army and its officer corps are not classical 
military groups brought up in barracks, since its members are primarily recruited from 
the peasantry and the working class and essentially they grew up and became officers 
during the struggles to end colonialism and fights for Algeria’s independence. The 
social base and standing up for preserving the accomplishments of the revolution, the 
army and officers could be of utter importance considering the prevention of further 
orientation to the right.  
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Translated by Sabine Topolansky   
Source: MOL Küm, XIX-J-1-j, Algéria Tük, 1965, 12.d. 00888/6/1965. - analysis 
made by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (excerpts) 
Published in Hungarian in: J Nagy László, Magyarország és az arab térség – 
Kapcsolatok, vélemények, álláspontos 1947-1975 [Hungary and the Arab World – 
Connections, opinions, standpoints 1947-1975], JATE Press, Szeged, Hungary, 2006. 
 
 
Document 5 
Report from the Hungarian Embassy in Cario on Kosigin's visit in the UAR 26 May 
1966  
(26 May 1966) 
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL!!!!!!!!!!!!!  
EMBASSY OF THE HUNGARIAN     
PEOPLES’S REPUBLIC     
TO COMRADE FOREIGN MINISTER 
BUDAPEST  
Cairo, 26 May 1966 
       27, RUE MAZHAR PACHA, 
       ZAMALEK, LE CAIRE 
 
112/Sz.T./1966      Subject : Comrade  
         Kosigin’s visit to 
the  
Made in : 5 copies      United Arab Republic 
Center: 4 copies 
Embassy: 1 copy 
Presenter: L. Benczekovits 
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Invited by President Nasser, Comrade Kosigin made an official visit to the UAR 
between 10 and 18 May. Comrade Kosigin was accompanied by foreign minister 
Gromiko, energy minister Neporozhny, chairman of foreign economic relations 
council Skarchev, deputy defense minister Groshev and several experts. 
It was two years ago that a similarly high-level Soviet delegation visited the UAR, 
lead by the then prime minister. Since then friendship between the Soviet Union and 
the UAR has strengthened, economic relations have expanded and development has 
been steady. 
The importance of this visit is underscored by several factors. 
- The UAR is making good progress on the way to becoming a non capitalist 
country. Its domestic policy is showing more and more democratic features 
and the country is determined to activate its social life. The role and 
importance of the Arab Socialist Union have become considerably stronger. 
They took steps against imperialist attempts that aimed at intervening into the 
internal affairs of the Arab world and the African and Asian countries. All in 
all, these steps have created favorable conditions for the visit of the Soviet 
prime minister. 
 
- Since it was his first visit outside the socialist camp, Comrade Kosigin’s visit 
has increased the UAR’s reputation and importance in the Arab world and, 
equally importantly, among the third world countries. 
The official bodies did their best to make the Soviet prime minister’s visit a success 
and it can be established that the organization of the event went far beyond what is 
common over there. All the important representatives of the government participated 
in the various receptions, led by the vice presidents and Nasser. Comrade Kosigin was 
greeted by huge crows upon his arrival and departure in Cairo as well as during his 
official visits the other parts of the country. These crowds included many workers and 
young people who belonged to the youth organizations of the Arab Socialist Union. In 
Asswan four special trains and several trucks were provided to bring the people of the 
neighboring villages to the assembly to meet the Soviet delegation. 
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What went far beyond common practice was that the crowds in the street were truly 
enthusiastic in meeting the delegation and sheering the Soviet-UAR friendship. This 
shows that even less educated and knowledgeable people know the Soviet Union, its 
policy and activities. 
The press, the radio and the television had presented several reports before the visit as 
well as during and after the visit, addressing in detail issues related to the Soviet 
Union, its role, the relations between the two countries and the economic support the 
Soviet Union provided for the UAR. The papers published a detailed biography of 
Comrade Kosigin and his previous positions. Various factories and foreign trade 
companies published Kosigin’s and Nasser’s pictures in their own papers to greet the 
Soviet prime minister. Several political article were also published which compared 
the Soviet Union especially with America, evaluating the Soviet Union positively and 
condemning the other party’s activities, especially in that the Soviet Union does not 
use its economic assistance to intervene into the internal affairs of the country. The 
articles highlighted several parts of Comrade Kosigin’s speeches delivered at various 
places which were related to the achievements of the past period and the relations 
between the two countries. In addition, they published several other parts of these 
speeches in full which addressed the activities of the imperialist countries, enabling a 
wide range of people to make a parallel between the Soviet Union and the imperialist 
countries. It must be noted that the press sharply criticized America and its policy on 
several occasions during the time of the visit.  
The two delegations conducted official talks on three occasions during the visit. In 
addition, Comrade Kosigin had private talks with President Nasser on several 
occasions in the presence of his interpreter. These talks were also attended by Marshal 
Amer too. We do not know what topics were discussed during these private 
negotiations. 
The following two key topics were discussed during the negotiations: 
a./ International issues, including the Arab world, Africa, Asia, European security, 
etc. 
b./ The relations between the two countries (political and economic cooperation) 
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The speeches delivered and the joint communiqué details the position of the two 
parties on the most important issues. As far as the speeches are concerned, it must be 
noted that Comrade Kosigin made several references in them to the development that 
the UAR had achieved and stressed the role the Soviet Union had played in the 
development and the achievements of the country. He made a comparison between 
the economic assistance provided by the Soviet Union and the economic aid provided 
by the capitalist countries. In his speech he attached political importance to the 
conditions under which the western countries would have built the big dam, 
comparing them to the conditions that the Soviet Union had undertaken. When 
greeting the Soviet experts working in the country he made it clear that their presence 
and work in the country were extremely important in the life of the UAR. He stated 
that the big dam was not only the best school for training specialized workers but, 
more importantly, the best school for training and educating a “new type” of man. He 
pointed out that it was a difficult task to train Egyptian experts during the building 
process who can work efficiently but it was an even more important achievement to 
create a new type of man who can help the development of the country and preserve 
its independence by keeping their national identity and by their special qualification. 
In his speeches delivered at various places President Nasser expressed his 
appreciation and gave prominence to the fact that both the relations of the two 
countries and the current talks were characterized by mutual understanding, equality 
and mutual benefits. He highly appreciated the support given by the Soviet Union 
during the revolution and afterwards too. In addition, in one of his public speeches he 
asked the Soviet Union to continue to support the UAR in the future as well. Comrade 
Kosigin answered this request in his speech delivered in Alexandria, saying that “the 
Soviet Union will stand by the UAR in the future too and will take part in the 
development of the country and in solving its problems, just like in the past.” During 
the negotiations and in their speeches both parties expressed that they were pleased 
with the results achieved so far and the relations that they had built. 
The issues discussed during the negotiations which were not made public included the 
following: 
a./ The Vietnamese issue 
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Comrade Kosigin made it clear that everybody should take a straightforward 
and clear position on the Vietnamese issue. The Soviet Union is acting on the 
basis of the resolution adopted by the 23
rd
 Congress in regard to this issue. He 
stated that the relations between the Soviet Union and America had 
deteriorated because of Vietnam but it would not prevent the Soviet Union 
form continuing to provide all the support it can for Vietnam. Their position 
has not changed in this respect and they continue to demand that the 
Americans should leave Vietnam. He asked the UAR to take a firmer stand on 
this issue. 
 
The conflict between the Soviet Union and China 
Comrade Kosigin explained that the Soviet Union would do its best to 
improve its relations with China but so far all of their proposals had been 
rejected. The Soviet Union does not want to conduct an open debate and 
deepen the conflict. In his view the Chinese will not change their position 
regarding the Soviet Union because that is the only way in which they can 
mislead their people and conceal the failure of the Chinese policy. He said that 
China’s influence had increased in Indonesia in the past three years and what 
had happened there recently was a clear sign of the failure of Chinese policy. 
He characterized China’s policy as adventurist policy. 
According to President Nasser recent events suggested that the imperialist 
aggression had intensified and in his view it was due to the Soviet-Chinese 
conflict. He stated that progressive forces were in a crisis. He supported this 
claim by saying that Vietnam, a socialist country had been fighting a war for 
years and essentially nothing was happening to prevent it. He attributed the 
crisis of progressive forces to the events in Indonesia, the present situation of 
the Organization of African Unity and the attack on the African progressive 
forces. He compared the current situation with the 1956 period when the unity 
of progressive forces was able to stop the imperialist aggression. 
Comrade Kosigin stated that these facts were true but the starting point was 
not right. We should not be saying that the progressive forces are in crisis 
 49 
because it is not true. In addition, such a statement would weaken the 
movement of the progressive forces. True, the Vietnamese people have been 
suffering from a war but it cannot be said that the Vietnamese freedom fight is 
in crisis since a nation with a much smaller population and much less 
developed economy has been fighting American imperialism for years. What 
should be talked about is the real situation of the freedom fight, its current 
stage. Such a fight is generally characterized by an offensive stage, a stage of 
gathering strength and sometimes a stage of retreat too. This is the stage that 
the African progressive forces are in at present but by no means does it 
suggest that the progressive forces are in crisis. He asked Nasser that if he is 
talking about a crisis he should also identify who are responsible for it, 
especially if he believes this crisis is the result of the Soviet-Chinese conflict. 
President Nasser did not take a stand on this issue publicly and did not 
condemn the Chinese position but in private talks he said he shared the Soviet 
position. 
 
c./ The Arab world 
1. The Islam alliance. President Nasser said that the conflicts between the 
Arab countries had intensified and internal reactionary forces were beginning 
to cooperate with international reactionary forces against progressive forces. 
The Islam Pact is a clear sign of this development. The hostile forces are 
launching their attack in a very delicate area, in the field of religion. He asked 
the Soviet Union not to criticize the Islam Pact openly because it would only 
help the reactionary forces if an atheist state took steps against a religious 
alliance, which   they would immediately use for their own purposes. He asked 
the Soviet Union to use its influence on Turkey and Pakistan to persuade them 
not to join the Islam Alliance. The Soviet Comrades made a promise to do so. 
2. The Kurdish issue. Both parties agreed that the Kurdish issue should be 
resolved peacefully. Comrade Kosigin asked President Nasser to use his 
influence to end the fighting and resolve the differences of opinion by peaceful 
means. /Since then President Nasser has summoned the Iraqi ambassador./ 
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3. Syria. Comrade Kosigin outlined why they support and provided an 
economic loan for Syria. He said it was in the interest of the Soviet Union to 
maintain good relations with Syria and in his view the current Syrian 
government was conducting a progressive policy. He also believed it was 
necessary to create a progressive front in the Arab countries including the 
UAR, Syrian, Iraq and Algeria so that these countries could take steps against 
the reactionary countries in unity. In his view the most important task was to 
find a form of cooperation in which the UAR and Syrian could work together. 
President Nasser largely agreed with this but he had reservations regarding a 
few points. He raised some problems regarding the old confederation as well 
as the activity of the Baath Party, the difficulties in working together with it, 
the weaknesses of the current Syrian system as factors that hamper the 
development of relations between the two countries. /One sign of some 
progress in the relations between the two countries is the fact that President 
Nasser had received the permanent Representative of Syria in the Arab 
League. Currently a Syrian economic delegation is visiting the UAR./ 
4. Yemen. The UAR again requested military assistance to help Yemen. The 
Soviet Union made a plea to continue to provide assistance for Yemen. At the 
same time, the Soviet comrades asked President Nasser not to launch any 
attack on Saudi Arabia before having consultations on this issue since any 
such step could have an impact on the entire region. The UAR agreed with this 
proposal. 
d./ Israel 
The Soviet comrades told President Nasser that Israel is not in a position to be 
able to make a nuclear bomb and launch a nuclear attack against the Arab 
countries. Therefore, it is not necessary for the UAR to begin nuclear tests or 
launch a preventive war on Israel. The real danger in the case of a possible war 
is not Israel. 
Economic issues 
1. The UAR did not request any new loan during the negotiations. They 
requested postponing the payment of the outstanding installment. The Soviet 
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Union accepted it and agreed to extend the repayment of the military loans and 
reduce the amount too. /This reduction will be about 50%./ 
 
2. An agreement was made on the exchange rate between the ruble and the 
Egyptian pound, which was necessary because of the depreciation of the 
Egyptian pound. 
 
3. The UAR requested the Soviet Union to supply wheat for the country. The 
Soviet comrades apologized and said that it was not possible since the Soviet 
Union was having difficulties in this area. The UAR acknowledged this 
statement. 
The issued communiqué took a stand on all the important international issues. With 
its principled statements and concrete formulation it surpasses all the communiqués 
issued before. The following points should be mentioned.   
1. As far as the imperialist policy in the Middle Eastern region is concerned, the 
Soviet party expressed its intention to support the fight of the Arab nations 
against the imperialist policy in every possible respect. 
 
2. The Soviet Union fully supports the legitimate demands and fight of the 
Palestinian Arab people. /This fact was highlighted in the press./ 
 
3. It was emphasized that the Soviet Union highly appreciates the non-aligned 
policy of the UAR and the fight it is conducting for the liberation of the 
African countries. 
 
4. A separate part of the communiqué is devoted to the aggression on Vietnam 
and both parties state that they profoundly condemn it. 
 
5. The UAR expressed its appreciation regarding the Soviet peace policy and 
especially its fight against imperialist, colonialist countries. 
 
6. They both attached great importance to general and full disarmament, which 
can only be ensured by international supervision. To my knowledge, the joint 
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communiqué was submitted by the UAR which the Soviet delegation accepted 
with some modifications. 
 
Comrade Kosigin’s visit to the UAR was a highly significant political event which 
further strengthened the friendship between the Soviet Union and the UAR. The 
Soviet Union made another victory and found friends not only among the top leaders 
but also among the men in the street. In addition, it encouraged the leadership to 
continue with the course of action they had begun and act more firmly against any 
forces that hinder progress both inside and outside the country. Both parties are 
satisfied with the results of the negotiations and discussions, and the favorable 
atmosphere is also supported by the fact that it was the first occasion that the 
president and the vice presidents participated in nearly all the events. As time went 
by, participation in the various events was raised to a higher political level. Originally 
President Nasser was scheduled to go to Asswan only but plans were changed in the 
meantime and personally President Nasser accompanies Comrade Kosigin to all the 
places he visited. This is an important fact. /It was not the case when Comrade 
Khrushchev visited the country./  
The issues presented in this report which were not made public are based on the 
information received from the Soviet ambassador. 
 
       Lajos Benczekovits 
       chargé d’affaires ad interim  
 
Translated by András Bocz 
Source: MOL XIX-J-1j SZU/IV-10/003348/1966 104.d. 
 
Document 6/A 
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Report of the Inter-ministerial Expert Committee for the HSWP PC on military 
support for “friendly” Arab countries in 1967 
 (11 July 1967) 
 
 
INTERMINISTERIAL EXPERT COMMITTEE  STRICTLY 
CONFIDENTIAL! 
ON THE PREPARATION OF THE SUPPLY OF   Made in: 30 copies 
AID FOR ARAB COUNTRIES AND VIETNAM   1 copy is made of 7 pages 
        Copy No. 2. 
        Sfsz: 1030 
 
117 
S u b m i s s i o n 
for the Politburo of HSWP 
 
Following the Israeli aggression on 5 July this year, the governments of the Arab 
countries submitted the following requests to the government of the Government of 
the Hungarian People’s Republic (through their embassies): 
United Arab Republic: vehicles, medical equipment and devices, machinery, basic 
materials, consumer goods, and telecommunications and  military equipment 
(submitted on a list) totaling an amount of 7 million Egyptian Pounds (982 million 
HUF). 
Syrian Arab Republic: weaponry (anti-tank and anti-aircraft), wireless 
telecommunications devices, tanks, aircraft, armored vehicles, gas masks and 100 
pieces of UM-2 amplifiers. No value was specified. 
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After studying the possibilities of fulfilling the submitted requests for aid the expert 
committee set up by Government Decree No. 3212/1967 proposes the following: 
 
1./ United Arab Republic 
We propose to offer the military equipment listed in Appendix 1 as non-refundable 
aid in the amount of 2.5 million rubles (100 mln) along with HUF 20 mln for 
packaging, transportation, etc costs. 
In addition, the Government of the HPR has already offered – as emergency aid –
HUF 2 mln, and the National Organization of Trade Unions HUF 100 thousand, 
primarily in medication. 
On the basis of the list submitted by the Government of the UAR we propose to offer 
the following items from our foreign trade commodity reserves as loan (for a period 
of 5–7 years) under the 15 million Egyptian Pound (clearing value) credit line 
agreement made between the governments of the HPR and the UAR in February 1966 
on economic cooperation. 
10 X-ray machines    clearing EGP 120 thousand 
4 200-bed field hospitals   clearing EGP 146 thousand 
50 field first aid centers   clearing EGP 92 thousand 
Total:      clearing EGP 358 thousand = (ca. HUF 
50 mln) 
 
Note: the UAR’s credit portfolio is currently HUF 240 mln, of which about HUF 50 
mln is outstanding this year. 
2./ Syrian Arab Republic 
We propose to offer RUB 1.6 mln (HUF 65 mln) in military equipment and war 
supplies listed in Appendix 2 in order to satisfy their request as non-refundable aid 
along with HUF 15 mln for maintenance, packaging and transportation costs. 
In addition, the Government has offered HUF 1 mln and the National Organization of 
Trade Unions HUF 100 thousand in medication as emergency aid. 
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We note here that we have recently concluded an USD 492 thousand (HUF 30 mln) 
credit line agreement for 5 years with the Syrian Arab republic for the supply of 
various military goods. 
The Technological Foreign Trade Company has made an offer to provide war 
supplies worth USD 1 million and 65 thousand (HUF 65 mln). 
3./ Iraq 
A general request was submitted for any kind of economic and financial aid. We do 
not propose to fulfill a request like this.  
4./ Jordan 
HUF 500 thousand in tents, conserved food and medication has already been offered 
by our Government as aid. We have not received a direct request yet. We do not 
propose to provide any further aid at this point.  
In sum: 
For the Arab countries 
Aid provided so far:     HUF 4 mln 
proposal for additional aid 
on the basis of this memorandum  HUF 200 mln 
 aid      HUF 204 mln 
 government loan (for the UAR)  HUF 50 mln 
 Total:      HUF 254 mln 
 
HUF 32 mln of this in ammunition must be returned to the Defense Ministry by the 
military industry and the budget of the Defense Ministry must be amended to include 
the Hungarian forint amount of the above over the plan.  
The transportation, maintenance and packaging costs (ca. HUF 35 mln) must be 
covered by the state budget. 
If the proposal is accepted, we believe the Foreign Ministry should communicate the 
position of our Government to the United Arab Republic and the Syrian Arab 
Republic. Concurrently with this communication it should ask for their opinion on the 
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place and time of the negotiations on the details. The negotiations would be 
conducted on behalf of the Hungarian People’s Republic by a delegation consisting of 
representatives of the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs headed 
by the Deputy Minister of Trade. 
The negotiating delegation should be authorized to conduct talks on the following 
issues, which have not been raised so far in any concrete way: 
1./ Providing equipment for getting production going or increasing production under 
the above mentioned clearing EGP 15 mln government-provided credit line 
(These opportunities include, e.g.: prompt delivery of vehicles, aggregators, 
compressors, machine-tools, etc. ) 
2./ Aid for training various skilled-workers and technicians for 100–150 people and 
for one year. 
3./ 2–3 year moratorium on the loan recovery (roughly HUF 50 mln per year) or some 
part of it which is due under the 1967 credit line agreement. 
4./ Providing HUF 3 mln in food supplies as aid (canned food, cheese, butter, etc.) 
 
Budapest, 11 July 1967. 
Appendices:       (Dr Ervin Jávor) 
No. 1. 
No. 2. 
No. 3. 
 
 
 
  
 
Appendix 1 
MILITARY EQUIPMENT TO BE OFFERED TO THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC 
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No. Item Unit Qty 
1. 7.62 mm rifle  pieces 10,000 
2. 7.62 mm rifle ammunition thousand pieces 5,000 
3. 7.62 mm DP light machine gun  pieces 900 
4. 7.62 mm ammunition for the DP 
light machine guns 
thousand pieces 3,600 
5. 82 mm trench mortar with 10 cases pieces 50 
6. 82 mm ammunition with 10 cases  pieces 60,000 
7. 82 mm trench mortar unit kit  pieces 50 
8. 82 mm trench mortar company unit 
kit  
pieces 3 
9. Offensive hand grenade thousand pieces 100 
10. Anti-tank mortar bombs (TMD–B, 
TM–41)  
thousand pieces 100 
11. BO–76 mine detector pieces 100 
12. Field oven pieces 50 
13. Individual field dressing pieces 100,000 
14. Stretcher  pieces 200 
15. Food supply kit thousand pieces 750 
 
Total of all these items: HUF 99,269,000, that is, RUB 2,481,000. 
 
Appendix 2 
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MILITARY EQUIPMENT TO BE OFFERED TO THE SYRIAN ARAB 
REPUBLIC 
No. Item Unit Qty 
1. 76 mm anti-tank gun  pieces 36 
2. 76 mm anti-tank gun ammunition 8 
cases 
pieces 35,000 
3. 76 mm gun unit kit  pieces 36 
4. 76 mm gun battery unit kit  pieces 6 
5. 76 mm gun regiment unit kit  pieces 1 
6. Offensive hand grenade thousand pieces 100 
7. 7.62 mm DP light machine gun pieces 100 
8. 7.62 mm ammunition for the DP 
light machine guns 
thousand pieces 400 
 
Total of all these items: HUF 64,868,000, that is, RUB 1,621,000. 
 
Appendix 3 
I N F O R M A T I O N 
on the aid to be provided for the UAR by the socialist countries 
(based on the report of the Embassy in Cairo) 
Country Amount in own 
currency 
Item Amount in 
thousand HUF 
Delivery type 
German Democratic 
Republic 
DEM 4.5 mln 
German Marks 
Food 650 Aid 
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Polish People’s 
Republic 
PLN 190 mln 
PLN 300 mln 
Food 
War supplies 
1,900 
3,000 
Aid 
Negotiations on 
payment terms 
to be conducted 
later 
Czechoslovakian 
Socialist Republic 
 War supplies 200 Gift 
Bulgarian People’s 
Republic 
 5,000 t food 
100-bed hospital 
(with 25-member 
staff) 
War supplies 
 
 
15,000 t wheat 
5,000 t corn 
80,000 t cheese 
5,000 t zinc 
5,000 t lead 
 
? 
 
 
2,000 
 
Aid 
 
 
Negotiations on 
payment terms 
to be conducted 
later 
Romanian People’s 
Republic 
 wheat and corn 5,000  
 
 
 
Document 6/B 
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János Kádár’s speech at a HSWP Political Committee meeting on military 
support for “friendly” Arab countries in 1967 
 (18 July 1967) 
 
 
Comrade JÁNOS KÁDÁR: 
 I support Comrade Fock’s proposal but I would also like to make a few 
comments. 
 The first thing I would like to take into account regarding this aid is that in 
such a situation the problem, the trouble for the country involved is that actually they 
cannot assess what they precisely need in terms of military technology and in other 
areas. This is why we have this request, which is quite like a “circular” which 
includes a few headwords addressed to different countries, asking everybody for 
money without knowing the situation. There is no way to know how this can lead to 
any effective assistance. I raised the following at the meeting: first of all we need to 
provide assistance for them to assess their actual needs, and if they are unable to do 
that, perhaps the Soviet Union could help them since they know exactly what these 
countries really need. 
 The next issue concerns our negotiating methodology and the document we 
submit. I would like to propose that if we decide to submit a document to the 
Politburo and the Council of Ministers we should help them comprehend the situation 
by not including anything in this document that does not belong there. This appendix 
will mean nothing whatsoever to the Council of Ministers. This is not the business of 
the Politburo or the Council of Ministers. It’s the business of military officials. The 
best negotiating method is to say:   here is the amount we propose as non-refundable 
military aid, or this is the amount we propose as long-term loan … etc. And if they 
want to give some kind of additional information they can include the kinds of 
military equipment they need, and that’s it. And we used to discuss these issues 
confidentially, and if they are not the business of the Politburo or the Council of 
Ministers, then these bodies simply should not be burdened with these issues. 
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 My other comment: we should use the method suggested by Comrade Fock, 
that is, we should separate military, technological aid and other types of economic 
assistance. I would also set up two groups. One of them would include prompt 
assistance (supply of medication and food), while the other would include long-term 
assistance for recovering production, etc. 
 Another comment: I always propose – on the basis of certain experience – that 
we should not fully exhaust all our resources. First of all, as far as the parties in 
question are concerned, we are always likely to get into a situation in which they 
come up with a new list when they have assessed and have a better idea of their 
needs. Therefore, we need to set aside some of the equipment and money we have. 
And if there is a fight against the imperialists somewhere else, we should be able to 
help over there too. So we need to assess our available resources, that is, what we 
really can afford without endangering the financial situation of our country and the 
normal operation of our administration, but we should not fully exhaust all these 
resources. It is always better to give less than expected now than having to say later: 
we agree with your request but we are unable to fulfill it. 
I also want to refer to the resolution adopted by the seven socialist countries at 
their conference held last week. First of all, we are concerned directly with the three 
Arab countries that fell victim to the aggression, and Jordan can be excluded here on 
two counts: one of them is a military issue, the other one is related to material, 
economic aid. Jordan must be excluded because they have western relations and they 
want to ask the western countries for military and economic aid. So, Jordan should be 
reckoned with only in terms of medical aid in connection with red cross issues. As for 
Iraq, for which, incidentally, the resolution is right, we can also forget about 
providing aid for now. To our knowledge, Iraq was not directly involved in the 
aggression and didn't participate in the fights either, so we should primarily focus our 
work on Syria and Egypt.  
I have the following comment on implementation: I wonder how strongly we 
are urged to respond now. I would say that if they put pressure on us regarding this 
topic we should issue a communication but we should wait in connection with issues 
that are not so urgent. I would definitely put off the military aid. Here, we need to 
“conspire” with the Soviet Union. We need to say that this is the situation, we have 
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not responded yet, and they should say what they think. Or, if you will, we can 
expand the range of participants in the consultation, because the actual suppliers were 
two socialist countries. So the military specialist should look for an opportunity to sit 
down and review the question as to what should be provided for Syrian and Egypt. 
The most pressing issue is the supply of medical aid and it would also be good 
if we could give them some food too. As for the other types of economic aid, we 
should not delay the Belgrade conference any longer. We should urge for organizing 
it as soon as possible. 
So, the Council of Minister should be authorized to give the Arabs some kind 
of a preliminary answer on the basis of what we discussed here by designating some 
blanket sum and the type of aid. Going forward I would propose consultations and 
more organized action. 
 
[...] 
 
Translated by András Bocz 
Source: MOL M-KS 288. f. 5/430. ő. e. (1967.07.18.) 
 
 
Document 7 
 
Report from the Hungarian Embassy in Moscow on Soviet foreign policy on the 
crisis in the Middle East in 1967  
(2 November 1967) 
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL!!!!!!!!!!!!! 
EMBASSY OF THE HUNGARIAN PEOPLES’S REPUBLIC   
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Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
B u d a p e s t 
    
 
Moscow, 2 November 1967 
        
 
Sz.T./1967      Subject : The Middle Eastern 
crisis and 
           the policy of the Soviet 
Union 
       Made in : 3 copies 
            2 copies: for the Center 
            1 copy: for the 
Embassy 
 
Presenters: József Oláh 
  András Köves 
 
 Since the June war our embassy devoted a lot of attention to the Middle 
Eastern situation in its foreign affairs and information work. Using our contacts in the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist 
Party   we prepared a series of reports on the different aspects of the Middle Eastern 
policy of the Soviet Union and on hoe the Soviet Union evaluated the entire Middle 
Eastern situation and the foreign and domestic policy of each country. So, recently we 
addressed – among other things – the internal and international situation of the United 
Arab Republic, King Hussein’s visit, the Soviet evaluation of the Iraqi and the 
Algerian situation, the developments in Yemen, etc. The present report is not intended 
to repeat the data and facts that were contained in our earlier reports. 
 
 Also, we believe it is not our task to attempt to give a deep historical analysis 
of the present Middle Eastern crisis in any way because in our view this does not 
belong to the duties of our embassy. However, we would like to address some of the 
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current tasks involved in the foreign policy of the Soviet Union and the European 
socialist countries regarding the Middle East and explore, on this basis, some of the 
problems that are involved in the further possible developments of the Middle Eastern 
crisis from the point of view of the entire international situation. 
 
[…] 
 
… as far as the second danger is concerned, the United States– ultimately – would 
probably agree with the Soviet Union that breaking out a new war conflict with the 
danger of resulting in a world war is against its national interests. 
 
 By the nature of the issue, however, “ultimately agree” means that the two 
superpowers will only regard the renewal of warlike actions in the region as 
dangerous if both of them see roughly the same risk in a newly sparked conflict not 
remaining a local war. And as it is obvious that the danger of any new aggressive 
action may come from Israel, the United States must make sure that another attack on 
the Arab countries does not stay within the framework of the June war because the 
Soviet Union will not be able or will not want to keep such an event within this 
framework. This issue, however, does not emerge independently from place and time. 
As far as the place is concerned, because of its geographical proximity to Europe and 
the Soviet Union, the Middle East is obviously strategically an important region for 
the security of the Soviet Union. For this reason, The Soviet Union should or would 
take the explosion of any warlike conflict in this region than for instance in Vietnam 
or Cuba. As far as time is concerned: can the United States be sure that the Soviet 
Union will not test what military, economic and political burdens the United States 
can cope with in addition to Vietnam? 
 
For various reasons, the Soviet Union – as has often been stressed to our colleagues in 
the negotiations with the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs – is interested in keeping 
the international situation relatively relaxed and avoiding, if possible, any new 
sources of tension or the intensification of existing military conflicts. These reasons 
include /without going into a detailed analysis/: the China problem, the primary 
importance of raising the standard of living in domestic policy and economic reforms 
/not only in regard to the Soviet Union/ 
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 The Soviet comrades have the impression that even if, in view of the war in 
Vietnam, it cannot be claimed that the United States is also striving for international 
détente, it can be safely said that today the US is unlikely to intend to intensify 
tension in the international situation beyond certain limits. It is precisely because of 
Vietnam that it wants to avoid the intensification of tension because it does not want 
to multiply the military, economic domestic and foreign political difficulties that the 
war in Vietnam alone entails. The American government is obviously trying to 
increase cooperation and improve relations with the Soviet Union, or at least declares 
to do so, and to take steps in the international scene which demonstrate their intention 
to ease tension (the Outer Space Treaty, the Non-Proliferation Treaty, etc.). 
 
 As for the Middle Eastern conflict, if the crisis continues and turns into 
another warlike conflict, it would jeopardize the current relations between the Soviet 
Union and the United States. Even if direct military conflict between the two 
superpowers is envisaged as a last resort, the problem that the leaders of the United 
States should address is whether it is in the interest of the United States to put the 
Soviet Union into a situation in which – despite its obvious intentions – it has to 
modify its tactical approach which is used to accomplish the general strategic goal of 
peaceful coexistence. 
 What would such a modification involve? 
 1./ Obviously, under certain circumstances the Soviet Union might revise its 
current position regarding the support of national liberation movements. So far it has 
rejected the idea of demanding “two, three or even more Vietnams” but despite all the 
dangers involved in such a demand, will the Soviet Union not believe that such a 
change in its policy – let’s say today – would be more dangerous and detrimental to 
the United States than to the Soviet Union? 
 2./ It is possible that the Soviet Union will change its aid provided for 
Vietnam, more precisely, its policy of providing aid for Vietnam, turning it into more 
effective military aid. 
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 3./ It is also quite possible that the Soviet Union decides to establish an 
alliance with some con-aligned countries, for example with some countries in the 
Middle East. This would mean that the Soviet Union might attempt to change the 
slow progress that is beneficial to the socialist countries today in terms of 
international status quo by means of a more comprehensive attack on the status quo 
that prevails in the world today. 
 In order to avoid any misunderstanding we would like to repeat that today it is 
obvious that the Soviet Union has no intention to modify its tactical policy in this way 
because it sees such a change way too risky and believes that the right thing to do is to 
ensure the security of the Soviet Union on more sound bases and its progress in 
communist development. However: the United States must take into account that 
under certain circumstances the Soviet leaders may feel that this basic tactical 
standpoint should be changed and therefore, when they make a decision on their 
position regarding the developments in the Middle East, the American politicians 
must take into consideration that the Soviet Union might be forced to draw such 
general conclusions if the USA boycotts progress that is being made towards an 
acceptable political resolution of the conflict. 
 In sum: the general intensification of tension in the international situation, due 
to the prolongation or intensification of the Middle Eastern crisis – or to any other 
reason – is not in the interest of the socialist countries. However, since it is roughly 
equally not in the interest of the West either, there is a theoretical possibility for 
making progress towards the resolution of this crisis. However, it is the United States 
that has to take steps in this direction because they can decide whether they are 
willing to engage in a policy laden with the intensification of tension or not, since 
they have the means to influence the aggressor and prevent Israel from breaking out a 
general warlike conflict. 
 Obviously, the above considerations can hardly lead to any swift, radical 
solution in the Middle East, even if the American leaders are willing to consider these 
circumstance even as early as the next few days when Johnson has to reply Kosigin’s 
message. There are various reasons for this but one of the most important ones is that 
the United States and Israel still believe there is a possibility to overthrow the 
progressive Arab regimes, or at least some of them, without [...]  
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Translated by András Bocz 
Source: MOL XIX-J-1-j-SzU-1-001684/1/1967 (89.d) 
 
 
Document 8 
Report for the HSWP Politburo on weapons exports to the UAR and Syria by 
Minister of Defense Lajos Czinege 
 (21 October 1969) 
 
    STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL  
        
 
       Made in : 2 copies 
       1 copy consists of 3 pages 
       Copy No. [illegible]  
       Sfsz: T/214 
No.: 00546/1969 
       Seen by: Comrade Béla Biszku 
 
 
R E P O R T 
For the Politburo 
 
 In April this year the defense minister of the United Arab Republic requested 
us to provide for them as soon as possible the following military technology 
equipment worth about USD 60 million: 
- 400 57 mm anti-aircraft guns /together with radars, directors and telemeters/ 
- 200 57 mm double barrel  
- 100 armored reconnaissance trucks 
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- 680,000 57 mm ammunition. 
 
After consulting with the competent ministries we worked out the following 
position which we reported to the Defense Committee and I also informed the 
UAR’s defense minister about it in June. 
- Since Hungary has never manufactured 57 mm self-propelling anti-aircraft 
guns, we cannot provide these items for them; 
- We agreed to provide some of the other requested equipment (10% of the 
requested amount) with delivery beginning in 1971 – since we do not have any 
reserves – except for the radars, for we do not manufacture such equipment 
and we do not have any reserves either. 
- At the same time I offered to provide the other military items which were 
requested by their foreign trade organization. 
 
I have not received a written answer to my letter but Fawti and other state leaders 
of the UAR made exasperated and negative comments to our ambassador to Cairo 
claiming that we fail to understand and take their situation seriously and therefore 
they no longer see our willingness to assist them. The attitude towards us was 
growing cold and the Arab leaders also suggested that our position regarding their 
request might have a negative influence on political relations too. 
 
 Next, their foreign minister talked about this issue with Comrade Péter and the 
delegation of the Arab Socialist Union intervened in it when visiting Hungary at a 
meeting first with Comrade Lajos Fehér and later with Comrade János Kádár. 
 
 Taking all this into consideration – and based on my authorization – I sent a 
letter to Fawzi in September in which I suggested that there was a possibility to 
meet their need for military equipment, so it would be practical to send their 
military-economic experts to Hungary for negotiations. Their reaction was 
positive and their delegation of four members came to Hungary in September with 
Fawzi’s message in which he said it was vital for them to get the 57 mm guns and 
that they knew that only we could provide these guns for them. After we had 
outlined our problems concerning manufacturing and delivery and made another 
offer to them the delegation continued to stick with the original demand and 
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definitely asked us to provide at least 4 complete batteries in 1969 and begin 
continuous supply in 1970 on the basis of domestic production. 
 
 We re-evaluated the situation and asked the Soviet Union for help regarding 
the radars, to which we received a positive answer on 18 October. As a temporary 
solution, they will give us 22 overhauled radars in 1970/71. They will provide us 
with the documentation of the new, modernized RPK-1 radar in order to launch its 
manufacturing in the Hungarian People’s Republic with the purpose of meeting 
the needs of both the member states of the Warsaw Treaty Organization and the 
developing countries. 
 
In view of the above our position negotiated with the Ministry of Transport and 
Economy, for which I request the approval of the Politburo, is the following: 
 
1. We should provide 4 complete batteries /24 guns with 1000 pcs of 
ammunition for each/ from the supply of the people’s army – to be returned 
later. 
2. The Hungarian industry should begin to manufacture 73 batteries /a total of 
414 guns with 1000 pcs of ammunition for each/ – with gradual increase in 
quantity – in 1970 so that the requested quantity can be delivered by 1974 /if 
the UAR can agree with the schedule/. 
3. The Hungarian and the UAR’s economic and foreign trade organizations 
should carry out the necessary negotiations and sign the agreements for the 
equipment to be delivered in the amount of about 35-40 million US dollars. 
4. The Hungarian foreign trade organizations should make an agreement with the 
Soviet bodies on the radars and other items to be imported from the Soviet 
Union. 
 
After the Politburo has given its consent  
- I will inform the defense minister of the UAR on our position in a letter sent to 
our embassy in Cairo; 
- in collaboration with the affected state, economic and foreign trade bodies we 
will complete the exploration of the situation and submit a proposal for 
making the necessary state resolution. 
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Budapest, 20 October 1969. 
 
 
       Lajos Czinege 
Translated by András Bocz 
Source: MOL M-KS 288. F. 5/501 ő. E (1969.10.21.) 
 
 
 
 
Document 9 
 
Foreign Ministry memorandum on the Palestine Liberation Movement in 1970  
(Excerpts) 
(10 August 1970) 
 
 The strengthening of the Palestine Movement is closely related to Israel’s politics, 
which is based on acquiring territory, racial differentiation and persecuting the Arabs.  The 
process in which Israel became the main area of oppressing liberation movements, 
progressive systems and advancing imperialist ambitions is also connected to the Palestine 
Liberation Movement. The Movement’s main objectives are the following: fighting for 
autonomy for the Palestinian Arab people and the foundation of an independent state 
where Palestinian Arabs and Jews may live together with equal rights, hence the fighting 
for the destruction of Israel that was founded on the basis of race and religion. 
[…] 
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 The Palestine Movement is invariably still extremely fragmented and despite the 
efforts for a centralized leadership lead by organizations and partisan groups there is still 
an estimate of 100 movements. 
[…] 
 
 During the past 20 years of the liberation of the Palestinian people the movement 
went through great developments. In the beginning, it meant the issue of refugees that the 
UN and the Security Council tried to tackle. The SC resolutions declared that those 
seeking to go home should be granted the possibility to return to their homelands and 
granting compensation by Israel for those who did not wish to return. The 
implementations of these resolutions were rejected by Israel. 
[…] 
 
 The upsurge and strengthening of the Palestine Movement as well as appearing as 
a political and military actor introduced a new and difficult situation for the majority of 
the Arab countries, especially for Jordan and Lebanon. The influence of the Arab 
governments weakened towards the movement. Ten organizations that were included in 
the PLO, FATAH and the Central Committee together with the partisan groups are 
becoming more and more independent. They achieved authority in the Arab world thus 
most Arab governments are clearly inclined to support the Palestine Movement both 
financially and morally (part of the Arab countries founded their own Palestinian 
movements in hope of control – Syria founded the SAIKA and Iraq founded the Arab 
Liberation Front).  
 The PLO and the FATAH is more and more recognized internationally. One proof 
of this is their participation at the consultations of the non-aligned countries and first and 
foremost their successful ambition to seek contact with the socialist countries. This spring 
the delegation of the PLO lead by Yasser Arafat visited the Soviet Union, China and the 
Democratic Republic of Vietnam. The delegation of the PLO was welcomed by the 
Solidarity Committee while in China and in the DRV the delegations of the PLO and the 
FATAH were received on a governmental level. 
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 The socialist countries – with the exception of China – dealt carefully with the 
Palestine Movement however they are granting moral support in some cases even financial 
support for their cause. 
 Through the Hungarian Solidarity Committee our nation also met different 
Palestinian organizations. Until now the injured were seen to and skilled workers were 
offered training. Only the PLO was granted financial support. This year, for the first time, 
the scholars of the PLO were seen. Considering our future relations we recommend to 
consider the following points:  
 1, The Palestine Liberation Movement – along with all its current contradictions – 
is a manifestation of the anti-imperialist fight for the independence of the Palestinian 
people, the struggle for autonomy, recovering national rights and the getting back 
territories taken by Israel.  
 The movement’s most powerful element is the Palestine Liberation Organization 
(PLO) which is the closest to the politics, strategy and tactics of the EAK that plays the 
vital role in tackling the Middle-East crisis. Because of this, we should focus on our 
relations towards the PLO. Besides, we are in close relations with the ANSAR (Partisan 
Forces) that is a communist Palestine Liberation movement. 
 
 2, Considering the affiliations and advancements(in case it is required) in our 
relations, political and financial possibilities the partner of PLO should be the Hungarian 
Solidarity Committee and as for ANSAR, MSZMP should be responsible. For this, 
government bodies and social organizations should offer their help.  
 
 3, We should continue to distance ourselves from certain radical terrorist attacks 
committed by Palestinian groups, from declarations of propaganda concerning the ultimate 
destruction of Israel and the anti-communist statements.  
 
 4, Our press and informative bodies should stand up more bravely and 
determinedly for the just cause of the Palestinian people, furthermore they should also 
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shed some light on and explain the nature and challenges of the Palestinian movement and 
they should highlight the positive developments within the movement. 
 
Translated by Sabine Topolansky 
Source: MOL Küm, XIX-J-1-j, Palesztina Tük 1971. 72.d. 001302/8. The state of the 
Palestine Liberation Organisation (excerpts) Budapest 10 August 1970. Foreign Ministry 
analysis. 
Published in Hungarian in: J Nagy László, Magyarország és az arab térség – 
Kapcsolatok, vélemények, álláspontos 1947-1975 [Hungary and the Arab World – 
Connections, opinions, standpoints 1947-1975], JATE Press, Szeged, Hungary, 2006 
 
 
Document 10 
 
Foreign Ministry memorandum on Soviet Ambassador Titov’s briefing on Soviet 
foreign policy 
 
 (26 June 1970)  
 
 
Frigyes Puja      Strictly confidential! 
       Made in: 8 copies 
       Comrade Dr P. Várkonyi 
1. Comrade Péter 
2. Comrade Szilágyi 
3. Comrade Gyenes 
4. Comrade Holla–Comrade 
Bartha 
5. Moscow 
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6. Paris 
7. Comrade Csatorday 
8. Own copy 
Subject: Soviet Ambassador Titov’s visit 
 
M e m o r a n d u m 
 At your request I received Comrade Titov, the ambassador of the Soviet Union 
on 25 June. Comrade Titov informed us about Gromiko’s visit to France and U 
Thant’s visit to the Soviet Union. He gave us the following information: 
 “A. A. Gromiko, the foreign minister of the Soviet Union paid an official visit 
to France between 1 and 5 June. During this visit he met with President Pompidou, 
Prime Minister Chaban-Delmas, Foreign Minister Schumann and Minister of 
Economy and Finance Giscard d’Estain. The results of these negotiations are shown 
in the joint Soviet-French communiqué. 
 The most important result of the visit was that the French party confirmed its 
intention to pursue an independent foreign policy and to develop its relations with the 
Soviet Union and other socialist countries, which had originally begun by De Gaulle. 
The French statesmen, including President Pompidou himself, all firmly stated – 
among other things – that no country or a group of countries should be able to damage 
the steadily improving relations with the Soviet Union.  The French hosts created an 
atmosphere of friendship and good will which clearly reflected the attitude of the 
French government. 
 During the talks it was confirmed that the French were somewhat concerned 
that a possible agreement with the German Federal Republic on abandoning the use of 
force might reduce the interest of the Soviet Union in maintaining its good relations 
with France. 
 […]  
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It was also suggested that the Soviet party should nominate one of the secretaries of 
the Central Committee as chairman of the intergovernmental cultural committees. 
However, this would extremely overburden the affected CC secretary. 
4./ Comrade Vinogradov touched upon the Middle Eastern situation several 
times. In his evaluation the new situation resulting from the acceptance of the Rogers 
plan by the UAR is very positive, creating an opportunity to resolve the deadlock 
regarding the resolution of the crisis. He described the policy of the UAR leaders as 
mature although he also noted that emotional elements were still characteristic of their 
reactions. For example, after consulting the UAR the Soviets presented a draft to the 
United States in the spring which outlined what would be concretely needed to create 
a status of peace in the Middle East. According to this draft a status of peace would 
mean that the countries in the region would not only abandon the use of force or 
threaten with the use of force but would also commit themselves to the following: 
they will not allow private individuals or groups to launch any hostile action against 
another country. This draft proposal had been leaked out and was published in the 
Israeli press. Some of the UAR leaders concluded from it that it was a wrong decision 
to present the draft to the Americans. However, the Soviets convinced the Egyptians 
that leaking out the draft was good for them, strengthening the Arab positions and 
helping the isolation of Israel. 
 Similarly, the UAR first wanted to reject the Rogers plan. The Soviets 
persistently worked on convincing the UAR leaders that they should accept the plan 
precisely because it did not contain anything new and the Americans wanted to 
capitalize, in a political sense, on the fact that the UAR would likely reject it. This 
step can be used to force the United States to take action that would lead to the 
resolution of the conflict. 
 Further progress depends on whether the United States will exert the required 
pressure on Israel. It would be in Israel’s interest to make an agreement on the 
settlement of the issue now – with the Egyptian leadership headed by Nasser – 
because later they may have to come to an agreement with the Palestine movement 
and rather than with Nasser. The political nature of this movement is very complex – 
including Maoists as well as CIA agents and many others – and it is doubtful whether 
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they will be willing to negotiate any time in the future on the basis of the recognition 
of the state of Israel. 
 Comrade Vinogradov was extremely skeptical about the idea of establishing a 
Palestinian state. He stressed that there was no country that would be willing make its 
territory available for this new state. 
 As far as the perspectives of the Palestinian movement are concerned, the 
Soviet comrades view the situation somewhat differently from Nasser. Nasser is sure 
that if Israel withdraws from the territories occupied in 1967 and is ready to 
implement the UN resolutions on the refugee issue, the Palestinian movement will 
essentially cease to exist. The Soviet party is rather skeptical in this respect. 
 
5./ There was some progress towards the resolution of the relations between Iran 
and the UAR with the help of the Soviet contribution. The shah was extremely 
flexible in that he gave up the original demand to require Nasser to apologize to him 
and the only thing he insisted on was that the normalization of diplomatic relations 
should be based on a direct Egyptian initiative.  The immediately agreed that the two 
countries would send diplomats to each other’s countries who will, for the time being, 
work within another embassy. /Formally it is like the American “department” 
working within the Spanish embassy in Cairo./ 
 
Translated by András Bocz 
Source: MOL XIX-J-1-j-SzU-146-00358/17/1970 
 
 
Document 11 
HSWP CC Foreign Affairs Department Proposal on the financial support for the 
Israeli Communist Party  
(23 August 1971) 
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Hungarian Socialist Worker’s Party    STRICTLY   
        CONFIDENTIAL! 
Central Committee      Made in: 2 copies 
Foreign Affairs Department     Budapest, 23 August 
1971 
 
114/5 
 
P R O P O S A L 
submitted to the Secretariat 
 
 
 At the invitation of the Hungarian Socialist Worker’s Party the delegation of 
the Central Committee of the Israeli Communist Party, headed by David Khenin, 
member of the Politburo and secretary of the Central Committee, paid a goodwill visit 
to Hungary between 5 and 18 this month. 
 
 During the negotiations the leader of the delegation requested the Central 
Committee of HSWP to grant financial support to the Central Committee of the sister 
party which was struggling with financial difficulties. 
 
 In the past few years we have provided the Israeli sister party with support in 
the amount of USD 13,000 including both in kind and financial aid. 
 
 We propose to satisfy the Israeli request and award them a one-off in cash in 
the amount of USD 5000. This amount should be sent by the Foreign Affairs 
Department of the CC. 
 
 The Department of Party Economy and Management has approved of this 
proposal. 
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      /András Gyenes/ 
 
 
 
      
 
Translated by András Bocz 
Source: MOL M-KS 288. f. 5/563. ő. E (1971.09.07.) 47R/79 
 
Document 12 
 
Foreign Ministry report on current foreign affairs 
(Excerpt)  
(23 February 1974) 
 
 
[…] 
 
4./  The Middle Eastern conflict 
They want to pursue the same political course in order to find a solution. They try to 
ensure that more comprehensive series of negotiations are conducted which do not 
end by the separation of troops and the talks in Geneva continue. If the resolution of 
the issues is stuck with the separation of troops, it would result in the conservation of 
the conflict and the increase in American influence and possibilities. 
They will increase the number of meetings in the future with the Arab countries that 
are directly affected. Comrade Gromiko will travel to Cairo, the deputy secretary of 
the Iraqi Baath Party will soon visit Moscow and they will prepare President Assad’s 
visit to Moscow. 
Comrade Katusev stressed that in the future the socialist countries should pay more 
attention to the most progressive Arab countries surrounding Egypt, especially to 
Syria and Iraq as well as Algeria, despite its weakness, and to strengthening relations 
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between these states and the socialist countries. In doing so, we will, together with 
Somalia and South Yemen, two other progressive countries, strengthen progressive 
movements and the influence of the socialist countries and the Soviet Union in the 
Middle Eastern region. This will have beneficial effects on Egypt both in terms of the 
American influence and in terms of reducing room for maneuvering in Egypt. They 
are also considering how the Soviet Union’s and the socialist countries’ efforts could 
be appropriately coordinated in regards to these countries.  
5./ Indochina 
The Soviet comrades are definitely less concerned about the possibility of one or the 
other party sparking another war. They believe that the current “neither war nor 
peace” situation will be maintained in the next period too [...]   
 
Translated by András Bocz 
Source: MOL XIX-J-1-j-SzU-144-00-1577-3/1974 (106d) 
 
 
 
 
Document 13 
 
Saddam Hussein’s political portrait - compiled for foreign minister Frigyes Puja 
prior to the Iraqi leader’s visit to Hungary in May 1975 
(26 March 1975) 
 
Saddam Hussein: 
• deputy secretary-general of the Regional Directorate of the Baath party 
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• vice-president of the Revolutionary Commanding Council 
 
 He was born in 1937. He went to elementary school in his hometown Tikriti and 
attended middle school in Baghdad. 
 Six months before completing his education, Saddam was charged with the 
assassination of Abdul Karim Qasim and was arrested. He first fled to Syria then to the 
EAK, where he finished middle school in 1962. 
 He returned to Iraq at the time of the 1963 Ramadan Revolution (8
 
February) 
during the first time the Baath took over authority. In the 1962-1963 school year Saddam 
studied law however he did not pass exams in his second year party due to health issues 
(he had an appendectomy) and partly because his participation in organizing the partisan 
movements. 
 In 1964 he was taken into custody during the arresting campaigns of the regime in 
power. He remained in prison until 1966 (where he escaped from with his friend: Abdul 
Karim al-Sheikly – former minister of Foreign Affairs). Until his case was closed he loved 
on illegality.  
 After the 17 July 1968 revolution he continued his studies in Law and completed 
his education in 1972.  
He is married and has four children. 
He does not speak any foreign language. 
He has lead an official government and party delegation in the Soviet Union on 4 August 
1970 as a guest of the CPSU and the Soviet government. Since then he has paid three 
official visits to the Soviet Union (the last in February 1974). 
 Vice-president of the Revolutionary Commanding Council and on the 8
th
 Regional 
Congress of the Baath party Saddam Hussein was re-elected in January 1974 as deputy 
secretary general of the Regional Directorate.  
 During the past six months paid official visits to: India, Yugoslavia, Spain, Tunisia 
and Algeria. His planned visit to the Soviet Union did not occur just yet. He attended the 
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Arab Summit in Rabat and the OPEC discussions in Algeria. During visits paid by the 
Yugoslav, Bangladeshi, East German, French prime ministers and the Indian prime 
minister, Saddam Hussein has lead the discussions as prime minister.  
 
His political portrait: 
 
 He is a progressive, nationalist patriot. In the past decade his political views 
improved significantly: from a conspirator Baath party member he came to be a mature 
politician who is aware of the importance of the alliances with progressive forces, thus co-
operates with socialist countries and the Soviet Union in order to fight imperialists. He 
reads a lot, educating himself and broadening his political range of vision. There is still 
some nationalistic aspects concerning his political views, however he cannot be viewed as 
a narrow-minded nationalist.  
 In the past four years his influence in the party significantly increased. Today he is 
more than just the ‘second person’. He confined his political opponents. His relationship 
and cooperation with president al-Bakr is balanced. Saddam does not fight with the 
president only the president’s men. His authority increased in the past few months not 
only in Iraq but in the Arab community as well. According to several Arab diplomats: 
Boumedien and Saddam Hussein are the two major leaders in the Arab world, since they 
hold the highest authority and they are both strong handed, forward leading personalities.  
 His relations with the Iraqi communists is not bad, they are objective. 
 Concerning the Kurdish issue Saddam has a firm opinion. He believes in hard 
military actions combined with political actions. In the present situation he truly seeks a 
just solution for the Arab nationalists and seeks to resolve the Kurd problem for good. 
 Saddam pays great attention to Domestic Security and National Defense. 
 Concerning the economy his main goal was to incorporate the oil economy into the 
progressive domestic development: resulting the formation of an ideal Arab state. He 
emphasizes that the alliances with socialist countries is indispensable which also has to be 
an example that has to be followed. In order to achieve these goals he still seeks to find 
 82 
Iraq's own economic program, though his views are still somewhat immature. In this, the 
economic advisors who surround him do not really help him, since concerning economic 
development they propose entirely different, sometimes contradicting theories.  
 Saddam is a talented, well to do politician who is far the most eligible leader 
amongst other Iraqi leaders. He holds absolute authority around him, his relation with his 
colleagues is hard. 
 
As a negotiation partner: 
 
 In the past few years he paid visits to the Soviet Union four times. Three times 
comrade Kosigin was his discussion partner (During Saddam’s first visit c. Kosigin was 
not in Moscow). Comrade Brezhnev saw Saddam at all times.  
 He has won the sympathy and respect of Soviet leaders with his personality. They 
believe him to be a talented politician and he is called ‘comrade’. During negotiations he 
acts reserved, but friendly. He raises questions openly and answers them honestly in a 
comrade-like fashion. He is a good discussion partner, since anything he means to say is 
logical, right to the point and spoken with excellent language. Because of this, a well-
prepared, fluent translator is vital. 
 His nationalist views are primarily concerning the Arab-Israeli issues. In the near 
future, during discussions the issue of Hafez Assad will most likely be raised. 
 Concerning bilateral relations, economic co-operations and possible problems – 
unlike other Iraqi leaders – Saddam's attitude is not narrow-minded. He emphasizes the 
fact that strengthening relations is essential. He shows special interest in long-term 
planning. 
 He is not fond of busy programs. During his four visits to the Soviet Union he only 
went to Leningrad besides Moscow. He declined offers to visit the countryside (Siberia, 
Caucasus) and he emphasized the fact that the aim of his visits is to meet Soviet leaders 
and talk as much as possible. 
 Since he is not entirely healthy (lumbar inter-vertebral disk syndrome) he gets tired 
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easily and spends his evenings with rest, reading rather than going out. Thus he did not 
participate in the evening programs. The Soviet comrades organized film screenings for 
him: he mostly enjoyed documentaries on advanced military technology, field-exercises 
and war movies. During his visits he was taken to visit military units, witness smaller 
maneuvers and he always enjoyed these programs. 
 He is not a gourmand. He seldom drinks. He enjoys hunting, which is why Soviet 
leaders always give him presents related to hunting or presents for his wife. His favorite 
sport is tennis.  
 Concerning protocol, formalities he is quite sensible, he expects proper reception.  
Translated by Sabine Topolansky 
MOL M-KS 288.f. 32/1975. 9.ő.e. - Frigyes Puja ordered the compilation of information 
on Saddam Hussein two months before his visit to Hungary 
Published in Hungarian in: J Nagy László, Magyarország és az arab térség – 
Kapcsolatok, vélemények, álláspontos 1947-1975 [Hungary and the Arab World – 
Connections, opinions, standpoints 1947-1975], JATE Press, Szeged, Hungary, 2006 
 
 
 
Document 14 
 
Report to the HSWP Political Committee on the visit of the special envoy of 
Saddam Hussein in Hungary  
(13 October 1980) 
 
 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
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Top Secret! 
 
Prepared in 7 copies 
 
Copy 
number: 1. 
Attachment: rough 
translation of 
written message 
REPORT 
for the Political Committee 
 
 
 
on Naem Hamid Haddad, Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister, Saddam Hussein’s special 
envoy’s visit to Budapest. 
 
 
 
 
The Iraqi party requested on 7  October 1980 that Naem Hamid Haddad carrying 
Saddam Hussein’s  message  to  Comrade  Pál  Losonczi  [Chairman  of  the  
Presidential  Council]  be recieved. (Our embassy reported that the Iraqi president 
sent special envoys to 27 countries. Naem Hamis Haddad, Deputy Prime 
Minister, the President of the Iraqi National Assembly was  sent  to  the  
European  Socialist  countries   /Bulgaria,  Hungary,  Romania,  German 
Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia, Poland). 
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Comrade Pál Losonczi met the Iraqi special envoy on 10 October, who delivered 
President Saddam Hussein’s written message. Based on the wording of the message 
it is likely that that the same message was sent to each country. 
The message stresses that their aim is to consult with and exchange opinion with 
the friendly countries over the conflict with Iran, and stresses that the Iraqi 
leadership intends to enhance the  cooperation  with  the  countries  friendly  to  
Iraq  in  the  future.  It  reviews  the  events preceding to armed conflict and stresses 
Iraq’s readiness for a negotiated settlement. 
Naem Hamid added the following to 
the message. 
 
President Saddam Hussein received him before the departure and informed him that 
he would meet with  friends in Hungary who would understand him. Saddam 
Hussein sends his kind regards to Comrades János Kádár and Pál Losonczi. 
[...] 
The Iraqi leadership thoroughly considered the impacts of the war, primarily the 
dangers of the involvement of the United States. The Iraqi leadership is 
convinced that the Americans’ involvement  was  coordinated  with  the  Iranian  
leadership.  The  aim  of  holding  back  the American hostages in Iran is that the 
Fleet of the United States is already in the area with the aim to “defend friends”. It 
is characteristic of the American  behavior that when Hammadi, Iraqi Foreign 
Minister’s made a remark on the delivery of US war material to Iran, Secretary of 
State Muskie responded that the United States sold weapons and parts to Iran worth 
of only 
50 Million $. There are American military advisors still 
staying in Iran. 
Iraq is determined to prevent the United States from being involved in the region’s 
affairs; the security of the Arab Gulf and Indian Ocean is the concern of the peoples 
living there. 
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Iraq accepted the mediation attempts not from the position of weakness, but from 
the position of power and  even more, it was ready to order an unilateral cease-
fire. She accepted the Security Council’s call, too. 
[...] 
Iran’s real aims concerning the continuation of the conflict are not known [to Iraq]. 
The Iraqi leadership can imagine that the Iranian religious leaders’ aim is the 
complete weakening of both the Iraqi and Iranian Armies so that, having achieved 
this, the “Islamic Army” come on stage in order to spread the Islamic Revolution. 
In order to prevent the aims of the United States, they consult with their friends, 
the Socialist countries in the first place. The Iraqi leadership thinks that more 
pressure needs to be put on the Iranian regime in order to enforce a negotiated 
settlement on them. 
They expect help from their Hungarian friends as well. They ask that we speed up 
the delivery of military and economic goods necessary for war. They especially 
ask that we make the Iranian party participate in the peaceful settlement.  Iraq is 
ready to accept the multinational organizations’ resolutions calling for a cease-fire 
and talks and is ready to listen to and review its friends’ views and advice. 
Comrade Losonczi explained that our friends in Iraq might be right in many issues 
pertaining to the preceding events, but now what is important is not to consider it, 
but to do everything possible so that the international tension do not increase, 
prevent the imperialist circles from [executing] their intentions aimed at 
intervention. 
[...] 
Our main concern is the danger of the continuation and the escalation of the 
conflict, thus providing potential for an  open  intervention  by the imperialist 
forces. Consequently our common aim is the settlement of the conflict and the 
prevention of the involvement of the imperialist circles. We have to work on it 
jointly.  
[...] 
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Comrade Losonczi stressed that according to friendly relations between our 
countries, we want  to  meet  all  our  contractual  obligations.  Due  to  the  war, 
the  execution  of  our undertakings is not untroubled. The relevant economic 
and trade organs are working on meeting our previous undertakings, both in the 
delivery of the special items and the food and other items. We try to speed up 
certain deliveries, such as meat, canned food, bus parts and machines. We are 
reviewing the additional request by the Iraqi party. 
Those specialists, who are forced to discontinue their activity, are ready to return 
as soon as the conditions  enable them to do so. We are ready to participate in 
the restoration of war damages. We wish not to have any problems in our friendly 
cooperation due to the events. 
We have friendly relations with Iraq, also based on the basic principle that we 
have common aims in the fight  against imperialism. We have respected Iraq’s 
anti-imperialist policy, its positive  role  in  the  non-aligned   movement’s  anti-
imperialist  wing  and  the  results  of development of the Iraqi economy. 
XXX 
 
A member of Naem Haddad’s attendance had separate negotiations with 
Technika Foreign Trade Company [the Hungarian Foreign Trade company for 
military materials]. 
 
Budapest, 13 October 1980 
 
Translated by: Levente Gajdócsi 
Source: MOL, 288.f. 32/1980/62. ő.e. 
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Document 15 
 
 
 
Report of the Hungarian Embassy in Iraq on the developments of 
Soviet-Iraqi relations  
(2 March 1981) 
 
 
 
 
 
00/448/1 
 
No. 41/TS/81. TOP SECRET! 
Rapporteur: Dr. Gy. Tatár Baghdad, 2 March 1981 
Written in four copies Subject: Developments 
in Soviet- Copies to: three copies to Centre  Iraqi relations 
one copy to Embassy 
 
Typed by: Kurucsai 
 
 
 
To Comrade FRIGYES PUJA  
Foreign Minister 
Budapest 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Since the beginning of 1978, several events have taken place 
contributing to the deterioration of the Iraqi-Soviet political relations. 
a/ In the spring of 1978, the Iraqi leadership stood up against the Iraqi 
Communist Party  openly,  they  started  persecuting  communists  legally,  which  
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meant  that  the  Iraqi Progressive and National Front  became formal and 
progressive elements were definitely excluded from power in perspective. 
b/ At the beginning of 1980, in connection with the events in Afghanistan, 
Iraq started heated campaigns against the Soviet Union, during which she 
compared the Soviet Union to fascist Germany among others. 
 
c/ In February 1980, Iraq proclaimed the National Charter, which called all 
the states of the region to "keep superpowers away from the region" and to "keep 
equal distance from the two superpowers". Practically, this programme can be 
considered a major step in the Iraqi estrangement from the Soviet Union. 
d/ From the beginning of the Iraqi-Iranian conflict, based on her neutral 
position taken in the war, the Soviet Union froze her weapon consignments to 
Iraq. After the Soviet Union had rejected the Iraqi leadership's repeated initiative to 
restart transportation, in the Iraqi press and news releases there appeared more and 
more -  anonymous - reports and implied hints characterising  the  Soviet  Union  
as  "an  unfaithful  ally".  At  the  same  time,  they  gave conspicuously great 
publicity to Mirage planes, the first group of which arrived in Iraq at last after 
several postponements. 
In the past three years, parallel with the above events, economic and, 
especially in 
 
1980, also political relations strengthened between Iraq and the developed capitalist 
countries. A careful opening characterised military relations as well. 
Iraq's relations with the progressive countries of the region kindled sometimes /see 
Syria/, but they  remained  basically  cold  and,  here  and  there,  even  hostile.  
At  the  same  time  an unambiguous process of rapprochement started in the 
direction of Arab reactionary regimes. This  above  tendency  became  more  
emphatic  as  a  result  of  the  fact  that  the  pace  of development of economic 
relations between the Soviet Union and Iraq slowed down, and the decline in the 
total volume could be prevented only by increasing the export of special [a code 
name for: military] Soviet products. By 1980, it had become obvious that the Iraqi 
leadership called the Soviet Union her "strategic ally" because of the arms 
consignments, and that they did not sharpen the latent political conflicts because it 
could be retorted by a decrease in the arms consignments, which served as a basic 
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precondition of Iraq's success and her endeavour to become a superpower in the 
region. 
Recently, in spite of the express and implied Iraqi attacks, the Soviet 
Union has continued her  efforts to expand and deepen bilateral political and 
economic relations by moving  her  own  interests  to   the   foreground  more  
emphatically  -  with  little  success. Seemingly, she tried to maintain normal 
relations between the two countries. 
 
From the point of view of the future development of bilateral relations, 
the Iraqi- Iranian  war  may  be  considered  a  negative  milestone:  with  the  
freezing  of  Soviet  arms supplies, the strongest link between the two countries has 
been torn. 
The Soviet Union's behaviour during the war up to now has given several leaders – 
being anti- Soviet anyhow -- a trump-card, which they cannot play yet for three 
reasons: 
1/ They hope that eventually the Soviet Union will restore her 
consignments, without which the promised victory can hardly be imagined. 
2/ They are afraid that in case they poison relations, the numerous 
Soviet experts remaining in Iraq during the war will not continue their work, which 
would mean that several economic projects of key importance would become 
paralyzed in the country. 
3/ They are aware that an open break-off with the Soviet Union in the 
present straits would render  the country completely defenseless against the 
intentions of the developed capitalist countries and the USA. 
At the same time, it may be taken for granted that the camp of those demanding the 
break-off of relations with the Soviet Union will play the "trump-card" sooner or 
later. 
The so far implied anti-Soviet nature of the top leadership and their becoming 
even more pragmatic during the war than before - they take only the arms 
suppliers into account in the competition taking place in other fields of the 
economy as well - have encouraged the middle level economic leadership mainly 
oriented toward the West anyway, and, making use of the favourable opportunity, 
they try to oust the Soviet companies completely out of the market. Their 
activities during the war will set back the level of economic relations for the next 
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one or two years. / Soviet economic experts said, "Before the war in quite a few 
cases it was sure that the Soviet company would win the tender. However, as a 
result of the "punitive" actions all tenders have been won by other countries."/ 
In the Soviet Union's Middle-Eastern strategic position a crucial change was 
caused by her signing an Agreement of Friendship and Co-operation with Syria in 
the Fall of 1980. This way  she  achieved  that  the  possible  loss  of  the  Iraqi  
ally,  becoming  more  and  more problematical in the region,- the termination of 
the Agreement of Friendship signed in 1972 - would not result in the complete 
weakening of her positions. This way, it has become possible to pursue a more self-
confident policy concerning Iraq. 
 
In the future it may be hardly expected that the Soviet Union will restore her 
consignments to Iraq as it could result in the USA's direct arms transportation to 
Iran, which would contradict the  interests  of  the  Soviet   Union  and  the  
socialist  camp.  Moreover,  the  renewal  of consignments would effect only 
temporary positive changes in the Iraqi leadership's relations with the Soviet 
Union. 
Based on the above, we may make the following statements: 
 
1/ Political  relations  between  the  Soviet  Union  and  Iraq  have  
continuously  been deteriorating since 1978, that is the beginning of the 
consolidation of the position of the pro- Western, anti-Communist Iraqi leaders 
represented by Saddam Hussein. The sharpness of the forms of manifestation have 
depended on the importance of momentary Iraqi interests. 
2/ In 1975 Iraq was economically open toward the developed capitalist 
countries, which, by 1980, has resulted in the Soviet Union and the socialist camp 
being pushed into the background from an economic point of view. 
3/ The termination of Soviet arms consignments constituting the most 
important link between the Soviet Union and Iraq on the one hand, the 
consolidation of existing economic and political relations between Iraq and the 
developed capitalist countries and the tightening of co-operation between Iraq and 
the reactionary Arab regimes on the other hand, have openly directed Iraq toward 
the West. 
4/ At the end of the war, the present implied hints concerning the Soviet 
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Union are likely to turn into an open attack, the extent and forms of which may 
be assessed only with difficulty at present. 
5/ In the near future it may be expected that Iraq will press the Soviet 
Union through the socialist camp to restore her indirect arms consignments at 
least and that Iraq will try to obtain supplies from the other members of the 
socialist camp. 
6/ Tendencies in recent years suggest that the process of fermentation 
started in the relations between the Soviet Union and Iraq may take a favourable 
turn only in case of a new, more progressive Iraqi political leadership coming to 
power. 
 
 
Lajos Gonda 
 
Ambassador 
 
 
Translated by: Zsófia Zelnik 
Source: MOL, 288.f. 32/1981/60. ő.e. 
 
 
 
 
 
Document 16 
 
HSWP CC Foreign Affairs Department proposal on the development of tourism 
between Israel and Hungary 
(24 March 1981) 
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Hungarian Socialist Worker’s Party    STRICTLY   
        CONFIDENTIAL! 
Central Committee      Made in: 2 copies 
Foreign Affairs Department     Budapest, 24 March 1981 
 
 
P R O P O S A L 
submitted to the Politburo 
         Dr József Németh 
 
The leaders of the Israeli Communist Party submitted a request to the Central 
Committee of HSWP to ensure that the Hungarian authorities ease the restrictions on 
the entry of Israeli citizens into Hungary.  
 
According to the ICP a more flexible via policy would receive a favorable 
political response in progressive Israeli circles and could also mitigate the effects of 
anti-socialist propaganda in Israel. 
 
 The ICP also has financial interests in the visits of Israeli citizens to Hungary. 
Israeli tourism with a Bulgarian destination has been generating significant earnings 
for the foreign trade company of the party for years now. The company would like to 
expand its business activity in tourism in Hungary too. 
 
 The earnings of the party-owned company are used to support various 
activities of ICP. 
 
 We propose to grant the ICP’s request on condition that this year the entry of 
2000 Israeli citizens will be permitted and that the quotas for the next years will be 
determined on the basis of the political experiences gained this year. 
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 We have consulted the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Department of 
Economic Policy and Public Administration of the Central Committee on this 
proposal. 
 
       /János Berecz/ 
 
       
 
Translated by András Bocz 
Source: MOL M-KS 288. F. 5/823. ő. e (1981.03.28.) 1R/67 
 
 
 
 
Document 17 
 
 
Foreign Ministry report on the visit of the Iraqi deputy prime minister in 
Hungary between 18-20 March 1981  
(30 March 1981) 
 
 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
Top Secret! 
 
003/13 
 
Briefing 
 
On the official visit of Taha Jassin Ramadhan, First Deputy Prime Minister to 
Hungary 
 
 
/Based on [Foreign Minister] Comrade 
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Puja’s report/ 
 
 
Taha Jassin Ramadhan, member of the Revolutionary Council of the Republic of 
Iraq, First Deputy  Prime  Minister,  at  the  invitation  of  György  Lázár,  President  
of  the  Council  of Ministers paid an official visit to the People’ Republic of 
Hungary between 18 and 20 March, 1981. Taha Jasin Ramadhan was received by 
Comrades János Kádár and Pál Losonczi. The Iraqi First Deputy Prime Minister had 
discussions with Comrade György Lázár. Taha Jassin Ramdhan invited Comrade 
György Lázár for an official visit to Iraq. An official communiqué was issued, at 
Iraq’s initiation. Simultaneously with T.J. Ramadhan’s visit, the 7th  session of the 
Hungarian-Iraqi Economic Cooperation Permanent Joint Committee was held. The 
Minutes of the session was signed by the Co-Chairmen of Joint Committee, József 
Marjai, Deputy Prime Minister and Hassan Ali, Iraqi Minister of Commerce. 
 
[. . .] 
 
[T.J. Ramadhan reported on the internal situation and economic development in Iraq] 
Parliamentary elections were held on democratic basis in 1980. The internal 
situation inI raq is stable. People support the government even in the midst of war. 
The aim of the Baath Party is to build up a socialist society, free from exploitation, in 
Iraq and in the Arabic world. Comrade János Kádár said, that we welcomed the 
revolution in Iraq from the beginning, as we saw them to become the owner of 
their own faith  and natural resources, and that they themselves  want  to  lead  the  
direction  of  the  country’s  development.  We  welcomed  the revolution wanting 
Socialism and its anti-imperialist nature. 
 
III. 
 
Comrade György Lázár gave an overall picture of our aims and of our views on 
the most important international issues. He empathetically talked about the new 
offensive launched by imperialism against international peace and security, against 
détente and disarmament and he declared that the World’s progressive forces should 
take a strong line against that. He outlined our position on solving the crisis in the 
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Middle East, the peace and security of the Persian Gulf. He deplored the conflict 
between Iraq and Iran, pointing out its dangers and urging the restoration of peace. 
[. . .] 
 
 
 
[T.J. Ramadhan declared that] 
 
In Iraq’s foreign policy, strengthening of the ties with the Socialist countries is an 
important element 
[. . .] 
 
During the talks, T.J. Ramdhan put the issue of the war between Iraq and Iran in 
the center. He emphasized that the dispute between the two countries over the 
borders were centuries old. Iran had always exploited Iraq’s relative weakness to 
grasp further and further territories. In 1975, due to internal problems, Iraq was 
forced to give in. After the revolution in Iran, Iraq tried all  possible  ways to 
enforce its rights put forth in different treaties. Iranians did not answer to Iraqi 
petitions,  and even threatened occupying further Iraqi territories, called the Shiite 
population in Iraq for a revolt and then started to shell and bombard Iraqi cities 
starting on 4 September 1980.  Between 4 and 22 September Iraq tried to warn Iran 
several times with no effect, thus she was forced to deal the Iranian troops a 
blow with a  military action launched on 22 September 1980. 
 
 
The Iraqi Army reached its goal in a week. Following this, the Iraqi leadership 
expressed its intention for a cease-fire. Iran was proposed to admit Iraq’s claims 
and hold discussions on disputed questions. Iraq does  not want to acquire Iranian 
territories, and, maintaining its claims, is ready to withdraw its troops to a line 
accepted by both parties. Iraq wants peace from a power position and would like to 
maintain good neighborhood relationships with Iran. Iraq demonstrated its good will 
by responding positively to the calls for a cease-fire from the UN Security Council 
already at the beginning of the war, supporting mediation by non- aligned, 
Islamic countries and the UN. 
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Iraq wants peace but is prepared for a long  war, too. The Iraqi Army is well 
prepared; its moral status is good. The relationship between the leadership and the 
people is perfect. The work ethic is good in the hinterland. 
 
[. . .] 
Comrade János Kádár said that the war between Iraq and Iran took us by 
surprise. We are concerned, as we know that imperialism takes advantage of all 
situations like this. We did not welcome Iraq’s step but we did not  condemn it 
either. We stressed, that the war causes damages. We welcome the Iraqi intentions 
for talks and consider them important. 
 
On the Iranian revolution, Comrade János Kádár said that we welcomed the 
outbreak of the revolution, as it  was a blow on imperialism. The Iranian world 
of ideas is far from us; currently the nature of this revolution is not fully clear to 
us. 
 
 
We appreciate  the  non-aligned  movement  and  Iraq’s  role  within  it.  The  non-
aligned movement is  known to involve different elements and this underlines 
Iraq’s role in this movement at a greater extent. We wish Iraq successes for its 
activity in this movement. 
 
 
Comrade Pál Losonczi [Chairman of the Presidential Council], speaking of the Iraq-
Iran war, welcomed the efforts of the Iraqi leadership for a peaceful settlement. We 
wish the peaceful settlement of all disputed questions in every case. We are 
concerned about the protraction of the conflict, thus providing a pretext for  the  
imperialists to strengthen their position in the area. 
 
 
We welcome the Iranian revolution, however, we condemn the export of the 
revolution. In our opinion, there is a perplexing situation in Iran, many would like to 
restore the old regime. 
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IV. 
 
 
Speaking about the bilateral relationship, Comrade György Lázár expressed, that 
we are interested in their comprehensive development on the ground of mutual 
benefits. 
 
 
Taha Jassin Ramadhan emphasized that his visit took place based on a special 
decision. The aim of his visit was to raise our relationship on a higher level. Iraq 
has its determined aim to raise our cooperation to a special level. The relations are 
developing well between the two countries, even if we had conflicts, we could 
settle them with mutual understanding. We have done  a  lot  for  developing  the  
relations,  however,  there  are   still  plenty  unexplored opportunities. We have 
common aims, we are building a new society, pursue anti-imperialist course of 
policy, we are small countries. We need to apply new methods on new fields. 
However, we need to open every door for a widening cooperation. Closed door 
hinder the relations. The development of the relations can be developed fast if we 
are mutually ready to examine the  other party’s claims. In the period to come we 
need greater coordination to achieve  our  goals  and  to  prevent  the  activities  of  
those  not  interested  in  widening  the Hungarian-Iraqi cooperation. 
 
 
Iraq wishes sincerely that Hungary participate in accomplishing the development 
plans in Iraq at a greater  extent. We must search new areas of cooperation. Iraq is 
firmly determined to urge the cooperation in all areas. 
 
 
V. 
 
 
Simultaneously with the talks were held the meeting of the Joint Committee, and 
other trade meetings. 
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During the Joint Committee talks, the Iraqi party talked with appreciation of the  
Hungarian experts’ firmness and good work in Iraq. 
 
 
The two parties recorded that since the meeting of the Joint Committee in August 
1980, the economic   cooperation  between  the  two  countries  have  accelerated  
and  have  become undisturbed. They agreed to maintain this tendency and speed up 
the decision-making process mutually. 
 
 
During the talks, new opportunities of cooperation were revealed, including the 
participation in oil and gas  mining and storing, electrification, vehicle construction 
and delivery on the road, planning and construction of the underground in Baghdad 
and development of the Iraqi agriculture. These were recorded in the minutes of the 
Joint Committee. 
 
 
The technical-scientific  cooperation  work  schedule  for  the  years  1981-1982  
was  signed. However, this will only be effective when the Iraqi party positively 
returns to the settlement of financial/payments problems. 
 
Dr. Taha  Ibrahim  Al-Abdullah,  Minister  of  Planning  had  talks  with  Comrade  
dr.  Lajos Faluvégi on the possibilities for cooperation in planning. 
 
 
 
During the talks in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs the Iraqi party recommended 
the development of the cooperation and working relations between the two 
foreign ministries. The Hungarian party raised those issues that hinder the work 
of our foreign representations and citizens in Iraq. 
 
 
The representatives of the Ministry of Transportation and Post held discussions 
with their Iraqi partners. During the talks the Iraqi party submitted the proposals 
of the treaty for road delivery and company transportation. 
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Budapest, 30 March 1981. 
 
 
Translated by: Levente Gajdócsi 
Source: MOL, 288.f. 32/1981/60. ő. e. 
 
 
 
Document 18 
 
Announcement by Prime Minister György Lázár on the new Soviet position 
concerning the shipment of arms to Iraq and Iran at the HSWP Political 
Committee meeting on 14 April 1981  
(14 April 1981) 
 
 
[. . .] 
 
 
György Lázár: I would like to inform the Political Committee that I have received 
a piece of information from [Soviet Ambassador in Budapest] Comrade Pavlov. 
Earlier I also informed the Political Committee about the preceding events. 
According to the latest information, they have taken everything into account, that 
is mainly  the fact that, based on the experiences, there is a strong demand on the 
Iraqi and Iranian side for the acquisition of some technical equipment from the 
Western countries, and these demands are usually satisfied by them. The Soviet 
Union has reviewed her earlier position concerning the introduction of full embargo 
on transportation.  This  full  embargo  will  be  lifted  to  a  limited  extent  further  
on,  both  in connection  with  Iraq  and  Iran.  I  have  considered  it  important  
to  inform  the  Political Committee about this. Comrade Pavlov requested us to 
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treat this information confidentially. 
 
János Kádár:  Confidentially. And we are going to carry on with our practices 
accordingly. Clear. 
 
 
 
György Lázár: Yes, yes, just like earlier, on the authorization of the Political 
Committee. 
 
 
Translated by: Zsófia Zelnik 
Source: MOL, 288.f. 5/829.ő.e. 
 
Document 19 
 
Report of the Hungarian Embassy in Egypt on the evaluation of the 
Israeli terrorist action against Iraq in 1981 
(15 June 1981) 
 
 
 
TOP SECRET! 
 
004140/ 
 
73/81. 
Cairo, 15 June 1981 
 
Written: in 4 copies Subject: The evaluation of 
the Israeli Centre: 3 copies  terrorist action 
against Iraq Private copy:1 
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Frigyes Puja 
 
Comrade Foreign Minister 
 
Budapest 
 
 
 
Political and diplomatic circles are unanimous in their opinion, according to 
which the Israeli attack against the Iraqi nuclear plant did not only shock the 
Egyptian leadership but also caused such  embarrassment  for which there had not 
been an example for a long time. Although nobody considers it seriously that, at 
the summit held in Sharm el Sheikh three days before, the Israeli Prime Minister 
could have informed Sadat about the action or could have made the slightest hint 
at it, both Cairo and Tel Aviv refuted  this most categorically and almost at the 
same time. 
The confusion of Egyptian diplomacy is proved by the fact that for only 
one day after the Israeli  action the foreign officials appearing at the receptions 
made statements full of 
anxiety and they answered all the questions openly. Later on they gave evasive 
answers, then they were wrapped in silence. At the receptions held a week after the 
terrorist attack they did not even appear. 
 
The political leadership preparing the action carefully also became pressed 
for time and  they  could  not  act  harmoniously.  A series of  official declarations  
were  published/Presidium, People’s Assembly, Consultative Council/, which were 
phrased in a style unusual since Camp David. At the extraordinary session of the 
People’s Assembly on the 9th  , where the Vice-Premier, Foreign Minister Kamal 
Hasan Aly described the government's position, in the following debate the 
speaking  representatives - both the supporters of the government /NDP/ and of 
the opposition - gave voice to such demands almost without a difference in tone 
that were unacceptable for Sadat staking everything on the single card of Camp 
David. 
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Although none of the numerous articles released in the press exclude the 
possibility that the Israeli Prime Minister made this step to increase the chances of 
his re-election, they see the real causes in the following /at the same time 
expressing the anxiety felt by Egypt/: 
- Begin wanted to provoke Sadat to make such a step which could be an 
appropriate pretext  for  Israel  to  withdraw  from  the  "peace  process",  to  go  
back  on  her  obligations undertaken in Camp David, to suspend the complete 
withdrawal from Sinai for an indefinite period of time. They think Begin considers 
he could bear the consequences of this in case of his re-election if Egypt provided 
a pretext; 
- By this terrorist action, Begin wants to block the way for other Arab 
states who would like to  join  the peace process, because this is the only way he 
can achieve that he would not have to withdraw from other Arab territories 
/West Coast/, thus he can maintain Egypt's isolation, postpone the settlement of 
the Palestine question and maintain the present division of the Arab world; 
-he wanted to deal a blow on the forces of the Israeli society wishing 
peace by dramatically  intensifying  the  atmosphere  of  endangerment,  and  he  
wanted  to  strengthen demonstratively the notion of  the often voiced military 
superiority. According to another view, the Israeli public opinion does not have to 
be won over for aggressive politics, as it has supported this kind of politics from 
the beginning by nature, and the peace process up to now has been a mere bluff; -
he wants to raise doubts in the Arab oil-producing states of the Gulf concerning 
the United States whether she is capable at all of reaching a long-lasting and just 
settlement in the region; 
 
-he wants to prove that in fighting off the so-called Soviet danger, the 
United States has only one ally she can count on in the region, namely Israel - not 
Egypt - if she gets large quantities of modern weapons and economic help further 
on as well;  
-he warned Western Europe opening up to the Palestinians and 
experimenting with independent  initiatives that the settlement of the problems in 
the region would be possible only together with Israel and not against her even if 
their oil interests dictated the opposite. 
Our Egyptian talking partners do not exclude these motives at all, 
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moreover they add that in case of his re-election, Begin will surely endeavour to 
realise if not all but some of these goals. 
Egyptian foreign  officials  phrased  their  opinion  in  a  less  speculative  
way.  They emphasised that Egypt had already paid such a price at Camp David 
that they did not have any other opportunity but to follow the prescribed forced 
course. They had to hold on until April of 1982, then a lot of things would  
change. The Baghdad action came at the worst possible time for them, because, 
as a result of Egypt's diplomatic efforts, in the coming weeks they would have had 
the opportunity to partially break through their isolation. After the third military 
supplies agreement signed with Iraq about two weeks before, the settlement of 
the relations between the two countries had seemed closer. Moreover, they add, 
they had hopes that more than half of the Arab countries would settle their relations 
with Egypt. 
At the same time, they are not certain about how Israel really thinks. They 
would like to believe that Israel will fulfil her obligations laid down in the separate 
peace treaty and will evacuate the part of Sinai still under occupation. 
Begin's political environment pollution action [sic!] is extremely unpleasant 
for them. It turned out that the USA, which was forced to show her true colours 
before time, had not changed  her  commitments  toward  Israel  to  the  benefit  of  
Egypt  or  the  Arabs, and  the "impartial partner" was rather partial as a matter of 
fact. 
 
 
They are afraid that American politics striving for strategic consensus by 
exaggerating the Soviet danger will be a failure in the Gulf-region as Israel herself 
has proved by her action that the real danger comes from the Israelis. 
In case of the USA's silence, Begin will achieve the creation of such a 
precedent that could have unforeseen consequences in the region. 
According to my evaluation, the crisis resulting from the Israeli action has 
put more serious  obstacles in the way of the realisation of the separate 
agreement reached at Camp David  than  ever  /the  sabotage  of  the  talks  on  
Palestinian  autonomy,  the  annexation  of Jerusalem, the Lebanese rocket crisis/. 
At the same time, it may lead to the realisation that the settlement of the Near-
Eastern situation can be achieved only by international co-operation, within the 
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framework of a Geneva-type conference. 
 
 
 
 
István Fodor 
 
charges d'affaires ad interim 
 
 
Translated by: Zsófia Zelnik 
Source: MOL, M-KS-288 f. 32./ 60. ő. e. - 1981 
 
 
 
 
Document 20 
HSWP CC Department for Foreign Affairs Memorandum on Hungarian-Iraqi 
relations 
(July 1981) 
 
 
 
 
HSWP Central 
Committee 
 
Department for 
Foreign Affairs 
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Memorandum 
 
on the Hungarian-Iraqi relations 
 
 
 
 
 
Diplomatic  relations  were  established  with  the  Republic  of Iraq  on 30 
August 1958. Following the takeover by the Baath Party in 1968, our relations 
rapidly developed, currently Iraq being one of our most important partners in the 
developing world. 
 
 
The difference in opinions concerning certain foreign policy issues (e.g. the 
methods of settlement of the  crisis in the Middle East, the Afghanistan issue, 
the implementation of security in the Persian Gulf, the  issue of Eritrea, etc.) 
have not caused problems in our relations yet. However, our disapproving views 
on the Baath Party’s policy concerning IKP [the Communist Party of Iraq], our 
support to IKP, certain articles published in the Hungarian press, TV-programs, the 
student clashes in 1979, etc. resulted in the negative conduct of the authorities in 
Iraq, and from time to time, have troubled our political relations. All the 
problems have been solved calmly, without any break or regression. 
 
 
In the previous years, mutual high level visits have taken place on a regular 
basis. Saddam Hussein, the current President of the Revolutionary Commanding 
Council of Iraq, paid a visit to our country in May 1975. In October 1977, 
Comrade György Lázár paid a visit to Iraq, then Taha Ma’aruf, Vice President 
visited Budapest. There have been exchanges of messages between the highest 
rank leaders of the two countries. Our party and government delegation 
participated in the celebrations of the Baathist Revolution in Iraq in 1978 and 1980. 
 
 
At the  HSWP’s  initiative,  direct  party  links  were  established  with  the  Baath  
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Party.  An agreement  on  cooperation  was  signed  in  Budapest  in  1973  and  
two-year  working  plans regulated the development of relations. In spite of 
fostering it by the Baath Party, we did not renew  the  working  plan  that  expired  
at  the  end  of  1979,  but  during  talks  between  the representatives of the 
HSWP and the Baath Party in July  1980  a verbal agreement was reached on 
the methods of maintaining the party relations. IKP does not  object the close 
cooperation between HSWP and Baath Party. There is a close cooperation between 
the HSWP and IKP. Recently, the Baath Party seems to recognize this tacitly. 
 
 
The trade unions, the cooperative movements and the women’s associations have 
their own relations, too. Comrade Aladár Földvári participated on the 6th  Congress 
of the Iraqi General Union of Trade Unions in  1980; we hosted the (Baathist) 
Chairman of the Iraqi National Students Union, the Chairmen of the Union  of 
General Cooperatives and Iraqi Farmers’ Union. An agreement on the 
cooperation between the women’s unions valid for 3 years was signed in January 
1981 and in March, the Chairwoman of the General Women’s Union paid a visit to 
Hungary. Out of the mass organizations, only youth organizations lag behind of 
the general trend. 
 
 
Since the Iraq-Iran war, the Iraqi party has devoted much attention to the Hungarian 
relations. In October 1980, Naem Hamid Haddad, the President of the National 
Assembly, member of the Revolutionary  Commanding  Council  member  of  the  
National  and  Regional Directorate of the Baath Party, General  Secretary of the 
Progressive and National Front, Deputy Prime Minister, acting as a personal 
representative  of Saddam Hussein visited our country and conveyed his 
president’s written message to Comrade Pál  Losonczi. Then in November, the 
message by Taha Jassin Ramadan to Comrade György Lázár was delivered by 
 
the Iraqi Foreign Ministry’s chief of protocol. In February 1981, the Minister of 
Industry and Minerals, the Minister of Higher Education and Scientific Research 
and the General Director of the Iraqi TV and Radio was hosted The cultural 
working plan and the agreement on the cooperation of Radio, TV and sports were 
signed. The talks aimed at the confirmation of the agreement on a consular 
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convention – signed in 1978 -- proved to be unsuccessful with the consular 
delegation visiting Budapest. 
 
 
Iraq is our biggest trading partner among the developing countries. The exchange 
of goods has been dynamically improving since 1972; private contracts for 
investment goods and special products worth of 400  Million $ are valid for 
cash payment, occasionally with 10-30% advance ratio starting in 1974. The 
exchange of goods was 239 Million $ in 1980, that lags behind  the  peak  level  
of  291  Million  $  in  1979.  Our  country  has  met  its  contractual obligations 
even in times of war. 
 
 
The composition and price level of our export is favorable. Machine products 
form 50 % in recent years.  New ways of cooperation have been established: 
Chemokomplex-OKGT has been doing commission oil-well drills, a bus assembly 
plant has been operating in Iraq since 1974. Currently, approximately 350 workers 
are working on these tasks in total. 
 
 
 
Practically speaking, we only buy oil. The Iraqi party urges the receipt of other raw 
materials and industrial products. 
 
 
There are extensive financial relations between the two countries, too. Iraq has 
large deposits at MNB [Hungarian National Bank] for years. As of 1 1  March 
1981, the deposit was 350 Million $. (Before the war, the Iraqi deposit was around 
500 Million $, it is our interest to halt the decline.) 
 
 
A joint committee was set up to enhance the cooperation between the two 
countries in 1973. This committee did not work in the last two years, because the 
Iraqi party always diverges from our proposals to hold a meeting. Agreements on 
Veterinary hygiene and Fishery were 500 Iraqi specialist received training in 
Hungarian agricultural institutions. 
 109 
 
Cooperation in water conservancy matters started with the creation of a Joint 
Committee based on the Agreement on Technical- Scientific Cooperation in 1971. 
 
 
Our cooperation on the field of technical-scientific issues are governed by the 
two-year working  plans  based  on  the  agreement  signed  in  1971.  Within  the  
framework  of  the agreement,  35-40  specialist  work  in  Iraq  and  more  than  
100  Iraqi  specialist  receive  a secondary-level agricultural training yearly. The 
Agreement on Healthcare was signed in 1977. 
 
 
 
The Agreement on Cultural issues was signed in 1959 and working plans have 
governed our cultural ties since 1960. The working plan for the years of 1981-83 
was signed in Budapest on 2 March 1981. The educational relations are especially 
important. So far, more than 60 Iraqi citizens  received  degrees  at  a  university  
or  a  college  in  our  country  and  currently  55 scholarship-holders  study  at  a  
higher  educational  institute.   We  have  been  receiving candidates to a 
scientific degree since 1975. So far 12 Iraqi have received higher scientific 
degrees and currently 56 persons receive such training (out of which 23 paying full 
cost). The new cultural working plan estimates that we provide training at a higher 
educational training for 10 Iraqi citizens at our cost on a yearly basis, for additional 
14 persons at the Iraqi party’s cost. Out of candidates, 8 persons can start their 
studies at Hungarian cost, 10 persons can start their studies at Iraqi cost yearly. 
 
 
In the last period many exchange of exhibitions and art ensembles could take 
place. The musical cooperation has started as well, currently 16 Hungarian 
musicians and music teachers work in Iraq. 
 
 
The agreement on cooperation between MTA [Hungarian Academy of Sciences] 
and the Iraqi Scientific Research Foundation signed in 1979 forms the basis of the 
scientific cooperation. There is only little advance on the area. 
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The Agreement  on  Information  was  signed in October 1961, however, the 
signing of a working plan has  not taken place since 1973. The agreement on 
cooperation between MTI [Hungarian News Agency] and the  Iraqi press agency 
functions well. Following years of negotiation, the agreement on cooperation 
between the radio and TV companies was signed in March 1981. The relations 
between the journalist associations stagnate. The visit of the Iraqi Minister of 
Information and Cultural Affairs has been postponed for years. 
 
 
An agreement on cooperation in the field of sports was signed in 1975 but the 
execution of the agreement has not taken place. Considering realistic opportunities 
for cooperation, a Protocol on a 2-year cooperation was signed in March 1981. 
 
 
An agreement on Tourism was signed in 1970, governing the cooperation 
between tourism bodies. 20  thousand Iraqi visit our counrty yearly. The 
development of tourism and the expanding number of students  and specialits 
justified the signing of an agreement on legal assistance in 1977. 
 
 
At Comrade György Lázár’s invitation, Taka Jassin Ramadan First Deputy Prime 
Minister paid an official visit to Hungary between 18 and 20  March 1981. 
 
 
József Vince, Vice President of OVH [cc. National Office for Water 
Conservancy Matters] and Ottó Herkner, Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade visited 
Iraq. 
 
 
Karim Mahmoud Hussein, Iraqi Minister of Youth and Sport Affairs was hosted 
in April 1981. 
 
 
 
Budapest, July 1981. 
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Translated by: Levente Gajdócsi 
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MEMORANDUM 
 
 
 
Subject: Comments on the report 
of our Ambassador to Baghdad 
 
 
 
The report analyses Iraq's internal situation and her foreign policy in detail, it 
gives a brief overview of the main areas of our bilateral relations. /On the 
experiences of our economic and commercial activities and on the  press and 
propaganda activity of our Embassy separate reports have been prepared/. 
We agree with the evaluation of the political situation of the report, and we do 
not consider any changes necessary despite the events having taken place since the 
report was made. 
In the period described in the report the events of the war against Iran played a 
decisive role. The developments in the conflict had a direct influence on the 
foreign policy of Iraq and the internal situation in the country. 
There has been a turning-point in the course of the war, and the balance of power 
has changed in favour of  Iran.  It has become clear that Iraq could not realise 
her endeavours toward hegemony and her territorial  demands by military force. 
The political actions of the Iraqi leadership have become centred on the earliest 
possible ending of the war. But the initiatives, experiments  of  mediation  directed  
toward  peaceful  settlement  could  not  be  crowned  by success, as the Iranian 
position had become stiffer as a result of military success. For the time being, Iran 
would be ready for talks only in case of the removal of Saddam Hussein and an 
internal change in her favour. 
In the present situation the primary intention of the Iraqi leadership is not to be 
forced to admit defeat, to prevent the intensification of internal tensions and the 
activation of opposition forces. To this end, she demonstrates her intention to 
restore peace even through unilateral steps – cease-fire, the withdrawal of Iraqi 
troops, letting Iranian forces pass through [sic!] – and she tries to exploit the 
situation that has evolved after the Israeli attack against Lebanon maximally.
 The  events  of  the  Lebanese  crisis  play  an  important  role  in  
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the  further development of the Iraqi-Iranian war. It is the common interest of the 
countries of the region - including Iran as well - to stand up against Israeli 
aggression, and this will probably moderate conflicts between them. Although Iran 
does not consider satisfactory the withdrawal of Iraqi troops from her territory 
and she  has committed herself to continuing the war, there are several signs 
indicating that there are increasing  chances of the settlement of the conflict 
through negotiation. 
As a  consequence  of  the  repeated  defeats  and  the  deteriorating  economic  
situation,  the internal tension has increased. Saddam Hussein's positions have 
weakened, however, for the time being he enjoys the  support  of the USA and 
her allies in the region. It is for the possibility of his removal that it is his 
person that more and more obstructs the ending of the war. At the same time, it is 
a fact that Saddam Hussein has faced the consequences of the unilateral 
withdrawal of troops, which practically means admitting the failure of the war, it 
proves that the president still has enough power to preserve his position. At 
present, apart from the Baath party, there is no alternative force that has 
sufficient mass influence and organisation to take over power. However, we do 
not have any information about the centres of power within the leadership. There 
is little possibility of a Shiite turn similar to the one in Iran, nevertheless, Iran's 
political and military steps are directed mainly toward this. Neither the external, 
nor the internal conditions are given for this. 
Iraq's economic problems have become aggravated with the prolongation of the 
war. Oil production has decreased remarkably and, through it, so has the income 
from oil export. The increasing  deficit  and  liquidity  problems  necessitated  the  
taking  up  of  loans  of  greater volume. The leadership was forced to change  
their economic-political conceptions and to introduce war economy. All this 
greatly influenced Iraq's foreign economic relations as well. The  suspension,  re-
phasing  of  investments,  the  measures  constricting  import   had  an 
unfavourable  influence  mainly  on  socialist  countries,  and  this  could  hardly  
be  counter- balanced by the development and intensification of political relations. 
Based on the previous experiences, the Iraqi leadership will try to link civil 
business with military transportation. In practice,  though,  the  special  supplies  
[military  materials]  of  socialist  countries  are  not rewarded by special favours, 
and we have not seen any example, either, for favouring socialist countries  for  
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political  reasons  when  given  the  same  conditions.  At  the  same  time,  the 
proportion of developed capitalist countries has further increased in Iraqi import. 
Some people in the Iraqi leadership and a substantial majority of the middle-level 
economic leaders strive to strengthen economic co-operation with the capitalist 
states. This tendency is expected to be further intensified by the financial support 
received from Saudi Arabia and the countries of the Gulf and the increase in the 
importance of Iraqi private capital. We consider it necessary to assess the 
expected effects of the major  personal changes in the economic leadership as 
soon as possible. 
Our bilateral relations developed favourably during the period described in the 
report. The regular political contacts and high-level visits had a favourable 
influence on the expansion of our co-operation. We usually welcomed the political 
initiatives of the Iraqi side, we expanded our  relations  to  new  areas.  All  this  
provided  a  good  basis  for  the  development  of  our economic co-operation. Our 
export increased remarkably, the composition of products, their price-level  and  
quality  were  favourable.  Our  military-economic  ties  have  become  an 
important political factor and they serve as the basis for our economic co-operation. 
There are realistic opportunities to further develop our economic relations, but we 
have to count on the intensification of Iraq's  internal difficulties and economic 
problems. Considering the still remarkable reserves of the country and the 
external financial support, radical regress is not likely. We have to endeavour 
consequently to harmonise our supplies and our import. It is time to get prepared 
for the period following the end of the war, for joining the reconstruction plans. For 
this reason, besides the transportation of goods, there is a need for developing new, 
long-term forms of co-operation. 
Our competent organs and leaders evaluate the work of the Embassy in the 
development of economic relations as successful and high-level. 
In the described period there was an increase in events disturbing the 
development of our bilateral relations and leading to temporary tensions. Such 
problems were caused mainly by the cases of the so called  shamefully behaving 
Iraqi citizens. The Iraqi side pressed the Hungarian  authorities  to  stand  up  
more  firmly  against  their  citizens  pursuing  anti-Iraq activities and committing 
crimes, however, they tried to use this real problem - through the active 
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participation of their mission in Budapest - to take action against the [Iraqi] 
Communist refugees staying in Hungary. We managed to solve the contested 
issues, affairs prudently, by diplomatic  means.  As  a  result  of  the  harmonised  
measures  of  the  competent  Hungarian authorities, there has been a remarkable 
decrease in the events disturbing our relations. 
In the coming period, our main task will be to further consolidate economic co-
operation and to fill the existing conventional frames with content better 
corresponding to our interests and serving our economic goals. We must take 
special care to build personal relations with the new leaders of economic offices 
as soon as possible. Our ministers are encouraged to initiate the establishment of 
relations with the new Iraqi partners. 
 
 
[…] 
 
 
 
Budapest, 8 July 1982 
 
 
Translated by: Zsófia Zelnik 
Source: MOL, M-KS-288 f. 32./ 54. ő. e. – 1982 
 
 
 
Document 22 
 
Foreign Ministry memorandum of conversation with the Iraqi Ambassador 
in Budapest in 1983 
(2 March 1983) 
 
 
 116 
 
9
th 
Territorial Department Written: in 8 copies 
 
Károly Szigeti Copies to: 
Comrade Puja 
 
2011-2/1983 Comrade J. 
Nagy Comrade Garai 
Comrade Házi Comrade 
Kázmér Comrade Szűcsné 
Baghdad 
Private copy 
 
 
 
Subject: The visit of the Iraqi 
Ambassador 
 
 
 
Today I  have  received  Ismail  Hammoudi  Hussein,  the  Ambassador  of  
the  Iraqi Republic in  Budapest, with whom - according to our agreement last 
week - I have had a conversation about the problems in the region. 
The Ambassador emphasised that our points of view were identical 
concerning the war. The prolongation of the conflict would cause serious damage 
to both nations and would endanger the peace and security of the whole region. 
They agree that the present situation is favourable only for the United States and 
her allies. 
Concerning the latest mediation efforts, he said that, from the beginning, Iraq 
had supported those efforts which were directed at the solution of the conflict by 
political means, but Iran rejected all constructive suggestions and wanted to 
force a military solution. It seemed that, as a result of the talks with the 
Algerian Foreign Minister, the positions had come closer. However, the Iraqi side 
is concerned that, for political reasons, Iran had only made an oral gesture toward 
Algeria. Therefore, there is little hope for reconciliation. 
Hussein expounded his private opinion, according to which the Soviet 
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Union and the socialist countries should make steps more actively to finish the 
war, this way consolidating their positions in the  region, that had weakened after 
the Lebanese crisis. He stressed that Hungary, for example, could play an 
important role, considering that she had good relations with both parties, her 
policies were recognised at the international level [sic!] and considered 
skilful. 
 
I interjected that we saw little opportunity for mediation as Iran rejected 
even the initiatives coming from Islamic countries. 
The Ambassador agreed and declared that Iran would surely reject the 
mediation of the Soviet  Union  or  Hungary,  just  like  the  similar  actions  of  
Islamic  countries  or  of  the organisation of non-aligned countries. However, in 
his opinion, there are other opportunities as well. He mentioned as an example 
that  Hungary had good relations with those Arab countries - Libya and Syria  - 
which provide substantial support to Iran, and whose opinion is considered by the 
Iranian leadership. 
Hussein said that sometimes such indirect steps could have decisive 
importance. For instance,  when  relations  between  the  Soviet  Union  and  Iran  
improved  through  Syrian mediation, it became  possible for ten divisions of the 
Iranian army to be directed from the Soviet border to the front and this decided 
the battle of Khoramshari, which meant a turning- point in the war.  He underlined 
that he did not consider a direct interference necessary from the side of the Soviet 
Union but rather a similar demonstration to the demonstration of force made 
recently by the USA on the side of Sudan. 
According to the Ambassador's opinion, the Lebanese events also confirmed 
that there was a need for resolute Soviet steps, more active policy and diplomacy. 
The consolidation of imperialist positions had already influenced the Palestinian 
liberation movement as well. The latest Algerian conference suggested that there 
was a shift to the right going on within the leadership of the Palestinian 
Liberation Organisation and they were in favour of the American plan of 
settlement. He stressed that he did not want to censure the Soviet Union or 
diminish the responsibility of the Arab countries for the evolved situation. 
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In my  reply,  I  pointed  out  that  I  did  not  agree  with  the  
Ambassador's  opinion concerning several issues. I emphasised that the Soviet 
Union could not fight the war against Israel instead of the Arab countries. The 
Soviet Union most resolutely stands up against the American-Israeli aggressive 
endeavours and her policy is directed at the creation of the unity of action of the 
Arab countries, without which they cannot count on success. It is a pity that the 
Arab countries observed Israel's aggression against Lebanon impotently and they 
look on the Palestinian question moving their own interests into the foreground. It 
was not in the Arab countries but in Israel that the bloodshed of Beirut caused 
the biggest demonstration and protest. The internal Arab conflict and division 
undermine the effectiveness of the policies of both the Soviet Union and the 
socialist countries. 
The Ambassador analysed Syria's policy in more detail. He stated that one 
of the main obstructers  of  the  creation  of  the  Arab  unity  was  Syria,  who  had  
regional  superpower endeavours and she approached the Near-Eastern crisis, the 
Palestinian question and the Iraqi- Iranian war proceeding from this. The Syrian 
leadership wants to mislead the Soviet Union by proclaiming leftist slogans and an 
anti-imperialist policy. At the same time, they co-operate with Saudi-Arabia and, 
through her, with the USA, and in their internal  politics, they set limits for the 
Syrian Communist Party. Their real goal is to get the most modern weapons, 
which they did not deploy in Lebanon peculiarly. Syria's main aim is to abduct 
Saddam Hussein and to raise such a Baathist system to power that will subject 
itself to Assad and will open up the country's economic resources for the Syrian 
ambitions for power. 
Hussein denied that Saddam Hussein had met Assad  in Fez or Khaddam 
in Riyadh. He stated that the Iraqi side was prepared any time for an exchange of 
ideas at high level, but Syria rejected this, although the situation after Camp David 
had proved that the minimal Arab unity might only be created with the co-operation 
of Iraq and Syria. 
At the meeting lasting about one and a half hours participated Béla 
László, desk officer for Iraq, as well as an interpreter of the Iraqi Embassy. 
 
 
Budapest, 2 March 1983 
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Translated by: Zsófia Zelnik 
Source: MOL, M-KS-288 f. 32./ 45. ő. e. - 1983 
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BULLETIN 
 
for the members of the Political 
Committee 
 
 
 
On  4  July  1983,  Comrade  János  Kádár  received  Soviet  Ambassador  
Comrade Vladimir  Bazovsky at his request, who made the following oral 
statement on behalf of the Central Committee of the CPSU: 
"Studying the situation in Iran, we consider it necessary to share with you 
some of our ideas concerning this matter. 
It is well known to our Hungarian friends that in Iran harsh sanctions are 
instituted against the Tudeh Party. An intensive anti-Communist and anti-Soviet 
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campaign has started to unfold, in which official personalities participate too. On 
the whole, the shift to the right of the Iranian regime is obvious. Some of  the 
right-wing religious and political circles, the influential pro-Western elements of 
the state apparatus and the army, the undisguised agents of the USA want to bring 
Iran back to the side of the West, to restore military, commercial and economic 
relations with her. They have set as their goal to undermine the  relations 
between Iran and the socialist countries, although they are going to do this 
selectively at first. One cannot but notice that all this mainly serves the interests of 
the USA, which endeavours to aggravate the situation in the region by all means, so 
that she may use it to her advantage. 
Still, it seems to us that in Iran - including the influential Iranian leaders as 
well - there is readiness to maintain relatively normal relations with the socialist 
countries, including the Soviet Union. Objectively, this  course is strengthened 
by a number of factors which are related to Iran's present internal and 
international situation. 
 
 
 
Our theoretical point of view concerning Iran is well-known and 
unchanged. The Soviet side has stated several times that they stand up for the 
development of normal, good neighbourly  relations  with  Iran,   which  are  based  
on  the  principles  of  equality,  non- interference in internal affairs and mutually 
advantageous co-operation. 
Although in the past period the Iranian side has taken a series of hostile 
measures, we are pursuing a careful but, at the same time, determined policy, we 
endeavour to prevent the further deterioration of Soviet-Iranian relations. 
Through our contacts maintained with the Iranians, we expound the idea 
that their unfriendl  policy toward the Soviet Union causes harm to Iran, to the 
cause of the Iranian revolution in the first place.  It is doubtful whether a set-
back in existing commercial and economic relations with the Soviet Union would  
be in the interests of the Iranian people, especially if we consider the 
importance, from the point of  view of Iran, of the transit consignments passing 
through Soviet areas and the traditionally evolved economic relations between  
our  country  and  the  Northern  Iranian  territories.  The Iranians  should  also 
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comprehend  that  their  hostility  toward  the  Soviet  Union,  in  some  way,  
influences  our practical relations with the parties participating in the Iranian-Iraqi 
war. 
Of course, we cannot ignore the anti-Communist and anti-Soviet campaign 
stirred up in Iran, and we have to draw the appropriate conclusions. Among 
others, we consider it necessary to terminate special consignments [military 
materials] to Iran completely, including agreements signed earlier, let alone the 
signature of new ones. 
It goes without saying, in case the Iranian side puts an end to their hostile 
activity toward the Soviet Union and they make steps to normalise relations, the 
Soviet side will be ready to develop co-operation in the various fields. 
We think that Hungary, having good relations with Iran, could exercise some 
influence on the Iranian leadership, using her political connections and economic 
opportunities, in order to defend her own interests to some extent. It is possible 
that our Hungarian friends would consider it reasonable to use their Foreign 
Minister's planned trip to Tehran to this end. 
We would be grateful if our friends informed us about their views concerning 
the issues outlined above.” 
 
 
Budapest, 4 July 1983 
 
Translated by: Zsófia Zelnik 
Source: MOL, M-KS-288 f. 11./4415.ő.e. 
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STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL! 
 
 
Baghdad, 15 December 1983. Subject: inner crisis ripening 
 
within the highest Iraqi leadership 
 
 
Recently it has been suggested by several signs that there are significant 
differences of opinion within the highest Iraqi leadership as to the issue of “how to 
proceed” now that the third year of the war between Iraq and Iran has passed. The 
opinions converge on two 
possible positions: 
 
- one position acknowledges the failure of several initiations aimed at a peaceful 
resolution of the conflict, accepts the existing balance of forces and takes it as a 
fact that the war will be a lengthy one with a lot of bloodshed and intends to take 
comprehensive measures to prepare 
for further casualties; 
- the other position is afraid that a protracted war might result  in the fall of the 
regime and urges further military actions in order to force the resolution of the 
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conflict at any cost, even accepting further severe casualties. 
 
Both positions derive from Iraqi reality, both are represented by followers of 
the Baath party system and both give priority to saving the existing regime. 
However, the latter position, or the methods that it advocates, may easily result in 
the elimination of the regime despite of its contrary intention, or at best in its 
significant weakening and modification. Advocates of this position propose a 
double system of arguments to defend their views: 
- Iraq has already withdrawn its troops from Iranian territories and accepted 
every peaceful initiation or mediation for peace. 
- Iran is free to use its waterways in the Persian Gulf to export its oil and import 
arms, while Iraq has been deprived of the same possibility. In the long run this 
would upset the existing economic and military balance of forces. 
 
On the basis of both arguments Iraq may feel entitled herself to deal Iranian 
economic facilities a heavy blow by using all its available military force and 
prevent Iran from using the Persian Gulf for trading. They are fully aware that if 
such a step is taken, the Strait of Hormuz will most likely be shut down, and as a 
result the great powers of the world will intervene, thereby putting an end to the 
war. 
 
 
Adherents of this position also believe that Iraq is likely to make 
significant concessions in order to create the necessary conditions for peace (and, 
above all, in order to preserve the regime and her own position), even going as 
far as removing the present president. There are some who maintain that it is the 
president himself that is the main obstacle to making an agreement with the 
Iranian regime. 
 
 
It has to be noted here that such a position would have been totally 
impossible two years ago. However, the conditions that make such a position 
possible today are not merely the direct result of the war, and for this very reason it 
is all the more dangerous from the point of view of Saddam Hussein’s personal 
power. 
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This phenomenon derives from the fact that in the past three years it was 
exactly the president who initiated far-reaching changes in the power structure of 
the regime both in its organization and in its staff. Representing the interests of the 
civil wing of the Baath Party the president radically replaced supporters of party 
president Bakr, removed the old military officers who constituted the backbone of 
the party and filled these posts in public administration and the commandership of 
the army by young, militant party cadres brought up by the Baath Party. However, 
the dragging war and the worsening situation made them realize that propaganda 
was used to conceal the facts, and some of them even recognized that the president 
and the regime were not the same thing, the regime is viable even without the 
president and Saddam Hussein would have to make a sacrifice, even by resigning, if 
the existence of the regime were to depend on it. 
 
 
This view could not surface under the present circumstances of severe, 
even cruel control and supervision, and most likely it was only some members of 
the presidential family who had the courage to suggest that the president should, at 
least temporarily, stand aside for the sake of the regime and his own security. 
Several sources say that this idea – the preservation of power within the family – 
was already brought up for the first time last year, and proponents of this view 
include, among others, the then minister of health care and several other members 
of the government. As is well known, the minister of health care was quickly 
liquidated, while others disappeared without a trace. Thus there seems to be quite a 
lot of support for the rumor spreading in Baghdad that the president's three half-
brothers who had previously held high positions were “written off” for their 
similar views (more on this issue in our report on domestic policy). 
 
 
True, the president has thus far been able to withstand these rather hasty 
attempts, and as in many other critical periods he has managed to turn the events to 
his own benefit with an exceptional gift. He takes propagandistic measures to prove 
that Iraq is a democratic country, while cleansing is underway in the secret service 
and the state administration. He takes a tight rein on party organizations and by 
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making various concessions and promises he rallies all the former Baath Party 
officials on his side who were transferred back to civil life from the military. In the 
spirit of this tactics his official policy is a complex mixture of conciliatory gestures, 
wait-and-see and military threat, in precise daily doses, as required by the current 
situation. 
 
 
For the time being it is not justified to draw far-reaching conclusions on the 
basis of these disputes and differences of opinion. However, it is already obvious 
that thawing has already started at the “tip of the iceberg”, and the dissenting 
attitude of his brothers and their subsequent shelving involve a serious warning for 
the absolutistic president, even if the concrete measures were not taken by him. It 
also demonstrates that the forces that might attempt to overthrow the president, if it 
ever comes to take place, may not come from among the Kurdish or Shi’ite 
opposition, but rather from among his own people who are so committed to the 
regime that they will be able to bypass him for the sake of saving the regime at any 
cost, if the need arises. Most likely Saddam Hussein has properly understood this 
message, as reflected in his various statements that include a far more realistic 
evaluation of the current internal and external situation as well as in several of his 
most recent measures and the obvious signs of settling down for a lengthy war. 
However, it remains to be seen which position will win the battle. It largely 
depends on whether it will be possible for the regime to create the necessary 
conditions for holding out in the war for a long time before the country reaches a 
level that it can no longer tolerate. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Zoltán Pereszlényi  
ambassador 
 
 
Translated by: András Bocz 
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structure and some of its consequences 
 
 
 
Leaning on the support of the civil wing of the Iraqi Baath Party president 
Saddam Hussein had built a well-organized power system and despite the turn that 
took place in the war in the summer of 1982, up to the fall of last year he had 
managed to maintain firm control over the country both in foreign policy and in 
domestic affairs. 
One important pillar of presidential power is the party itself; another one is 
the army, 
including security forces as well as regular and civil defense forces. These two main 
forces enjoyed a relatively stable support from the majority of the Iraqi people. 
Internal supervision was secured by the followers of the president who come from 
his family or from the region where he was born. 
The stable power structure outlined above started showing some cracks 
last fall and the balance of power seems to be breaking down. The changes are 
partly due to the protracting war and partly to the internal transformation of the 
system: 
 
 
1./ The protracting and bloody war has shattered the economic foundations 
of the system and as a result the revenues that are necessary for the steady supply of 
the population and the army and for operating the Iraqi economy that is dependent 
on imports and foreign labor force to a great extent have diminished to a level that 
is hardly tolerable any longer. These developments urged the Iraqi government to 
solve two problems: on the one hand consumption should be reduced to a level that 
is allowed by the present circumstances, and on the other new ways should be 
found to export Iraqi oil. The Iraqi leadership has managed to solve these two 
problems only in part so far and it remains to be seen whether they can implement 
real and effective measures in this respect. The chances for rapid changes and 
improvement are practically nil until the beginning of 1985. 
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- The deterioration of the economic and financial situation and the measures taken 
under pressure have caused distortions in production and in the forces of 
production. For example, there is a serious imbalance in industrial production to 
the advantage of military industry, while due to the shortage of raw materials and 
labor force the newly built factories cannot work properly, including the iron and 
steel factories; agricultural labor force was absorbed by the military, the war and 
the cities. 
 
- Corruption is running wild, the black market has become an important factor in 
the economy, and irritating differences have developed between the working 
classes and the “privileged” in terms of supply of basic goods and financial 
conditions. Though overall consumption has been reduced, it is still well over the 
level that the country can maintain, and many inconsistent measures have evoked 
further tension both in the economy and in the mood of the people. 
 
- Several plans have been made to increase oil exports – none of them is viable 
before 1985. The most recent new possibility is a pipeline to be built with 
American assistance through Jordan. We have given an account of this plan in our 
economic report. Even if it can be built, extra revenues will only be realized from 
the beginning or the middle of 1985. 
 
In brief: the Iraqi leadership cannot reckon with more revenues coming 
from its own resources than in 1983. However, state expenditures will further 
increase, mainly due to the costs of the war. 
 
2./ In the 4
th 
year of the war the population seems to be increasingly worn 
out both financially and morally. The propaganda of the system can no longer 
counterbalance the shortages that people experience; the president, the leadership 
and the war itself have lost much of their popularity among the people and the 
number of firm followers of the regime has diminished considerably. The failure 
to put an end to the war and the hopeless prospects for the future have mobilized 
some forces within the Iraqi leadership that demand rapid and radical decisions 
and a prompt conclusion of the war. These people mostly come from young cadres 
of the Baath Party. 
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Mention must be made here of the fact that Saddam Hussein’s deliberate 
efforts to decide the rivalry between the civil and the military wing of the Baath 
party for the benefit of the latter has met with only a partial success so far. 
Although he has managed to discard the military officials of the “old style” from 
the leadership, the new, young cadres of the party have created a platform of their 
own and tend to oppose many of the president's aspirations, though on the same 
ideological basis. The new leadership of the military, trained in hard battles, is 
therefore likely to act at a higher level that is more dangerous to the power of the 
president in order to win a more important role in political decisions. 
 
 
This process coincides with a serious weakening of the family base of the 
president, the “Tikrit Clan” that has always been the most important support for 
Saddam Hussein. Differences of opinion within the clan, partly due to efforts to 
redistribute leading positions and partly to secure the future of the family, lead to 
a division in the clan last fall. 
 
In actual practice this was manifested in the replacement of the 
presidential brothers and the quick “disappearance” of several individuals that 
had been quite close to the president. There appears now to be a gap at the 
leading posts of the pillars of the system mentioned above, the party and the 
armed forces. These post are to be filled still by the president, but the influence 
of the new group forming in the army (let us call them “young Baathists”) is 
beginning to assert itself. 
 
Another center of power is beginning to take shape around the figure of 
first deputy Prime Minister Ramadan, commander of the People’s Militia. The 
replacement of one of the brothers of the president, the powerful head of the 
Intelligence Service, Barzan Al-Tikrit was partly due to the hostile relationship 
with Ramadan. 
 
 
The “young Baathists” today do not yet constitute an organized force, and 
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their opposition is restricted to certain areas only. What is already obvious of their 
political aspirations however is that they do not support the unsuccessful peace 
negotiations with Iran, and they are convinced that the dragging war with Iran will 
undermine the system and eventually lead to its fall. Naturally, today nobody yet 
dares to speak of such ideas publicly in Iraq. 
 
Presumably this group, becoming more and more influential within the 
leadership of the army, has no strong position on what should happen after the war, 
but they have a very strong view that Iran can only be made to end the war by 
military force. Their position has been gradually gaining ground in the Iraqi 
leadership since the end of last year and is reflected in several official statements 
made by Iraq. One concrete result of this process was that on 2 February Iraq 
announced that it would resume attacks on Iranian settlements. 
 
 
Although it is premature to draw far-reaching conclusions at this point, it is 
clear that the Iraqi leadership has deliberately increased tension in the past few 
weeks, thereby speeding up certain developments that are not in its favor at all. 
Today we can see two possible explanations for this: according to one the Iraqi 
leadership intended to deter a large scale Iranian offensive by its threats. The other 
explanation might be that it got caught in the same trap of overconfidence that we 
saw in 1980 and Iraq really wants to provoke a final battle that will settle the war 
for once and for all. We believe that the latter explanation is closer to reality, and 
the new, young leaders of the army have played and continue to play a decisive role 
in this line of policy. What do they expect in view of the current balance of forces? 
Maybe they believe that a battle more serious than any other clash before and the 
elimination of a large number of civilians on both sides will force the great powers 
to act or intervene more radically. This is a slim chance though. Reality is that the 
war continues and new tensions are emerging. 
 
While in the middle of 1983 we could firmly state that Saddam 
Hussein’s personal power and the system he maintained were strong and 
unshakable, now, at the beginning of 1984 we can see several signs that there 
are some forces that clearly strive to curb the president’s personal cult and 
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dictatorship. They obviously act in defense of the system maintained by the 
Baath Party, but they also intend to reorganize the internal relations of power. 
This could result in a power crisis whether or not the war will eventually come 
to an end. 
 
 
 
 
Zoltán Pereszlényi 
 
Ambassador 
 
 
Translated by: András Bocz 
Source: MOL, M-KS-288 f. 32. 42. ő. e. - 1984 
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TOP SECRET! 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
R E P O R T 
 
 
 
on Iraqi consultations 
 
 
 
 
I conducted consultative discussions in Baghdad between 11 and 13 
December 1984. My negotiating partner was deputy minister Taha Yassim Al Ali. 
The negotiations were attended by competent senior officials of the Iraqi ministry 
of foreign affairs and H. Ali Al-Anbari, head of the department of the ministry of 
commerce. I was received for a longer negotiation by first deputy Prime Minister 
and minister of foreign affairs Tariq Aziz, member of the Iraqi Revolutionary 
Commanding Council. The meeting was also attended by Zoltán Pereszlényi, our 
ambassador to Iraq. 
 
 
 Tariq Aziz stressed the following: Iraq and Hungary are connected by close 
and friendly ties in various areas of party, state, trade union and other types of 
cooperation. President Saddam Hussein greatly appreciates the achievements of 
Hungary and is proud of his friendship with Comrade János Kádár. He regards 
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Comrade Kádár as an outstanding leader of high reputation. 
 
 
They think it is important to conduct open and honest negotiations with 
friendly nations of the world. They devote a lot of attention to negotiations 
between the two foreign ministries. They especially appreciate the fact that the 
negotiations will take place at a proper time at the initiation of the Hungarian side. 
 
 
 The Iraqi negotiating partners including T. Aziz, have also emphasized the 
following: 
 
 
In the present situation Iraq is mostly concerned with the war with Iran. The 
issue of the war requires a lot of time and energy. The great efforts on the part of 
Iraq are not only justified by the fact that the war is fought with a neighboring 
country but also by the fact that the conflict has an impact on the whole region. At 
the same time, the ongoing war may have unforeseeable consequences and become 
the source of real dangers. Therefore, the Iraqi side devotes special attention to 
providing information on the developments both in international organizations and 
in the course of negotiations with friendly states. A clear understanding of the 
situation may play a fundamental role in the future developments of the war. 
Everybody should see that the war between Iraq and Iran is not a war between two 
isolated countries. If it were, the conflict would long have been resolved , for one 
participant in it, Iraq has no territorial claims over the other and would be ready to 
accept a peaceful solution. 
 
 
Iran was a true capitalist country, part of the capitalist world with a huge 
territory, lots of resources and a large population. At the same time it suffered from 
several different “diseases”: The leaders of the country, personally the shah openly 
aspired to win hegemony in the region while doing nothing in order to eliminate the 
backwardness of the country. There is no developed industry and infrastructure in 
Iran. Even the huge revenues deriving from the production of 6 million barrels of oil 
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per day were not enough to develop the country properly, for the leaders spent most 
of the incomes on armament rather than on development. In the meantime it turned 
out that they were mistaken to believe that they can maintain modern armed forces 
with up-to-date technology when 80 percent of the population is illiterate. Problems 
were continuously accumulating on the ground of severe backwardness, and internal 
tension was increasing.  
Therefore “we socialists” – said Tariq Aziz – evaluated it from the beginning 
that has occurred in Iran in 1979 was not a revolution but an “explosion” that 
resulted in the coming to power of even more reactionary forces than the Sah’s 
regime had been, headed by Khomeini.  
[…] 
He [Khomeini] insists that life lost in a fight with the enemy shortens 
earthly sufferings and brings with it the happiness of heavens. At the same time a 
shorter life allows for fewer mistakes and thus heavenly existence can be even 
more happy and forgivable.) 
 
 
Tariq Aziz referred to Khomeini’s speech delivered on 11 December in 
which he proclaimed a war not only in the region but against the whole world. 
He disregards international norms and depreciates the achievements and the role 
of other nations. For example he states that in Asia there are only two powers, 
Iran and Japan, and since Japan is not a military power, the door is open for Iran 
to assume a leading role in the region. They also want to bring their internal 
problems out to the frontline across the borders. 
 
 
Thus Khomeini is ill, surrounded by similarly ill people. Iraq believes that 
the world should not cultivate any relationship with them. For the moment the 
assault is launched at Iraq, and Iraq is ready to stop it. But if Iraq falls, order will 
be upset in the whole region. 
 
 
Anyway, Iran is simply incapable of organizing its international relations 
on a healthy basis. Its views in the guise of religion derive from a dark age whose 
essence is opposition to anything that is foreign. This is the reason why Iran is anti-
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Soviet and anti-American at the same time. However, in the present situation it 
badly needs foreign relations, for it has to sell its oil for money and arms. 
 
 
When I remarked that that foreign minister Velayati represented a position in 
certain international issues that was quite close to Hungarian views at his last visit 
to Budapest Tariq Aziz made the following comment: he personally feels sorry for 
Velayati for he is in an impossible situation. He has to represent an outdated age in 
a way that the everyday interests of his country should also be enforced. Therefore 
he speaks very differently from what the official position of the Iranian leaders is 
when he is abroad. As a result his words lack any real value, because they do not 
reflect the position of the regime. He called upon Velayati at the General Assembly 
of UN to publish the speech he had just delivered in Iranian newspapers, and if he 
could do that, his words could be given much more credit. 
 
 
According to Tariq Aziz Iraq is not sensitive at all as to who maintains a 
relationship with Iran. Its only intention is to call the attention of collaborators to 
Iran’s “illness.” Control over this sick power is in the interest of the East and West 
alike. In Iraq they know it well that the essence of the turn in Iran was evaluated in 
many different ways all over the world. He conducted private discussions on this 
issue with comrade Ponomaryev in the Soviet Union, with minister Malmierca in 
Cuba and with other politicians. 
 
 
So Iran is ill, and people – regardless of their political affiliation and 
conviction – should fight against Iran purely on humanitarian grounds. This was 
the case with Nazism too. Hitler was a sick man. He felt entitled to rule the whole 
world and advocated the superiority of the German nation. And he was not alone in 
this. Millions and millions of “ill” people followed him who viewed ordinary 
crimes as honorable acts. At that time Germany was much 
 
more developed both economically and socially than Iran is now. Iran has 
totally alienated herself from the rest of the world. 
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Tariq Aziz and the other Iraqi negotiating partners emphasized that 
maintaining relations with Iran increases the dangers of the Iranian policy. Even 
today Iran is already a hindrance to a rapprochement between the East and the 
West, and the war in the Gulf may easily lead to the Third World War. Therefore 
much more care should be devoted to the analysis of the Iranian “phenomenon” 
and the relationship with Iran should not be evaluated purely on the basis of 
bilateral relations. They pointed out that Iran can continue with the war only if it 
can raise more money and buy more arms and other goods. The war makes 
economic growth impossible, and as a result tensions increase and Iran is pressed 
to continue the war. All this might lead to an internal explosion in Iran. If that 
happens, international tension will also increase significantly, for neither the 
Soviet Union nor the USA can just sit back and do nothing. 
 
 
According to Tariq Aziz there is no good solution for the Iranian 
“phenomenon” – what is going on in Iran today can only be changed either 
through a socialist revolution or a liberal takeover of power. 
 
 
The Iraqi partners also said that they did their best to explain the situation 
and clearly expressed their views to leaders of the Soviet Union too. Otherwise they 
maintain very good relations with the Soviet Union and the Soviets support their 
fight among other things by the supply of arms . Iraq deems it necessary to maintain 
good relations with other socialist countries as well and never fails to acknowledge 
their interests. They are quite satisfied with the development of their international 
relations. As the most recent development in their foreign policy, they mentioned 
the fact that Iraq had renewed diplomatic relations with the United States after 
clarifying their respective positions openly and precisely. In their view it is 
important to recognize that the attitude of Iran is more dangerous than the fight 
between the Arab countries and the Zionist state, for it is possible to predict the 
potential developments of the latter. But who can talk sensibly with Khomeini or 
exert an influence him? There is hardly any force in the world now that could bring 
Iran under control. Iraq is now fighting Iran with the force of arms, and others 
should do at least as much as not to provide food supplies for them. Tariq Aziz also 
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said that on his part he has a hard time understanding how Hungary can work 
together with Iran and how Hungary can plan its relations with Iran in advance for 
the next ten years. At the same time the Iraqi partners stressed: they believe the 
Hungarian leaders view the Iraqi position in the right way, as is reflected by well-
developed relations between the two countries. However, they wanted to know 
whether any concrete measure were taken besides diplomatic efforts in the issues 
raised by Iraq at the last visit of the Arab League in July 1984, such as tightening up 
economic relations, refrainment from supplying arms and buying Iranian oil. 
 
 
T. Aziz underlined that Europe had a key role in the peaceful resolution of 
the war between Iraq and Iran. This role is related to Europe’s historical role in 
defending civilization. It is primarily a moral obligation not only in the case of the 
Iraqi-Iranian war but in man other regions of international crises. Europe is morally 
obliged to take a position in the issue of the war and handle the problem in 
accordance with its real significance. Iraq feels responsible for world peace and 
security and has therefore accepted every initiative and resolution for peace. Thus, 
European countries, regardless of their social system, have to put pressure on Iran 
politically, economically and in any other possible way. Iraq fully understands and 
appreciates European interests, but pressure can be put on Iran without violating 
these interests. Potential economic losses can be compensated for in the long run. 
The potential dangers of escalating the conflict and its international impact must be 
taken into consideration. They are convinced that their Hungarian friends can 
understand and appreciate the Iraqi position. 
 
 
As for the situation of the Palestine Liberation Front the Iraqi partners said 
the convention of the conference in Amman was necessary purely in the interest of 
ensuring the operation of Palestinian institutions. The idea was to convene all 
members of the Council but as a result of external intervention it became 
impossible. Arafat had no choice but convene the conference in Amman with a 
partial but majority participation. Several Palestinian organizations that did not 
attend the conference have so far refrained from making hostile statements, so there 
is still a possibility for dialog. When the groups under total Syrian influence are 
considered, the situation is different and the distance between positions is greater. 
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Citing Palestinian views they said that besides Israel’ aggression in Lebanon Syria’s 
action in Tripoli also played a determinant role in the political liquidation of the 
PLO. Iraq’s view is that the Palestinian organization should not be broken into parts 
and there is no need for an alternative PLO. Apparently that is what Syria intends to 
achieve. 
 
 
As for the Gulf Cooperation Council they said that they view it as one of the 
aspirations of Arab countries for unity. The activities of the organization are aimed 
at planning a common future for Arab countries. Iraq has its own views and 
opinion about the organization but they do not wish to express them at this point. 
Military coordination is also part of these aspirations for unity, aimed at preventing 
intervention in their domestic affairs and defending their respective countries 
jointly from the danger that Iran means in the region. This is much better than 
requesting foreign intervention. In the case of member states of the Gulf Council it 
has to be considered that historical and traditional reasons may make the 
establishment of relations with socialist countries difficult, but steady efforts will 
surely bring success. Iraq supports the efforts of socialist countries in this matter. 
As far as bilateral relations are concerned, my Iraqi partners used praising 
words. T. Aziz stressed that they are ready to develop cooperation with the 
People’s Republic of Hungary on the basis of friendship and confidence and are 
willing to sign an agreement even for the duration of ten years. […] 
 
 
Budapest, 22 December 1984 
 
Translated by: András Bocz 
Source: MOL, M-KS-288 f. 32. 42. ő. e. - 1984 
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Baghdad, 12 February 1985.  
Subject: the development of Iraqi-American relations 
 
since the restoration of diplomatic relations 
 
 
For a long time the Iraqi leadership had taken great pains to prepare for the 
restoration of diplomatic relations with the United States on 26 November 1984. 
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The timing of the renewal of relations coincided with the reelection of President 
Reagan that according to some views will ensure some continuity in the foreign 
policy of the United States. Naturally, this policy also includes the Middle Eastern 
policy of the USA that had ended in repeated failures during the first term of 
Reagan’s presidency in Lebanon and brought the Camp David process to a 
deadlock. 
 
Therefore the republican government of the United States had to “freeze” its political 
activities in the Middle East in the year of the election so that it could erase the past 
of several blunders committed by the Reagan administration in the region. However, 
from the beginning of 1984 it became clear even in this “state of rest” that American 
foreign policy showed more “understanding” towards the Iraqi position both 
officially and through the press. This process eventually led to the restoration of 
diplomatic relations between the two countries. 
 
 
The Iraqi leadership was quite content to see that as a result of thorough 
preliminary arrangements and good timing the renewal of diplomatic relations was 
received as a “natural course of events” all over the world (with the exception of 
Iran), including the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. The reactions 
inside Iraq were also quite moderate and found sympathy in influential economic 
and political circles. 
 
 
One thing the Iraqi leadership was hoping for by the restoration of 
diplomatic relations was that it would promote the resolution of the war conflict 
with Iran that had been dragging on for almost five years, or at least it would bring 
political and economic support for Iraq until the war was finished (a wider market 
for Iraqi oil, loans, investments, etc.). However, they did not consider the possibility 
that as a result of the “thawing” that had already started in Soviet-American 
relations and due to some other, burning international issues that had been put on 
the agenda, issues of the Middle East and the problem of the Iraqi-Iranian war 
would become peripheral in international policy. True, at the beginning of 
December the Iraqi leadership ordered to resume air raids on Iranian tankers and 
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trading vessels bound for Iranian ports, thereby ensuring some international 
propaganda for Iraq, so that the world should not forget about the unresolved 
conflict. 
 
 
According to an American diplomat the growing importance of Soviet-
American negotiations has pushed the Middle Eastern policy of the USA into the 
background, whose conditions are not mature at present anyway. In his view this 
rules out in advance the possibility that the United States should get involved in the 
resolution of the conflict in the near future in a way that is expected by Iraq. He 
does not think that an economic and military embargo demanded by Iraq against 
Iran is feasible (especially in the case of the allies), all the more so because Iran 
continues to be one of the most important strategic partners for the USA by her 
geopolitical location. 
 
 
In this light the USA strives to maintain normal relations with Iraq “free 
from supplies of arms”, taking into consideration global American interests in the 
region. The American diplomat did not mention it, but it can be presumed that in 
the long run Iraq may prove to be a valuable link in establishing an axis friendly to 
the USA (United Arab Emirates, Jordan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, the Gulf countries) in 
the interest of ensuring the American interests in the region. 
 
 
Due to the rather rigid position of Iran in the issue of the war none of the 
international mediatory negotiations is expected to bring significant results, and the 
USA does not wish to take sides with Iraq in an issue that is hopeless in advance 
and contrary to her interests. However, they are ready to revive bilateral relations 
with Iraq on a wide scale, as demonstrated by the following events and visits since 
the restoration of diplomatic relations: 
 
 
- In December, 1984 a delegation of American journalists visited Iraq (New 
York 
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Times, UPI, etc.); 
 
- On 20 December 1984 President Saddam Hussein received Christine Moss 
Helms, a researcher of science policy of the Brooking Institute; 
- In December, 1984 an exhibition of historic Iraqi costumes toured in the 
United 
 
States for several weeks; 
- On 10-11 January 1985 Joseph Sisco, former deputy secretary of state 
visited Iraq, presumably to probe into the region before the scheduled visit of 
foreign secretary Schultz to the Middle East. During his brief stay in Iraq Sisco 
was received by Tariq Aziz, deputy Prime Minister and minister of foreign affairs, 
member of the Revolutionary Commanding Council, Hassan Ali, member of the 
Revolutionary Commanding Council, minister of commerce, Quassim Ahmed 
Taqi, minister of oil production and Subat Yassin, minister of industry and mineral 
materials; 
- On 15 January, a delegation of experts went to Iraq headed by Richard 
Smith, adviser of the American ministry of agriculture to discuss how agricultural 
cooperation could be extended. In addition to the Iraqi partner minister he was also 
received by Hassan Ali, 
member of the Revolutionary Commanding Council, minister of commerce. During 
the visit the two parties signed an agreement for a complementary agricultural loan 
of 12 million USD; 
- On 16 January, Judith Kippers, an American researcher of science 
policy was received by Dr. Saad Quassim Hammoudi, leader of the Foreign 
Office of the Baath Party; 
- At the end of January the Iraqi airline company (Iraqi Airways) opened 
several ticket and cargo offices in American cities (New York, Los Angeles, 
Detroit). This shows that Iraq expects a significant increase in the turnover of goods 
that can be profitably exported via air (such as electronic goods). 
 
 
The various bilateral negotiations also make it possible for Iraq to raise her 
economic and financial claims and for the USA to conduct valuable political 
consultations (the situation in the Gulf, the issue of the PLO). In the field of 
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economy the expected pace of development is restricted by Iraq’s solvency and 
financing capacity problems at least until the pipeline leading through Saudi Arabia 
is completed by the end of this year and another pipeline through Turkey to be 
completed in 1986 or 1987 is put into service. For the time being American banks 
show little willingness to take a risk in granting a loan and investing in Iraq, and no 
change can be expected in this respect until Iraq can pay off her outstanding debts 
deriving from other relations that have already been deferred once and are due by 
the summer of 1985. In any case, if the financial situation improves in Iraq, both 
the political-economic leadership and the increasingly influential Iraqi private 
sector will be ready to act in order to rapidly develop economic collaboration 
between Iraq and the United States. However, due to the previously mentioned 
financial and economic difficulties it cannot be expected that the trade volume 
between the two countries will exceed USD 1 billion in 1985. 
 
 
For the Iraqi leadership the resolution of the Iraqi-Iranian conflict as soon 
as possible is even more important than economic cooperation with the USA. 
Therefore they use every occasion to keep the issue of the war on the international 
agenda. As a minimal goal they want to make sure that the issue is put on the 
agenda of Soviet-American negotiations and that the USA should assist Iraq in 
keeping it on the agenda in the UN Security Council and at other international 
forums. In return it is quite possible that Iraq will become more moderate in 
statements concerning other major issues of world politics (such as Nicaragua, 
Afghanistan, the PLO, support for Craxi’s plan to resolve the situation in the 
Middle East, etc.). 
 
 
However, the expectations concerning the renewal of diplomatic relations 
have not been fulfilled so far. The patience of the Iraqi leadership is tested, among 
other things, by the fact that the USA still has not appointed its ambassador to Iraq, 
referring to some procedural reasons of approval, when Iraq was ready to 
commission Ismat Kittani, a former UN envoy, to head the Iraqi embassy in 
Washington as early as December last year. The failure to fulfill the Iraqi 
expectations (American promises) may easily evoke distrust towards the American 
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relations and the true nature of American intentions (this was already echoed in the 
Iraqi press at the beginning of February) that can in some sense result in a more 
contradictory relationship between the two countries than before the restoration of 
diplomatic relations. 
 
 
 
In the opinion of the American diplomat the USA is content with the present 
state of Iraqi-American relations but they are not interested in rushing their 
development. The American presence in Iraq ensures that in case a political change 
occurs (a basic precondition of ending the war set by Iran), they will have a chance 
to “support” pro-American forces within the Baath Party. The resolution of the 
conflict with American assistance however is not seen as a viable option by the 
USA under the present circumstances, although they are ready 
to keep the issue on the agenda when other issues of the Middle East are discussed. 
According to the American position “time is working for them” and the Reagan 
administration has plenty of time to deal with the delicate Middle Eastern issue, 
especially now that the government has just approved of a military and economic aid 
package to Israel that is greater than ever. 
 
 
The main goal of the scheduled visit of King Fahd of Saudi Arabia, King 
Hussein of Jordan and Egyptian President Mubarak is to convince the USA that 
they should abandon the policy of wait-and-see in the Middle East. Most likely the 
Reagan administration will consider their arguments and call to do so and will be 
ready to resume the diplomatic shuttle 
service at an “Arab request” even this year, if proper “guarantees” can be secured. 
In this case Iraq would also be involved in the negotiations under the pretext of 
examining the ways of resolving the Iraqi-Iranian conflict. 
 
 
 
Zoltán Pereszlényi  
ambassador 
 
 145 
Translated by: András Bocz 
Source: MOL, M-KS-288 f. 32. - 31. ő. e. - 1985 
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Baghdad, 17 April 1985. Subject: American and Iraqi views 
 
on the Iraqi-American relations 
 
 
The restoration of diplomatic relations between Iraq and the United States in 
November 1984 has brought abut much smaller changes in the relations of the two 
countries than what was expected. Even some Western diplomats have expressed 
their surprise at how cautious the United States is when it comes to the 
development of relations with Iraq. So far we have not seen any significant 
rapprochement between the two countries that was predicted by many at the end of 
1984. It has to be added that it is mainly due to the rather passive attitude of the 
American side, for Iraq is ready to broaden her relations both in a political and an 
economic sense. 
 
 
According to an American diplomat the relations between the two countries 
develop at a normal pace. The American party is content with the present situation 
and does not wish to establish a closer relationship with Iraq. For the time being 
Iraq does not play a prominent role in the Middle Eastern policy of the United 
States. It is still Egypt, Jordan and Syria that enjoy a key role in the region. The 
main reason for this is that the US continues to be interested in a protracted conflict 
between Iraq and Iran within the existing framework. Although the developments of 
the war that occurred in March may be a warning, the American position is that the 
conflict is more unlikely to spread over to other countries today than it was at the 
beginning of 1984 when Iraq subjected the region of the Iranian Kherg Island to an 
air blockade. 
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The USA pursues a policy of wait-and-see in the issue of the war and it is 
obvious that they can keep a close tab on any actions and preparations of the two 
parties by means of their AVACS system operating in Saudi Arabia. In this respect 
the American view is quite similar to the Soviet position according to which neither 
of the two parties is in the position to be able to put an end to the war my military 
means. 
 
 
Another part of this wait-and-see policy is that USA has not appointed its 
ambassador to Iraq since the restoration of diplomatic relations in 1984. According 
to an American diplomat the reason for this delay is only formal (a lengthy process 
of approval, etc.). He also added that there were many other places more 
significant than Iraq where the post of the ambassador was yet to be filled. 
 
 
In the present situation the USA does not wish to commit herself to Iraq 
more than necessary. The postponement of appointing the ambassador 
demonstrates that although Iraq, not long ago qualified as a “supporter of 
terrorism”, is regarded as more moderate now by the USA, the president of the 
country, Saddam Hussein is not likely to receive much support. 
 
 
 
This is even more likely in a situation when the USA can see that the internal Iraqi 
opposition has become active (they are responsible for some of the explosions), and 
the renewal of the war and its protraction may jeopardize the fate of Saddam 
Hussein. From another aspect Iran will continue to be a more important relation for 
the USA, and if circumstances develop in the desired way, the USA will be ready to 
normalize its relations with Iran and regain its influence on her. 
 
 
 
As a response to delaying the appointment of the American ambassador 
Iraq finally appointed a former chargé d’affaires, Nazar Hamdoun ambassador to 
the USA instead of Ismat Kittani (deputy minister of foreign affairs). (He 
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presented his credential to President Reagan on 6 March.) It has to be added that 
Kittani was ready to head the Iraqi embassy as early as December. 
 
 
Iraq has made rather neutral statements on the Iraqi-American relations. 
However, it is obvious that they are quite dissatisfied with the passive attitude of 
the USA, as a result of which Iraq has not received the requested loan and the 
negotiations on favorable trade relations have not proved successful either. The 
already rather moderate American political support for Iraq has further diminished 
in the past few weeks, and Iraq was especially hard hit by the American position 
expressed at the meeting between Tariq Aziz and foreign secretary Schultz on 25 
March when the USA raised the issue of condemning the use of chemical weapons 
in general. It is worth noting here that the Iraqi press sharply criticizes the 
American foreign policy in general as well as in relation to the war, while it speaks 
very highly of Soviet-Iraqi relations. This is demonstrated by celebrating the 13
th 
anniversary of signing the Soviet-Iraqi agreement of friendship and cooperation. A 
meeting organized by the Iraqi- Soviet Friendship Society was attended by two 
Iraqi ministers, and it was the first time that Iraq spoke publicly about a Soviet-Iraqi 
military cooperation. 
 
Zoltán Pereszlényi ambassador 
 
 
Translated by: András Bocz 
Source: MOL, M-KS-288 f. 32. - 31. ő. e. -1985 
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Report of the Hungarian Embassy in Iraq on the negative impact of 
the war on the Iraqi domestic situation in 1986 
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Baghdad, 24 April 1986.  
Subject: the negative impact of the war on 
 
the Iraqi domestic situation 
 
 
 
 The Iraqi leadership and the majority of the population had high hopes for the 
year of 1986 and expected that things would change for the better in the country. 
These hopes were apparently based on hard work done in the previous period of 
time, the relative stabilization of the economic situation, significant improvements in 
oil exports and a temporary standstill at the frontline. The belief in better economic 
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results is reflected in economic plans and several euphoric popular festivities. 
 
However, the events at the beginning of the first three months of the new 
year proved all these high hopes wrong in every respect: 
 
 
- The Iranian offensive that had been postponed several times was finally 
launched on 9 February and the Iranian troops crossed the middle section of 
Shatt-al-Arab, a move that had been considered impossible thus far. They took 
the city of Al-Fao and now many troops are stationed in Iraqi territory; 
 
 
- The steep decline of oil prices crushed any hopes for increasing state 
revenues and any significant returns for the costs and work invested in 
building new oil pipelines; 
 
 
- The decline of the exchange rate of the US dollar further decreased the solvency of 
Iraq; 
 
 
 
- Iraq had not received the requested political and financial support from 
the broad international community in her fight against the aggression of 
Iran. 
 
 
The negative impact of these developments strengthened one another 
and created rather depressive conditions in Iraq’s domestic situation. They 
made the latently present tensions even more acute and started erosion in the 
political elite and the society that may have severe consequences even in the 
short term. 
 
1. The most important consequence is that unity between the three major 
forces of power, the Baath Party, the army and other armed forces and the president 
was broken. The army is unwilling to assume responsibility for the failures at Al-
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Fao, and there are many voices now openly mentioning the role of the president and 
his immediate environment in this failure. Military leaders eager to fight demand 
that they should be given a free hand in eliminating the consequences of this failure 
that had destroyed their prestige, and insist that 
they should be given everything necessary to drive the Iranian troops out of Iraqi 
land. 
 
 
 
However, the president – as shown by his statements – clearly sees that the 
liberation of Al-Fao would require severe human and material sacrifices that Iraq 
cannot take now, or if it did, the country would become an easy prey to another 
Iranian assault. Incidentally, Iran has already prepared for such a grand offensive 
and deployed some 550-600 thousand troops in 
the region of Ahvaz. 
 
 
 
Thus, the president is forced to resolve two problems, since he cannot take 
the risk of openly opposing the military leadership: on the one hand he has to sell 
the present situation to the military and civil public and on the other he has to do 
that in a way that he can get out of this situation stronger than ever and consolidate 
his system internally. 
 
 
As in many other critical situations before, the president tries to push the 
party into the foreground and enforce his own ideas through party resolutions. He 
sets the party as an entity above any state institution against the military and the 
disillusioned people and cleverly avoids any direct clashes with those that he will 
need to rely on in the future. In the spirit of this tactics Saddam Hussein has 
withdrawn into the background in the past few weeks and hardly ever appears in 
public. This was especially striking when the key role on the anniversary of the 
Baath Party held in April was given to Michel Aflak, the old founding father of the 
party. 
 
 152 
 
Many Iraqis and members of the DT [diplomatic corps in Baghdad?]  
explain the withdrawal of the president by saying that the presidential authority has 
been undermined and some elements are forcing their way forward under the aegis 
of the party that are even ready to remove the president in the interest of saving the 
system. No doubt there are such forces present in Iraq now and they may as well 
have their chance if the situation further deteriorates. 
 
 
However, the reality of the balance of forces suggests that this is still a slim 
chance, and what is taking place now is nothing but the enforcement of the 
president’s will, only in an indirect form. This view is justified by news that the 
military leaders responsible for the events in the south have been relieved, 
transferred to some other posts or even executed and rumor has it that even the 
chief of the Security Service has been removed. First deputy Prime Minister T. Y. 
Ramadan, who has been mentioned as a real alternative to Saddam Hussein, is 
gradually “relieved” all of his functions, and more recently his powers in economic 
matters and management have also been placed under presidential control. 
 
 
Discipline has been severely tightened in the state and party apparatus and 
the armed forces, and for security reasons measures have been introduced to 
restrict free movement of the civilian population. In the Shi’ite capital, Kerbala 
there was a minor uprising a few days ago, and several signs appeared that 
criticized the president. The security forces did not hesitate for a moment to crack 
down on and disperse the demonstrators by brutal force and the use of fire-arms. 
 
 
Some hitherto unprecedented events similar to what happened in Kerbala 
demonstrate that the activity of anti-war forces that blame the regime has increased 
considerably under the surface. Thus, some rumors have been spread that that the 
president and his family has made significant illegal profits from revenues deriving 
from mandatory delivery of gold, horse- racing and lottery tickets. The direct 
dangers of these phenomena should not be overestimated, but they still can have an 
unfavorable impact on the mood of the population simply by the fact that they are 
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raised openly. 
 
 
The complexity of social reality in Iraq is also shown by some legends 
being revived among extremist Shi’ites, one of which is a story that the last Shi’ite 
imam who disappeared several hundred years ago will so return and restore the 
power of the Muslim church by expelling the ungodly Baathists. What is important 
in such rumors is not their content but the mere fact that they can surface in the 
country with a definite sharp tone against Saddam Hussein and his system. 
 
2. The mood of the people was further deteriorated by the economic and 
financial measures that were taken in the 18 March meeting of the government 
(see a special report on this meeting) and which severely affect supplies for the 
population for the first time during the five and a half years of the war against Iran. 
The import of luxury goods will be stopped, the selection of goods will be severely 
reduced, savings of the population will be curtailed and social investments will be 
stopped. 
 
 
The amount of foreign currency that foreign guest workers can transfer 
abroad has been reduced to a minimum and those who do not have a permanent 
work contract are forced to leave the country. According to the Egyptian chargé 
d’affaires some 180-200 thousand Egyptian workers left the country in a few 
weeks. As a result several bakeries, stores and small plants were closed that 
severely affect supplies for the population and the shortage of labor force paralyzes 
the private sector and state construction. If  Egyptian citizens keeping the 
agriculture of Iraq alive also start leaving the country, vegetables that are so 
important for the Iraqi people will also disappear from the markets. 
 
 
Thus, the limitations on imports and the shortage of labor force in domestic 
production may lead to the deterioration of supplies for the people to an extent that 
may well exceed the tolerance level of the population, the fundamental base of 
support for the regime. We have some information now that there are some 
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problems in supplying the army as well. 
 
 
The negative influence of the restrictions that have been introduced 
partly under pressure and partly as a result of cautious foresight is by now 
obvious to the political leadership. In order to liven up the mood of the people 
some reserves are being put on the market, but a temporary improvement has 
also brought about a buying fever. People are rightly afraid that once the 
reserves are used up, shortages will continue unless imports are resumed. 
 
 
For the time being the masses believe that the problems have deepened 
because of the war enforced on them by Iran, and there are very few who can see 
the mistakes committed by their leaders. Thus, despite growing fatigue and apathy 
the system with its propaganda can still maintain a national union against Iran and 
the appearance of unity. 
 
 
3. The political leadership intends to heal the wounds inflicted upon the self-
esteem and the feeling of security of the nation after the seize of Al-Fao by 
overstating the successes of the political and military leaders in other fronts, saying 
that Al-Fao will became “the cemetery of the Iranian aggressors and the graveyards 
will be left open by the Iraqi army until Iranians march into them themselves.” 
These words appear to be mere flowers of rhetoric, but it would be a mistake to let 
temporary Iranian successes in the south distort the real balance of forces between 
the two sides. Iran has clearly won a battle, but the war continues and the balance of 
power has not changed. Although the seize of Al-Fao has brought about a 
qualitative change in one section of the frontline, its importance is of a political  
rather than a military nature in that political fight in this phase of the war becomes 
critical on the Iraqi side. This is quite close to what Iran has been trying to achieve 
by protracting the war as much as possible. 
 
 
With some of our friendly ambassadors we believe that Iraq’s defensive 
capabilities are still quite good, and the multiple-stage defensive system at 
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important sections of the frontline, the high quality technology of the army, Iraq’s 
advantage over Iran in air forces and heavy arms and the almost unlimited military 
supplies all ensure that the country can properly defend herself. Most of the 
attention now should be devoted to keeping up the morale and discipline of the 
people, and the policy conducted in the hinterland may have a strong influence on 
these endeavors. 
 
 
The Iraqi leadership and Saddam Hussein first have to win a domestic 
battle, while making sure that the present situation at the fronts, which can by 
no means be called bad, should not worsen significantly. 
 
 
One of the components of the internal fight, we believe, is stirring the 
nationalist emotions of the masses and organizing demonstrations of taking sides 
with the president. March was the month of celebrating the anniversary of the 
Baath Party, while April passed in the spirit of events and ceremonies preparing for 
the birthday of the president. At the same time the “material-battle”, the increase of 
production and the decrease of consumption, continues to be fought in the country. 
It is premature to draw conclusions on the basis of a relatively short period of time, 
but the first results seem to suggest that Saddam Hussein will again manage to 
overcome the difficulties and consolidate his power behind the bastion of the party. 
However, the most he can achieve in the long run is to delay the tendencies that are 
bound to jeopardize his presidency and regime. The time factor is gaining more 
and more importance and events can be accelerated inside Iraq too if Iran launches 
a successful offensive in the middle and southern sections of the frontline. 
Presumably the offensive will take place on or soon after 28 April the birthday of 
Saddam Hussein. It is Iran that can take the initiative now. 
 
 
 
 
Zoltán Pereszlényi 
 
Ambassador 
 
 156 
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Subject: The Situation of the 
Military Conflict between Iraq and 
Iran, expected developments 
 
 
At the end of 1986 and at the beginning1987, the burdens of the war that turned to 
its 7
th 
year has further worsened the economic life in the Republic of Iraq and the 
occupation of  Fao in February this year led to both military and internal political 
convulsions. Ending  the war early and reducing the negative effects were 
invariably in the focus of Iraq’s foreign and internal political efforts. 
 
 
1./ Over the last year, a relative balance remained in the military power relations of 
Iraq and Iran, that on Iraq’s part was based on the technical supremacy of its land 
and air forces and bigger fire-power, while on the Iranian side, the supremacy was 
based on the existing surplus of human power, fighting spirit and the opportunity 
for initiation. 
 
 
There have been remarkable changes in some elements of the military situation 
recently: 
 
a./ - Both parties’ economic potential has further weakened, especially in the case 
of Iraq, it has happened at a faster speed, directly influencing some military 
directives; 
-Iran’s military power is growing faster as compared to Iraq, while Iraq’s technical 
superiority is gradually reducing; 
-the strategic initiation is still in the hands of Iran and it uses the opportunities 
increasingly better. 
b./ The Iranian troops broke through Shat-el-Arab on 9 February, having 
occupied and holding  el-Fadt, one of Iraq’s strategically important naval 
exit up to this date. 
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The Iranian success indicates  the beginning of qualitative changes, both in military 
and political terms. The war on land has reached to the immediate neighborhood of 
the Gulf- countries, shaking the faith in the firmness of Iraq’s defense, damaging 
the reputation of the Iraqi army and may cause internal political convulsion. /See 
my top secret report No.  34/86 / It has brought forward the potential and the 
danger that Iran would create the core of an Islamic Republic of Iraq based on  
emigrant  and internal opposition forces, thereby tearing off the country’s southern, 
vital area. The loss of  Fao partly supports the presumption articulated already last 
year, that in case the war would drag on, Iran would be capable of deciding the 
outcome of the conflict even by military means. 
 
 
-Iraq’s attempts to liberate the Fao-triangle have failed. To counterbalance it, a 
series of minor attacks have been launched on the full line of the front, and the city 
of Mehran  has been occupied. The tactic of “active defense” has been announced, 
increasing the air-strikes against the Iranian hinterland. However, these steps could 
not counter-balance the loss of  Fao, 
neither politically, nor militarily. 
 
 
 
-The military tension has stabilized on a level higher than previously, with better 
Iranian conditions, that can mean a point of departure for a new series of Iranian 
military successes. 
 
 
c./ Characteristics of the current situation: 
 
-Both parties endeavour to keep the military positions reached earlier and show 
activity on the full front line, but neither of them risks carrying out doubtful, 
bigger attacks. 
 
 
-Both parties have been searching for the options of delaying an economic-
financial collapse, in the form of grants, credits, respite, political bargain, etc. 
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-Active Iraqi offensives basically serve internal political interests, in connection 
with the Fao- failure. Earlier Iraq did not have the economic and military potentials 
and means for 
launching a decisive strike, either. Due to the drop in oil prices and the increase in 
economic problems, the current campaign also will run out of steam soon. 
 
 
-This way, while Iran continues the preparation for another large-scale attack, Iraq’s 
main task is to make the counter measures: redeployment of forces in the expected 
main direction of attack, accelerated conscription and training, replacement of 
weaponry and  increasing the productivity of domestic war industry. 
Iran is expected not to stop the actions, similar to the one in Fao, executed at a 
properly selected time and location, the  success of which can be directly measured 
by the influence it has on Iraq’s internal political and economic situation and which  
bring Iran to its final aim, to making the Iraqi regime shatter and  possibly causing 
the collapse of it. Iraq continues the bombing of Iranian oil, industrial and military 
objects, concentration districts and supply 
lines. 
 
 
 
The military tension increases  from time to time, and  influenced by internal 
problems, Iraqi steps of provocative nature can be expected,  which might be 
followed by Iranian counter strikes. Tendencies refer to potential bigger fights in 
the Fall. 
 
 
These presuppositions are justified in recent developments. Iranian troops launched 
an offensive to liberate the border town of Mehran, occupied by Iraqi troops on 17 
May. Iraq was forced to announce in a military announcement Nr. 2278 on 2 July, 
that after a 2-day long, heavy fight, the Iraqi troops were withdrawn from the town 
of Mehran to the state border. 
 
 
However, the Iranian announcement dated 4 July reports that the Iranian troops 
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continued to penetrate 15 km deep into Iraqi territories in the area of Mehran. 
 
 
Before the battle of Mehran, Iran launched a missile attack on the area of Kirkuk – 
that were residential areas according to Iraqi information, -- that in reality  proved to 
be oil and gas processing objects 25 km south of the town. The Iraqi Foreign 
Minister immediately turned to the UN General Secretary with a letter calling 
attention to the danger of the renewal of a “war against towns” following the 
Iranian action. He asked for the UN’s intervention to stop the “Iranian aggressor”. 
 
 
In the meantime, the Iranian Army has launched small attacks with the purpose of 
reconnaissance on the southern part of the front, too. The situation is still tense in 
the area of Fao. The combat actions are supposed to be part of the preparation for 
a larger scale offensive. The situation can be especially dangerous in the Mehran 
area, being closer to Baghdad, in case the Iranians press further advance. 
 
 
2./ The Iraqi foreign policy steps to stop the war early, to have a political 
settlement have basically remained unsuccessful, achieving only some partial 
result. The expected support from the UN, from the great powers, and the non-
aligned countries lagged behind Iraqi demands, hardly going beyond a call for 
both parties to settle the conflict peacefully. The resolutions apply to both 
parties; they do not take up positions expressly on either Iraq’s, or Iran’s side. 
 
 
Iraq failed to achieve the declaration of the war as an Arab national defensive war. 
Although some material, economic and other assistance has been received 
especially from the Gulf nations, but Iraq is not satisfied with the political support. 
Syria and Libya are clearly backing Iran. Thus not even the Arab background is  
united and this effects  the bilateral relations  of Iraq with certain Arab countries, 
and similarly,  it creates an  obstacle for the convening of 
the long-awaited Arab Summit. 
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Due to all this , Iraq’s relations with the above-mentioned international 
organizations have significantly deteriorated  and the Iraqi propaganda regularly 
criticizes the role and impotence of the UN and the non-aligned movement . In the 
latter case the criticism reaches the Indian president acting as the chairman of the 
movement. 
 
 
Although Iraq is awkwardly careful to portray the relationship with its main 
financial supporters, the Gulf countries undisturbed, during private talks, the Iraqi 
officials do not deny their suspicion about the improving contacts between the Arab 
Gulf countries and Iran. 
 
 
-Iraqi diplomacy, as well as the Iraqi Army, have gradually lost their opportunities 
for initiation and it is doubtful if they can apply any new element in their activity, or 
whether they will be capable of changing their methods. The activity on behalf of 
Iraq will hardly be capable of achieving more either in the international 
organizations or in the bilateral relations. The other method applied by Iraq, 
conveying  different international conferences in Baghdad, hardly brought any 
tangible results and this kind of “people’s or mass-diplomacy” will be more likely 
used for propaganda purposes only. 
 
 
-In spite of the above-mentioned, the Iraqi leadership, in their external 
communications, stick to their optimism claiming that the war can be ended within 
a reasonable period of time. They consider the demolishing of the Iranian hinterland 
and creating internal political tension as the biggest means to achieve this aim. An 
element of this policy is the harboring of Mudshahidin Khalk’s leaders and the 
support provided for them and for other Iranian leaders in opposition. However, the 
Iraqi leadership do not give up the alternatives of diplomacy. In the current phase, 
trying to increasing Iran’s isolation, they concentrate on persuading the countries 
friendly to Iran to cut down their connections and on  trying to distance  her allies 
from Iran. The talks with Syria have raised some hopes, but according to our 
sources, the rapprochement has come to a deadlock during the initial phase. 
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Zoltán Pereszlényi 
 
Ambassador 
 
 
Translated by: Levente Gajdócsi 
Source: MOL, 288.f. 32/ 27. ő.e.-1986 
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R e p o r t 
on the consultation regarding the establishment of a working relationship between the 
Warsaw Treaty Organization and the Arab League 
(Prague, 27–28 April 1987) 
 
 On the basis of the minutes (point 13) of the session held by the Foreign 
Ministers’ Committee of the WTO on 25 March 1987 the heads of departments of the 
foreign ministries of the member states competent in Middle Eastern matters held a 
workshop in Prague on establishing permanent dialog between the WTO and the Arab 
League and on its form and content. 
Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Poland, Romania and Hungary sent head of departments, 
while the Soviet Union and the GDR sent deputy heads of departments to the meeting. 
The host country – which treated the meeting as a consultation forum for experts – did 
not initiate the elaboration of a document or a communiqué. 
 
[….]  
This is unprecedented in the practice of the WTO. If we do this in connection with the 
Arab League, it can easily extend to other regions as well in the future. He did not 
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agree with the Czechoslovakian proposal according to which the dialog would lead to 
creating new bodies within the WTO. He also said that the planned dialog with the 
Arab League would hurt other national interests of Romania and, for example, its 
relations with the Israeli State. 
 
III. 
 The workshop held in Prague suggested that it would be effective to make the 
Middle Eastern consultations a regular exchange of ideas which would facilitate the 
coordination of the foreign policy of the member states. The host party summarized 
the results of the workshop as follows: 
- The proposals submitted during the meeting should be further studied. 
- We should continue exchanging documents between the Arab League and the 
WTO. We should stress the need for mutual agreement on this. 
- We should initiate consultations between the European socialist countries and 
the member states of the Arab League prior to the UN sessions. 
- The issue related to the authority of the WTO should be treated separately by 
experts. The topic could be readdressed at the Prague session of the 
Committee of Foreign Ministers. 
- The Czechoslovakian foreign minister intends to present a Czechoslovakian 
opinion to the Secretary-General of the Arab League upon his upcoming visit 
to Czechoslovakia claiming that multilateral relations as well as bilateral 
relations should be improved with the Arab League. 
 
IV. 
 During the unofficial talks the heads of the delegations informed one another 
of the timely issues related to the Middle East, the most important events that were to 
take place in bilateral relations and high-level visits. Almost all the speakers made 
mention of the increasing difficulties in economic cooperation with the Middle 
Eastern countries and the decline in trade. The Czechoslovakian party suggested that 
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the solutions should be sought after within the Comecon in order to counterbalance 
the difficulties. 
 
V. 
 Because of the Romanian attitude it was not possible to create a unified 
approach to the permanent dialog with the Arab League at the workshop. The 
Czechoslovakian idea to create permanent bodies for the dialog also proved 
unrealistic. 
 The participants of the meeting emphasized the importance of the bilateral and 
multilateral approach and their complementary nature. 
 The exchange of ideas on issues that affect the Middle East also proved to be 
useful. The Bulgarian party proposed that the next meeting of experts should be held 
in the fall of this year in the Bulgarian People’s Republic. 
 The Hungarian party explained the previously approved position (attached 
here). When summarizing the experiences, the Czechoslovakian party attached 
particular importance to the following comments that we made: 
- Until direct contact is established with the Arab League, the WTO member 
States should broaden cooperation with the specialized (economic and cultural 
organizations, agencies responsible for providing information, etc.) of the 
Arab League.  
- The organizational and other issues regarding the relations between the WTO 
and the Arab League should not burden the Committee of the Foreign 
Ministers; these issues should be addressed by experts for the time being. 
- Continuous dialog and the institutions required for it will incur extra costs. We 
need to prepare for it with due care because the Hungarian party cannot take 
extra burdens. 
Comment: The Czechoslovakian Ministry of Foreign Affairs will inform the WTO 
member states separately about on the discussion between the Czechoslovakian 
foreign minister and the Arab League. This information will also deal with how 
Secretary-General Klibi responded to Comrade Chnoupek’s initiative. Next, the 9th 
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Regional Department will submit a proposal on our approach in the future and the 
things we need to do. 
 
Budapest, 30 April 30 1987. 
    [illegible signature] 
 
Translated by András Bocz 
Source: MOL M-KS 288. F. 5/996. ő. e. 
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Subject: Recent developments of the Iraq-Iran war 
 
 
 
 
 
Comrade dr. Péter Várkonyi 
 
Minister of Foreign Affairs 
 
 
Budapest 
 
 
 
Recent developments of the war suggest that Iran’s superiority and military 
pressure on Iraq have grown. The weapons of the Iranian troops have improved 
and extended, due to the military equipment delivered during the American 
rapprochement-trial linked to McFarlane. 
 
Due to the Iranian troops’ gaining ground, Basra, Iraq’s second largest town seems 
to be in the front line, whose defense holds significant Iraqi forces with heavy 
casualties. Currently the offensive coded “Kerbala 10” is going on the northern 
part of the front, in the area of Suleimania. Here the Iranian troops have occupied 
not large but strategically important positions. By all means, the Iranian casualties, 
not disclosed, are bigger than Iraqi casualties, but the Iranian military leaders can 
replace them easier, even if the current ratio of compulsory mobilization reaches 
10% at the government institutions and mass organizations. 
 
Iran acts with increasing confidence and aggressiveness  in the Persian Gulf as 
well. The limits of her  naval “defense area” have been extended to 500 km. The 
naval traffic across the Straits of Hormuz is frequently checked by her navy. Iran 
stresses her  doctrine of the Straits on “security being either everyone’s or no one’s 
” with her  missiles allegedly constructed with Chinese cooperation, deployed in 
the area of the Straits and disturbing the naval traffic of the Arabcountries along the 
Gulf /air strikes against trading vessels/.   In other words, if Iraqi planes are 
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attacking the Iranian oil transportation lines, then Iran claims the right to launch a 
strike on the shipping of the countries in the Gulf supporting Iraq. 
 
 
Iran continues to supply and send new units to the front line. Today the units called 
pazdar, that is the Islamic Revolutionary Guard, play the main role. /Volunteers, 
that are independent from the army, committed to ideals of the Islamic Revolution, 
supplied with highly developed technical equipment /. In May, the reorganization 
of the army and the promotion of many field officers to generals were announced. 
 
 
 
In Tehran diplomatic circles there exists an opinion, claiming that with the full 
mobilization of its resources, although at the price of high casualties, Iran would be 
capable of occupying Basra, or even the whole territory of Iraq troubled with 
internal problems. However, in the question of the decisive attack, it plays an 
important role that other  Arab countries, even Libya and supposedly Syria as well, 
would object such a maneuver, namely the occupation of an Arab country, apart 
from the  international repercussions  following such a move and from the reactions  
of the great powers with interests in the area. Consequently Iran is waiting for such 
a situation to come, when in the climate of discontent, due to protracted war, the 
internal forces opposing Saddam – following the increased pressure by Iran – 
would overthrow the Iraqi president and its regime. Thereby creating the potential 
for forming a government friendly towards Iran. Consequently, the Iranian army 
would only give the events a push and with its strike, it would speed up the 
dissolution of the Iraqi army, Saddam’s main support. 
 
In Iranian judgments, the development of such a situation is simply a matter of 
time and it seems to be imminent. In the meantime, Iran  tries to wear out Iraq’s 
military power and the tolerance of the Iraqi people tired of war by ever renewing 
tactical but heavy attacks. In this war an increasing support is provided to Iran by 
the sabotage and guerilla actions of the Iraqi groups in opposition, primarily the 
Kurds. 
 
 
 169 
In the issue of war, similar to every other issue in Iran’s foreign and domestic 
policy, difference of opinion among the theoreticians and members of the 
executive branch of the Iranian Islamic revolution and a conflict within groups 
of the leadership is evident. There exists a view that the revolution’s best cadres 
should  not be sacrificed in the Iraqi war and that the countries reserves should 
not be exhausted as these are and will be necessary to build up the country and 
to extend the revolution in the Islamic world in perspective. 
 
 
In my view the polarization of the Iranian society in the issue of war has deepened. 
The increasing open activity of the “opposition” – the group of Bazargan – seems to 
be a controversial phenomenon of the social reality in Iran resulting in several – of 
course, small scale --  - recent anti-war marches in Tehran. These demonstrations – 
unlike the previous ones – were not broken up by the authorities, but were protected 
by the Islamic Guards and the internal security forces. The authorities seem not only 
to tolerate but to use these moderate demonstrations to test reception of slogans, 
such as Saddam Hussein should be pardoned. Within the top leadership a new 
endeavor seems to reveal itself increasingly, namely when Iran’s military 
superiority is becoming evident, in spite of the still existing internal problems, a 
negotiated settlement based on the best conditions should  be arranged with Iraq. 
/This was the reason why such views could be articulated that Koran makes 
forgiveness possible./ The persons and groups  advocating such views think that 
only the imam can give such a forgiveness and his words are accepted by the 
masses. If the imam dies without giving the forgivingness, then the war has to be 
carried on, according to the last will of the highest ranking  religious leader. This 
group is aware that war was an important element for cohesion and fostered the 
internal consolidation following the revolution. However, the problems caused by 
the war going on for 7 years are now producing counter effects, weakening the 
power of the leadership to influence  the masses. The mass base of the regime is not 
influenced by the war yet, but the increasing discontent and disappointment is 
inevitable. /This was visible during the air bombing -- of  towns in January-
February./ Nevertheless, certain conflicts of interest cannot be disclosed either 
concerning economic and cadre issues on the basis of which groups makes how 
much money or how its influence will develop in case of peace or a continuing war. 
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Out of the other, and in my opinion the decisive part of the leadership, imam 
Homeini, chief judge Ardebili, President Hamenei are supporters of the war with 
the realization of the well known conditions: until the “punishment” of the 
Saddam Hussein and the Baathist regime. 
 
 
This situation was closed –in my view –by chief judge Ardebili’s speech of 15 May 
on a Friday prayer in Tehran stating that the main goal cannot be a matter of 
negotiation according to the interest of individuals or groups. 
 
 
The military situation is still unpredictable. Latest information /in accordance with 
the information from Baghdad/ suggest that Iran is preparing another grand scale 
offensive. The level of troop concentration is high, dozens of new battalions sent to 
the front line. It is uncertain, how Iraq can react to the new Iranian offensive 
following the increasing pressure of the internal problems – according to local 
information these have been  an unsuccessful conspiracy against Saddam Hussein 
and the Kurdish rebellion. The most recent Iraqi air strikes against Isfahan and 
Tabriz project the potential of the renewal of the Iraqi air strikes against towns as 
the most efficient means of retaliation so far. 
 
 
The struggle continues over the issue of chemical weapons both on the front lines 
and in the international organizations. In this respect there is no new development, 
although the Iranian party wanted to portray the UN Security Council’s resolution 
as an obvious, exclusive condemnation of Iraq. 
 
 
Currently the Iranian position, being firm in the issue of war is intended to be based 
on  that the two superpowers object to the continuation of the war and want to put a 
pressure on Iran. Consequently, the continuation of the war would mean an 
expression of the opposition to the superpowers and by this, the Islamic revolution 
would grow to be a decisive factor in  world politics, along with the two leading 
powers. The Iranian leaders have condemned Murphy’s talks in the Middle East in 
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the same spirit. Petrovski, Soviet deputy foreign minister’s talks in the Middle East 
and the Soviet Union’s initiatives for an earliest ending of the war  have also been 
condemned. The Iranian party wants to give the impression that the Soviet Union, 
with the renewal of the agreement of friendship and with her  initiatives has fallen 
in the trap of American policy and got on the same platform with them.  This 
Iranian behavior has resulted in a significant and sudden cooling down and 
increasing tensions in the Soviet-Iranian relationship. The strong protest on behalf 
of the Soviet Embassy in Tehran against the attack against the Soviet tanker is part 
of the same problem.  The Iranian party is known to objecting the Soviet lease of 
tankers to Kuwait and to the appearance of Soviet warships in the Gulf. 
The essence of the Iranian behavior can be summarized as it tries to undermine  
the Gulf- states’ anti-war attitude and looks for the right occasion to launch the 
necessary – political, economic, or even military- strike on them. With reference to 
the Soviet Union, a view, officially not publicized yet,  exists about that  Iran 
could get into pincers with significant Soviet troops  stationing  on the northern 
borders, and Soviet warships appearing in the Gulf. 
 
 
I will report on the further development of the war as necessary. 
 
 
(dr. Zsigmond Kázmér) 
Ambassador 
 
 
 
Translated by: Levente Gajdócsi 
Source: MOL, 288.f. 32/1987 
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Document 33 
Report of the Hungarian Embassy in Iraq on the characteristics of the 
activity of the opposition forces in Iraq and the reaction of the Iraqi 
leadership  
(4 October 1987) 
 
 
 
 
 
To comrade [Foreign Minister] Dr. Péter Várkonyi 
 
Minister of Foreign Affairs 
 
Budapest 
002698/1 
77/ strictly conf. 1987 
 
 
Made in:  
4 copies Center:  
3 copies Embassy:  
1 copy Referent:  
Károly Peimli 
 
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL! 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Baghdad, 4 October 1987. Subject: On the 
continuing activity of the Iraqi opposition forces 
 
and the reaction of the Iraqi leadership 
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The permanently oppressed social and political tensions, worsened by a protracting 
war, gradually radicalize those groups and layers of society that are interested in 
bringing problems to the surface and resolving them, reflected especially by the 
activities of some 
significant opposition forces. 
 
 
The process of radicalization is not rapid, and various different, often 
opposing interests are involved. Opposition forces identified before continue to 
play a dominant role, but as compared to the previous period of time there are 
clear differences. 
 
 
After conciliatory negotiations held in December, 1986 in Tehran the 
activity of highly organized regular forces has come into the limelight in the 
Kurdish opposition movement. The regular forces of the Kurdish Democratic 
Party, estimated at around 15 thousand troops, continuously participate in 
Iranian offensives, thereby causing a lot of difficulties to the Iraqi leadership. 
 
 
They participated in three significant offensives between July and 
September in the area of Suleimania, and according to unconfirmed news they 
destroyed 5 Iraqi battle- helicopters and captured some 600 Iraqi soldiers. 
 
 
The primary reason for the regular Kurdish forces becoming more active in 
the war is that after the failure of earlier negotiations the Iraqi leadership decided 
to pursue a policy of strong hand in order to settle the Kurdish issue in the 
hinterland in this way. 
 
 
The reintroduction of the policy of strong hand is closely related to the 
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appointment of Hussein Madjid who replaced Izzat Ibrahim this spring in the 
position of Baath party secretary responsible for the Kurdish Autonomous 
Territories. According to the spokesman of the Kurdish Democratic Party Iraqi 
troops destroyed some 900 Kurdish villages during the period in question after 
having deported app. 70 thousand people to provinces to the south. The campaign 
claimed at least 110 thousand lives; most of them were Kurdish peasants. 
As a consequence it is quite understandable that the relatively high number 
of Kurds fleeing from death and deportation made it possible to bring regular 
Kurdish forces up to the strength mentioned above. 
 
 
 
These changes, however, did not mean that smaller commando units stopped 
raiding individuals and smaller Iraqi facilities. We have been informed recently that 
small commando units assaulted primarily representatives of the central 
government and party functionaries in the Erbil, Suleimania and Dohuk regions, or 
more recently even in Mosul. With one exception, when they raided and plundered 
a Yugoslavian camp, all the assaults were of a political character. 
 
 
Another similar raid took place in the middle of August at the main road 
leading out of Mosul to the south, claiming the life of four Iraqi university 
professors. The professors had visited their students in a training camp and were on 
their way back to Baghdad when they got killed in the raid. 
 
 
We think it is important to note here that despite recurrent rumors the 
terrorist actions committed in the capital should not be attributed to Kurdish 
opposition forces. Since the Kurdish movement is quite divided, there may well be 
some exceptions, but sources friendly to the Kurds also confirm that such actions 
are against the political objectives of determinant forces of the Kurdish movement. 
 
 
In the view of many observers the main obstacle to a more active and 
marked presence of the Shi’ite opposition is that the majority of Arab Shi’ites in 
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Iraq do not follow the line represented by the name of Khomeini, and therefore they 
will first have to fight it out with their own religious leaders. Under the leadership 
of Saddam Hussein the Iraqi government has made serious efforts to convince the 
Shi’ites in the country that the goal of Khomeini’s Iran is to break the Arab Shi’ites, 
undermine their independence and annex Iraq, relegating it to a mere province of 
Khomeini’s “Persian Empire.” 
 
 
As a consequence of the rivalry for power between Nadjaf and Kum, smartly 
exploited by the Iraqi leadership to its own advantage, Shi’ite tribal leaders can now 
be found in secular posts all over the Iraqi system, ranging from the Baath Party to 
public administration (mostly in their own tribal territories) and the army. 
 
 
 
Nevertheless, the name of the traditional illegal organization of the Shi’ite 
opposition movement, Dawa, which has weakened considerably in the past few 
years, keeps coming up in Iraqi circles. They have recently been mentioned as 
instigators of terrorist attacks committed at night in Baghdad and raids on leaders 
of the Baath Party around Nadjaf, Kerbala, Samava and Nassiria. The regions 
where the actions were committed (outskirts of Baghdad, e.g. Saddam City) and 
the selected targets (leaders of the Baath Party, regional party offices, and military 
buses) all suggest that the perpetrators were members of the radical wing of the 
Shi’ite opposition. In addition, the name of Dawa also appears on leaflets 
distributed by university students that make fun of the Baath leadership and 
especially the president. Their name was last mentioned in connection with the 
terrorist raid at the Kadissia meeting in Nakuba. The incident claimed 16 lives and 
several dozens of people were injured. 
 
 
The situation is made even more complex by the fact that the regime has 
to reckon with the latent strengthening of Iranian influence on the following 
two bases: 
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- On the one hand it is well-known that at present the number of Iraqi prisoners of 
war held in Iran is estimated at around 65-80 thousand. 
 
 
 
- On the other hand, since the July of this year we have received information on 
several occasions that large numbers of deserted soldiers concentrated in the 
regions of Samawa, Divania, Nadjaf and Karbala, and unlike earlier, when they 
wandered around as lonely wolves, they now form groups of several hundred to try 
to survive and are not above occasional raids and robbery either. In the last three 
months we have learned about 8-10 such incidents in which these groups raided 
and robbed buses, cars and worker’s camps. 
 
 
In July and August the army launched several offensives to try to eliminate these 
groups but because of the character of the ground in the region in question 
(swamp) and partly because many people of the population in the region support 
these groups, they apparently achieved only limited results, since these incidents 
still continue to occur. 
 
 
We cannot exclude the possibility that by resettling retrained and brainwashed Iraqi 
prisoners of war and winning the support of the deserters who live a hopeless and 
miserable life, the Shi'ite opposition will become stronger in the future, and such a 
development may have an influence on the future prospects of the Shi’ite 
movement against the present Iraqi leadership. Apparently the Iraqi leaders also 
reckon with this possibility, as demonstrated even to laymen by the various security 
measures that have been introduced recently. 
 
 
The presence of security forces is growing stronger in the central districts of 
Baghdad every day. Rules regulating the security of government offices and 
institutions become stricter as far as entry or the guarding of these institutions is 
concerned. The reconstruction of buildings for security purposes and new security 
installations mushroom in the city by bridges and flyovers. 
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In August we received information from several different sources that a large 
number of police forces were drafted in the army and deployed to the front. We 
have learned in connection with this measure that a riot broke out among the police 
forces in Samava that could only be crushed by a sizeable military and security 
force. Discipline and the increase of severity can be seen even among traffic 
policemen. There are roads in Baghdad where we can see very resolute and self-
confident police officers equipped with a walkie-talkie at every 20 or 30 meters. 
Unlike before, they are mostly of a higher rank and they check the identity of 
soldiers too. 
 
 
It is characteristic of the situation how efficiently and thoroughly the authorities 
had planned the supervision of members of artistic and scientific delegations 
attending the propagandistic “Babilon Festival.” They created a situation in which 
the guests were simply unable to take a single step without their designated Iraqi 
guides in Baghdad and especially when visiting the country. This obviously 
restricted the foreign guests to mix with the local people without the control of the 
authorities. Among the various security measures there is a decision that might turn 
out to be very important. According to an official statement a “national census” 
will be held on 17 October that will include foreign citizens too. We have 
submitted a separate report on this issue, so this time we only want to call attention 
to the new security measures that may affect the internal opposition, since the 
national census will also entail a curfew. 
 
 
As a brief summary, we can establish the following in connection with the events in 
which opposition forces may have played a role between July and September, 1987 
and the measures that were implemented or planned by the regime to counter these 
developments: 
 
 
- There is still no sign of any real attempt to form a unity between the main 
opposition forces 
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(Kurdish and Shi’ite) against the regime. 
 
- Kurdish opposition forces continue to be successful in their commando tactics, but 
there are clear signs of a more organized use of regular forces especially by the 
Kurdish Democratic Party in accord with Iranian offensives. It cannot be 
established with certainty yet how lasting the recent aspirations of different trends 
of the movement are going to be when it comes to political unity and joint action. 
- There are a growing number of Shi’ite opposition actions against the regime, 
but most of them are not very well-organized, and as a result they do not qualify 
as dangerous to the regime. 
- The Iraqi leadership has to focus mostly on the resolution of military issues 
arising from the activity of the Kurdish opposition, but at the same time they 
cannot ignore the dangers deriving from the growing number of deserters and Iraqi 
prisoners of war who serve as a natural base for the Shi’ite opposition movement. 
 
 
Finally, we think it is important to note that we continue to evaluate the situation 
from the point of view of the security of the Hungarian colony and our facilities. 
We utilize all the information and experience that we gather in this respect in our 
daily work and in the reports sent to the Center. 
 
 
 
Zoltán Pereszlényi  
ambassador 
  
 
Translated by: András Bocz 
Source: MOL, M-KS-288 f. 32. - 31. ő. e. - 1987 
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Document 34 
 
Report on Prime Minister Károly Grósz’s official visit to Iran between 25 
and 27 October 1988  
(31 October 1988) 
 
 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Top Secret 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Information 
 
On Comrade Károly Grósz’s official visit to the Iranian Islamic Republic 
 
 
 
 
 
At the  invitation of Prime Minister Mir Hossein Musavi Comrade Károly Grósz, in 
his position of Prime Minister, paid an official visit to the Iranian Islamic Republic 
between 25 and 27 October 1988. His visit was made in return to his Iranian 
partner’s visit to Budapest in 
1986. 
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Comrade Grósz was accompanied by Minister of Industry, Frigyes Berecz, the co-
chairman of the Hungarian-Iranian Joint Economic Committee, Deputy Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, Gábor Nagy, Deputy Minister of Commerce, Tibor Melega, co-
chairman of the Industrial Sub- Committee of the Joint Committee, Government 
Spokesman, György Marosán, Jr., Imre Székács, General Director of TESCO, and 
Zsigmond Kázmér, our ambassador accredited to Tehran. Comrade Grósz was 
accompanied  by many directors of interested Hungarian companies. 
 
 
Comrade Károly Grósz was received by  President of the Republic Seied Ali 
Hamenei and the 
 
President of the Legislative Body (Medzhlis), Hasemi Rafsandzhani. 
 
 
Comrade Grósz had talks with the Iranian prime minister  in the frame of a 
plenary session, private talks and a closing session. 
 
 
He received the heads of such ministries that have an interest in  bilateral 
relations: Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ali Akbar Velajati, Defense Minister 
Mohammed Dsalali, Minister of Agriculture and Regional Development, Issa 
Kalantari, the Iranian co-chairman of the Economic Joint Committee and Minister 
of Industry, Golamreza Safei. 
 
 
Members of the entourage , the experts and company directors conducted 
comprehensive talks on concrete issues concerning  bilateral cooperation with their 
Iranian counterparts. 
 
 
[Károly Grósz talked about Hungary’s position concerning international politics.] 
 
 
 
In order to guarantee the cease-fire, we participate in the activity of the UN 
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supervisory forces. He informed his counterparts of  our country’s position 
concerning the Persian Gulf, the conflict in the Middle East and Afghanistan. 
 
 
Mir Hossein Mussavi thanked our country for our  attitude towards  Iran during the 
years of war and  for our position supporting  Security Council Resolution No. 598 
and for our condemnation of the use of chemical weapons. He declared the Mid-
East a sensitive clashing point for  the great powers, where, besides the acute crisis 
situations in Lebanon and Israel, there have been further long-term problems, such 
as the Pakistani-Indian crisis and Afghanistan. The position of the Turkish 
government is ambiguous, as it tries to represent the interest of its people while it 
works simultaneously  as an arm of NATO. 
 
 
This was the environment for the Iranian Revolution that was declared being 
against her interests by the United States, due to the West’s dependency on oil. The 
roots of the Iraq-Iran war go back to there. The importance of the Persian Gulf is 
reflected in the fact, that -- apart from the Soviet Union --, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait 
and Iran have the largest oil reserves, and after 1990, the West’s dependency on the 
region’s oil will further increase. Mussavi noted 
 
that they did not have much expectation about the Middle East Peace 
Conference, as the Palestine people had been able to achieve any results by 
force only so far and the Israeli regime’s aggression was still going on. 
 
 
Foreign Minister Velajati informed Comrade Grósz that Iran was ready to 
continue the talks with Iraq at the request of the members of the Security Council 
to execute  Resolution No. 598 in full extent,  however, she  refuses every Iraqi 
attempts that would result in the revision of the Agreement of Algiers in 1975 
declaring the border between Iran and Iraq in writing. 
 
 
All three Iranian leaders,  Rafsandjani being the most precise, explained the Iranian 
position in connection with  Soviet-Iranian relations. They stressed that following 
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the victory of the Islamic revolution  huge opportunities opened up for the 
rapprochement and cooperation between the countries of the Eastern Bloc and Iran, 
in spite of ideological differences. Iran decided to improve the relations with them, 
launched an anti-imperialist policy and removed the American tapping stations 
[sic!]  set along the 2500 km-long Soviet-Iranian border. Due to this act, the USA 
did not ratify SALT-II Treaty as being unable to check the motion of Soviet 
missiles. Thus, due to the Islamic revolution an important loop in the imperialist 
chain encircling the Eastern Bloc was broken. 
 
 
However, Iran’s expectations with the countries of the Eastern Bloc – except for 
Hungary -- were not met. The Soviet leadership did not appreciate Iran’s anti-
imperialist policy and efforts to improve relations, instead they gave Iraq large 
scale support during the war, including the most sophisticated weapon systems. 
 
 
The Soviets’ decision on Afghanistan had an unfavorable effect on the bilateral 
relations as well. At the beginning of the Afghan crisis, Iran recommended finding a 
joint solution, but the Soviet Union did not show readiness for talks. Even today 
Iran is seriously affected by the existence of the problems caused by the 800 km-
long border and the 2 Million Afghan refugees staying on its territories. These can 
result in Iran’s involvement in the Afghan crisis, against its will. They could agree 
with the existence of a neutral and non-aligned Afghanistan, 
 
 
but they are pessimistic, because this goal, proposed originally cannot be fulfilled 
now, due to Afghan tribal and internal war. 
 
 
The relationship became worse by the Soviet Union’s mistrust towards Iran. 
The Soviet leaders did not support Iran’s proposals for improving  Soviet-
Iranian political-economic relations, there was no continuity of the positive 
statements in everyday life. 
 
 
 183 
The war and the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan is coming to an end and 
leaders of the Iranian Islamic Republic would like positive changes to take place in  
Soviet-Iranian relations simultaneously with the positive developments originating 
in Gorbachev’s policy. The Soviet Union and the countries of the Eastern Bloc 
should appreciate Iran’s anti-imperialist policy, her rejection of the Western 
proposals and her conduct of an independent policy, seriously influencing the 
geopolitical relations in the Persian Gulf. The Iranian leadership is prepared for a 
general settlement of the relations, for forming friendly and equal relations with the 
Soviet Union. The creation of mutual trust is the key to a long-term Soviet-Iranian 
relationship and currently it is in the hands of the Soviet Union. 
 
 
 
Comrade Grósz thanked for the Iranian leaders for their trust. He stressed that for 
him it seems that the Soviet-Iranian dialogue had not been developed   that could 
have cleared the misunderstandings in their relationship. The answer can be found 
at the currently ongoing restructuring in the Soviet Union that have forced the most 
pressing questions be reviewed, arresting the Soviet leaders’ time and energy. The 
Soviet Union, similarly to other socialist countries, is in the state  of seeking a way 
out and those who treat this situation with patience, will proceed properly. 
 
V. 
 
 
 
Comrade Grósz’s visit happened at a time, --although not on purpose -- when Iran 
has become more active towards  the outside world, endeavors to strengthen her 
positions and has started to work out her plans for reconstruction and development. 
The capitalist and socialist countries’ attention towards Iran has become lively, too. 
All these factors  justified the Prime 
 
Minister’s visit and have created good political and economic conditions for it. 
 
 
 
The visit was effective and useful. It has strengthened our positions in the Iranian 
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Islamic Republic under conditions of increasing competition and has increased the 
Iranian interest in building long-term and many-sided- especially economic- 
relations. Politically, the visit provided an occasion for  getting to know  each other 
better for both parties, what was useful as presently neither of us have sufficient 
and reliable knowledge of the other side. The visit has strengthened the Iranian 
leaders’ motivation for cooperation. Especially after the meeting with Haemi 
Rafsandjani, the most influential Iranian leader, the Iranian party’s more favorable 
attitude towards the strengthening of our relations became more perceptible. 
 
 
[…] 
 
 
 
Budapest, 31 October 1988 
 
 
Translated by: Levente Gajdócsi 
Source: MOL, 288. f. 32. /31 ő. e. -1988 
